

# **COST OF ELECTIONS IN THE ECOWAS REGION**

---

COUNTRY STUDY OF BENIN REPUBLIC,  
CAPE VERDE, GUINEA BISSAU, LIBERIA,  
NIGERIA & SENEGAL

Published by

**ECOWAS NETWORK OF ELECTORAL COMMISSIONS**

### **Consultants**

Professor Liasu Adele Jinadu  
Mr. Francis Adebola Laleye  
Mr. Jose Agnelo Sanches

### **Translation**

IEIBA Language Consulting Ltd

### **Design, Layout and Printing**

L'ESPOiR International Ltd.

### **Project Coordinator**

Mr. Raouf Salami

### **Financial Support**

Open Society Initiative for West Africa



© 2019 ECONEC - RESAO PUBLICATION

### **All rights reserved**

No portions of this book may be reproduced (either in part or whole) or transmitted in any form or by any means - graphic, electronic or mechanical including photocopying, recording, taping or information storage and retrieval system-without the prior permission from ECONEC-RESAO and acknowledgment of such use.

### **Published by**

ECONEC - RESAO  
INEC - TEI Building  
20th Street, Off Independence Avenue,  
Central Business District,  
Abuja-Nigeria.  
E-mail: [secretariat.econec@gmail.com](mailto:secretariat.econec@gmail.com)  
Website: [www.econec-resao.org](http://www.econec-resao.org)

 [econec\\_resao](https://www.facebook.com/econec_resao)     [@econec\\_resao](https://twitter.com/econec_resao)

## Table of Contents

Acronyms	
Acknowledgments	
Foreword	
Executive Summary	1
<b>Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
A. Background to the Study	1
B. Conceptual and Methodological Issues	5
C. Major Findings	9
D. Recommendations	22
<b>Country Study of Benin Republic</b>	<b>27</b>
A. Background	27
B. Structure, Power, Functions & Mandates of the EMB	28
C. Types and Sources of Funding	29
D. Variable Costs of Elections (i): Legislative Provisions/Overview	32
E. Variable Costs of Elections (ii): Sources, Processes and Factors	33
F. Variable Costs of Elections (iii): Main Election Budget/Analysis of Trends and Gaps	36
G. Variable Costs of Elections (iv): Opportunities and Challenges	38
H. Major Findings	40
I. Recommendations	41
J. Annexes	43
<b>Country Study of Cape Verde</b>	<b>47</b>
A. Introduction, Objectives and Methodology	47
B. Country Context	48
C. Structure, Power and Functions of the EMBs	49
D. Types and Sources of Funding	53
E. Variable Costs of Elections (i): Statutory Provisions/Overview	53
F. Variable Costs of Elections (ii): Sources, Procedures and Factors	55
G. Variable Costs of Elections (iii): Major Line Items in Election Budget/Trends and Capacity Analysis	56
H. Variable Costs of Elections (iv): Opportunities and Challenges	60
I. Major Findings	62
J. Recommendations	63
K. Annexes	64
<b>Country Study of Guinea Bissau</b>	<b>67</b>
A. Introduction, Objectives and Methodology	67
B. Country Context	68
C. Structure, Power and Functions of the EMBs	70



**COST OF ELECTIONS IN THE ECOWAS REGION**  
COUNTRY STUDY OF BENIN REPUBLIC, CAPE VERDE, GUINEA BISSAU,  
LIBERIA, NIGERIA & SENEGAL

D.	Types and Sources of Funding	71
E.	Variable Costs of Elections (i): Statutory Provisions/Overview	72
F.	Variable Costs of Elections (ii): Sources, Procedures and Factors	73
G.	Variable Costs of Elections (iii): Major Line Items in Election Budget/ Trends and Gaps	74
H.	Variable Costs of Elections (iv): Opportunities and Challenges	78
I.	Major Findings	80
J.	Recommendations	81
K.	Annexes	82
<b>Country Study of Liberia</b>		<b>85</b>
A.	Context: History, Culture and Political Economy	85
B.	Power, Function and Structure of the EMB	87
C.	Sources and Types of NEC's Funding	89
D.	The Election Budget: Preparation, Procurement Process and Bureaucratic Politics	92
E.	Election Budget: Major Line Items, Trends and Gaps	95
F.	Cost of Elections and the Future of Democracy & Elections in Liberia	100
G.	Recommendations	102
<b>Country Study of Nigeria</b>		<b>106</b>
A.	Context: History, and Political Economy	106
B.	Power, Function and Structure of the EMB	108
C.	Sources and Types of INEC's Funding	111
D.	The Election Budget: Preparation, Procurement Process and Bureaucratic Politics	115
E.	Approved Election Budget, Released Funds and Major Line Items, Trends and Gaps	117
F.	Cost of Elections and the Future of Democracy & Elections in Nigeria	126
G.	Recommendations	128
<b>Country Study of Senegal</b>		<b>131</b>
A.	Background	131
B.	Structure, Power, Functions & Mandates of the EMBs	131
C.	Types and Sources of Funding	133
D.	Variable Costs of Elections (i): Legislative Provisions/Overview	133
E.	Variable Costs of Elections (ii): Sources, Processes and Factors	136
F.	Variable Costs of Elections (iii): Key Items of the Election Budget/Analysis of Trends and Gaps	137
G.	Variable Costs of Elections (iv): Opportunities and Challenges	138
H.	Key Findings	141
I.	Recommendations	142
<b>Appendices</b>		<b>144</b>



## Boxes, Tables, Charts and Annexes

<b>Executive Summary</b>	<b>1</b>
Box I: Africa's Elections, 1996-2012	4
Box II: Challenges of election funding in Africa	20
Box III: Recommendations	22
Table I: General elections in the ECOWAS Region, 2005-April 2018	3
Table II: Study questions	7
Table III: Models of African EMBs	12
Table IV: Liberia's approved election budgets (2005, 2011 and 2017 General elections)	16
Table V: Main line items in Guinea Bissau's election budget (2009, 2012 and 2014)	18
<b>Country Study of Benin Republic</b>	<b>27</b>
Table 1: Cost of Benin's 2003 Communal and Legislative Elections	28
Table 2: Budget of CENA 2015 Legislative and 2016 Presidential Elections	36
Table 3: Trends in the cost of elections since 1996	37
Table 4: Summary of expenses incurred for 2011 Legislative and Presidential Elections	38
Annex 1: Financial report CENA 2011	43
Annex 2: Detailed budget for the 2007 Legislative Elections Support Project	44
Annex 3: Summary of budget forecasts and actual expenditures for the 2015 electoral process	45
Annex 4: Summary of budget forecasts and actual expenditures for the 2016 electoral process	46
<b>Country Study of Cabo Verde</b>	<b>47</b>
Table 1: Number of candidates per election cycle	48
Table 2: Expenses regarding police and security for elections	54
Table 3: Expenses on the media for elections coverage	54
Table 4: Budget template: Main line items	57
Table 5: Main line items of elections costs (2006, 2011 and 2016)	58
Table 6: Cost of Presidential and Legislative elections (2006, 2011 and 2016)	60
Table 7: Comparative table (1996, 2004, 2006 and 2011)	60
Chart 1: Cost of elections in Cabo Verde (2006, 2011 and 2016 Main budget lines)	59
Annex 1: Existing political parties in Cabo Verde	64
Annex 2: Detailed budget for Legislative and Presidential elections (2006, 2011 and 2016)	65
<b>Country Study of Guinea Bissau</b>	<b>67</b>
Table 1: Number of candidates per election cycle	69
Table 2: Main line items of elections costs in Guinea Bissau (2009, 2012 and 2014)	76
Table 3: Costs per voter for Legislative and Presidential elections (2009, 2012 and 2014)	77
Table 4: Comparative table: Cost of elections in Guinea Bissau, Cabo Verde, Spain and Burkina Faso	78
Chart 1: Guinea Bissau: Main budget lines for elections cost (2009, 2012 and 2014)	77
Annex 1: Existing political parties in Guinea Bissau	82
Annex 2: Detailed budget for Legislative and Presidential elections (2009, 2012 and 2014)	.83

<b>Country Study of Liberia</b>	<b>85</b>
Box I: Elections in Liberia 1840-2017	85
Box II: Power and Duties of NEC	87
Table I: Liberia's approved election budgets (2005, 2011 and 2017 General Elections)	95
Table IA: Trends in registration and election cost (2005, 2011 and 2017 General Elections)	96
Table IB: Summary of registered voters (2005, 2011 and 2017 General Elections)	97
Table II: Comparative cost of election per voter in Liberia and selected African Countries	98
Table III: Disaggregated election cost (2011 and 2017 General Elections)	99
<b>Country Study of Nigeria</b>	<b>106</b>
Box I: Elections in Nigeria 1923-2015	107
Box II: Nigeria's history of dual system of electoral bodies at federal and state levels	109
Box III: Power of INEC	110
Box IV: Establishment of the INEC fund	112
Table I: Summary of support from selected development partners for 2011 General Elections	113
Table II: Development partners funding for the 2015 General Elections	114
Table III: Approved election budget 2011 and 2015 General Elections	117
Table IV: Line items in INEC election budget for the 2011 General Elections	118
Table V: Line items in INEC election budget for the 2015 General Elections	120
Table VI: Comparative cost of election per voter in Nigeria and selected African countries	121
Table VII: 3 Top ranking items by cost (2011 General Elections)	122
Table VIIA: Cost of related items for employment of ad hoc staff - 2011 General Elections	122
Table VIII: 3 Top ranking items by cost (2015 General Elections)	123
Table VIIIA: Cost of related items for employment of ad hoc staff - 2015 General Elections	123
Table IX: Comparative cost of similar line items -2011 & 2015 Election budgets	124
Table X: Trends/changes in the cost of selected line items in 2011 & 2015 Election budgets: increase	125
Table XI: Trends/changes in the cost of selected line items in 2011 & 2015 Election budgets: decrease	125
Table XII: Nigeria's 2015 and 2019 General Elections in comparative perspective	127
<b>Country Study of Senegal</b>	<b>131</b>
Table 1: Distribution of election budget among stakeholders	134
Table 2: Details on electoral expenditures	137
Table 3: Summary of budget estimates and expenses for the 2017 Parliamentary elections	140
Table 4: Trends in the cost of elections for DGE in Senegal (last three elections)	140

## Acronyms

AFIS: Auto Finger-print Identification System	DGE: Direction Générale des Elections
AGR: African Governance Report	ECES: European Centre for Electoral Support
APRM: African Peer Review Mechanism	ECONEC: ECOWAS Network of Electoral Commissions
AU: African Union	ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States
CENA: Commission Electorale Nationale Autonome	EMBs: Election Management Bodies
CENI: Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante	ERC: Electoral Reform Committee
CIDA: Canadian International Development Agency	EU: European Union
CNE: Comissão Nacional de Eleições	FCT: Federal Capital Territory
CNRA: Conseil National de Régulation de l'Audiovisuel	GDP: Gross Domestic Product
COS-LEPI: Conseil d'Orientation et de Supervision de la Liste Electorale Permanente Informatisée	GTAPE: Gabinete Técnico de Apoio ao Processo Eleitoral
CPLP: Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa	HAAC: Haute Autorité de l'Audiovisuel et de la Communication
CRE: Comissão Regional Eleitoral	ICCES: Interagency Consultative Committee on Election Security
CSOs: Civil Society Organisations	ICT: Information and Communications Technology
CVR: Continuous Voter Registration	IDEA: Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
DCMP: Direction Centrale des Marchés Publics	IFES: International Foundation for Electoral Systems
DFID: Department For International Development	IGR: Internally Generated Revenue
DGAPE: Direcção Geral de Apoio ao Processo Eleitoral	INEC: Independent National Electoral Commission



**COST OF ELECTIONS IN THE ECOWAS REGION**  
COUNTRY STUDY OF BENIN REPUBLIC, CAPE VERDE, GUINEA BISSAU,  
LIBERIA, NIGERIA & SENEGAL

JDBF: Joint Donor Basket Fund

MDGs: Millennium Development Goals

MONUSCO: Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en RD Congo

MPD: Movimento Para a Democracia

NDI: National Democratic Institute

NEC: National Elections Commission

NGOs: Non Governmental Organisations

OEMs: Original Equipment Manufacturers

OSIWA: Open Society Initiative for West Africa

PAICV: Partido Africano da Independência de Cabo Verde

PPCC: Public Procurement Concessions Commission

PVC: Permanent Voters Card

SCRs: Smart Card Readers

SIEC: State Independent Electoral Commission

UEMOA: Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine

UNDP: United Nations Development Programme

UNECA: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa

UNMIL: United Nations Mission In Liberia

## Acknowledgments

The ECONEC Secretariat initiated the study on the cost of elections in the ECOWAS region in February 2018 with funding from the Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA), the main donor of ECONEC since its creation in 2008. We are extremely grateful to OSIWA for its financial support and for its commitment to the Network from the very beginning.

Our gratitude also goes to the Consultants that conducted the Study: Professor Liasu Adele Jinadu (Nigeria - Anglophone Lead Consultant); Mr. Francis Adebola Laleye (Benin - Francophone Consultant) and Mr. Jose Agnelo Sanches (Cape Verde - Lusophone Consultant). We salute their commitment and the spirit of collaboration that prevailed among them during the study.

The study was conducted on a sample of six (6) countries - Benin, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Nigeria and Senegal. We would like to sincerely thank the chairpersons, members, and directing staff of the Electoral Commissions in the six (6) countries for agreeing to meet with the Consultants and share their insights and sensitive financial data on several election cycles.

The findings of the study were first presented during the Conference on, *Opportunities and Challenges in the Use of Technology in Elections: Lessons from West and Southern Africa* organized by ECONEC in collaboration with INEC Nigeria and the European Centre for Electoral Support (ECES) from 9th – 11th April 2018. We would like to thank both INEC and ECES for providing the opportunity to share the finding and the participants in the conference for their comments and observations.

We also want to acknowledge the financial support of the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ) for the validation workshop of the final report of the study, which took place in Abuja from 15th - 16th October 2018 and attended by 20 participants from the 15 EMBs in the ECOWAS region.

The ECONEC Secretariat wishes to recognize and appreciate the commitment and leadership of Professor Mahmood Yakubu, Chairman of INEC and President of ECONEC, as well as the efforts and commitment of ECONEC Secretariat staff - Mr. Raouf Salami, Mr. Emeka Chinedu, Mr. Paul Ejime, Ms. Mariama Toure in managing this project.

For my part, I remain convinced that ECOWAS has the right vision in establishing ECONEC comprising of all the EMBs in the region and want to encourage the ECOWAS Commission to continue the collaboration with ECONEC for the promotion of credible elections and the advancement of democracy in the region.

Francis Gabriel Oke  
Permanent Secretary, ECONEC and Head, ECOWAS Election Assistance Division



## Foreword

A second democratic wave swept across the African continent in the 1990s as a result of which many member States of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) embarked on constitutional reforms to establish multi-party political systems and the inauguration of regular and competitive elections resulting in the installation of democratically elected governments across the region. In December 2001, the ECOWAS Head of State and Government signed the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, which affirmed that every accession to power in the ECOWAS region “must be made through free, fair and transparent elections”.

A key provision in the Protocol which came into force in September 2008 stipulates that the body responsible for organisation of elections in each jurisdiction shall be independent, neutral and command the confidence of all the political actors in order to guarantee free, fair, credible and transparent elections. This provision places an onerous responsibility on these EMBs given that a well-conducted election with an outcome that reflects the will of the majority of voters is an essential ingredient for democracy and good governance, while a badly conducted election with disputed outcomes is a recipe for crisis, conflict and war. It is noteworthy, that all ECOWAS member states are now governed by democratic governments elected in regular and periodic elections that are mostly adjudged by international and domestic observers to be free, fair and credible.

The ECOWAS Network of Electoral Commission (ECONEC) was established in February 2008 to foster cooperation and promote experience sharing, peer learning and peer review among the fifteen EMBs in the ECOWAS region. The Network recognises that the conduct of election is a huge, complex and expensive undertaking requiring significant financial, human and material resources. While many members of ECONEC have made substantial progress in strengthening the management, efficiency and integrity of the electoral process, they are confronted with the need for adequate resources to undertake all their activities. Although the state is expected to fund elections as a sovereign responsibility, such funding are constrained not only by the prevailing economic situation, but also the competing demands of other high-priority responsibilities and commitments of government. EMBs are therefore compelled to make do with what has been approved in the national budgets, whether adequate or inadequate, with attendant impact on the preparations and conduct of elections.

This study on the cost of elections in the ECOWAS region was undertaken by ECONEC in recognition of the centrality of funding for the conduct of free, fair and credible elections. It

recognizes that while inadequate or delayed funding is capable of undermining the entire electoral process, there is a need for EMBs to adopt better utilization of electoral materials and efficient management of electoral resources in order to optimize allocated funds. As such, it is important for EMBs to prioritize the local procurement of certain electoral materials and embrace transparent procurement processes to promote accountability.

I strongly believe that this study will deepen the knowledge of the intricacies governing the cost of elections and provide greater understanding on financing the electoral process in the ECOWAS region to the executive and legislative arms of government, election administrators, international development partners and all election stakeholders. It is also expected that it will provide ECONEC with an advocacy tool on good practices and lessons learnt on the management and financing of activities of the electoral processes.

Professor Mahmood Yakubu  
Chairman, INEC and President, ECONEC

## Executive Summary

“Elections are expensive, and becoming more so in Africa, because of rapid population growth and civil conflicts...

The new era of competitive politics---increasing the number and regularity of elections...has raised election-funding costs.”

*[UNECA, African Governance Report III (AGR III), p. 179]*

### INTRODUCTION

This summary is in four sections. Section I provides the background to the study of the cost of elections in the last two to three general elections (legislative and presidential) in each of six member states of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), focusing on the overarching rationale and objectives of the studies that the ECOWAS Network of Electoral Commissions (ECONEC) commissioned.

Two countries were selected from each of the three official linguistic zones in the ECOWAS region, as follows: Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau (Lusophone); Benin Republic and Senegal (Francophone); and Liberia and Nigeria (Anglophone). Section II summarizes the conceptual and methodological approaches that framed the questions in each study.

Section III outlines the major findings, and Section IV sets out recommendation for action at the country and ECOWAS level that flow from the study.

There are three appendices at the end of the Study report: Appendix I provides a Matrix for the analysis of the Main Line Items in an Election Budget; Appendix II is a Matrix for analyzing the disaggregated or sub-line items in an election budget; and Appendix III is a box of recommendations on election cost reduction, based on the findings of the study.

#### **I. Background to the Study**

The country study of the cost of elections in each of the six countries was commissioned by ECONEC. Founded in February 2008, ECONEC has the major objective of “promoting credible





## Executive Summary

elections and advancing democracy in the ECOWAS Region.” To this end, ECONEC's mission includes the following:

- (a) Supporting the ECOWAS Commission in the pursuit and realization of the mandate of promoting regional integration, strengthening the electoral process, deepening of and advancement of democracy and good governance practices in West Africa, premised on provisions of the 1999 ECOWAS Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, and the 2001 Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance;
- (b) Sharing of experience, information, technology and election documents; and
- (c) Rationalization and pooling of resources to reduce the cost of conducting elections.<sup>1</sup>

The period since the adoption of the 2001 ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance and, before it, the ECOWAS Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security and after it, the African Union's 2007 Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, has witnessed steady if fragile and faltering progress in the use of elections as a mechanism for resolving the crisis of political succession, which was endemic in the region in the immediate post-independence years between the 1960s and 1980s.

Not only have general (legislative and presidential) elections been held regularly, and presidential term limits respected in most ECOWAS member states, there have also been alternations of power from one party to another, such as in Benin Republic, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Nigeria and Senegal.

**Table I provides the list of the legislative and presidential elections held in the ECOWAS region, numbering sixty (60), between 2005 and May 2018.**

---

<sup>1</sup> Concept Note: ECONEC, ECF SADC, INEC, ECES Conference, Opportunities and Challenges in Use of Technology in Elections: Experiences from West and Southern Africa, p.6, Abuja, 9-11, 2018.

**Table I: General Elections in the ECOWAS Region, 2005-April 2018**

Election Year: Presidential/Legislative	Countries	No of Elections during year *
2005	Burkina Faso(November); Liberia (October); Guinea-Bissau (June); Togo (April); Senegal (February)	5
2006	Gambia (September); Benin (March); Liberia (October)	3
2007	Togo (October, June); Sierra Leone (August); Mali (July, April); Burkina Faso (May); Nigeria (April); Benin (March)	8
2008	Ghana (December); Guinea-Bissau (March)	2
2009	Niger (October); Guinea-Bissau (June)	2
2010	Cote d'Ivoire (October); Guinea (June); Togo (March)	3
2011	Cote d'Ivoire (December); Gambia (November); Liberia (October); Nigeria (April); Benin (March); Cape Verde (February); Niger (January)	7
2012	Ghana (December); Sierra Leone (November); Senegal (July, February); Gambia (March); Guinea-Bissau (March)	6
2013	Mali (December, August, July); Guinea-Bissau (November); Togo (July)	5
2014	Guinea-Bissau (May, March)	2
2015	Burkina Faso (November); Cote d'Ivoire (October); Guinea (October); Benin (April);Togo (April); Nigeria (March)	6
2016	Cote d'Ivoire (December); Ghana (December); Gambia (December); Cape Verde (March); Benin (March); Niger (February)	6
2017	Liberia (October, December); Senegal (July, January);Gambia (April); Guinea (February)	6
2018	Sierra Leone (March)	1
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>62</b>

Source: National Democratic Institute (NDI) Elections Calendar: Sub-Saharan Africa, [www.ndi.org/elections-calendar](http://www.ndi.org/elections-calendar), accessed May 8, 2018.



## Executive Summary

\*The calculation does not include in most cases re-run elections, provincial/ local government elections, and the number of elections that are staggered, such as Nigeria's elections to federal and state executive level (presidential, governorship), and federal and state legislative elections, held in batches over and conducted in two or three separate elections, but with one election budget. In some countries presidential and legislative elections are held on separate days. It is also possible some of the elections, though scheduled, were not held or postponed.

For Africa generally, the African Governance Report III (AGR III), points out, as recorded in Box I, the following presidential and parliamentary elections held in Africa between 1996 and 2012, totaling 156 for the period.

### **Box I: Africa's Elections, 1996-2012**

1996-2006: 44 elections in Sub-Saharan Africa; 2005-2007: 26 presidential and 28 parliamentary elections; 2011: 15 presidential elections and 20 parliamentary elections; 2012: 10 presidential elections and 13 presidential elections.
---

*Source: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, African Governance Report III: Elections & the Management of Diversity, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, p.3.*

Yet concerns have featured in recent discussions of the future and sustainability of democracy, and particularly of competitive party and electoral politics, as a positive force for managing diversity in Africa. As the African Governance Report III (AGR III) observes, "...these elections have differed in form, content and quality, and greater regularity has not necessarily enhanced their value. Sectarian mobilization, intimidation, and violence are major features of some African countries' elections, which have become conflict triggers rather than instruments for resolving conflicts...Rather than unite, elections can divide people, undermining the very essence of elections, which is to peacefully aggregate preferences in the choice of political leadership"<sup>2</sup>

One emerging area of concern is the escalating cost of the elections. The concern is due partly to the fact that, "elections are expensive, and [are] becoming more so in Africa because of rapid population

<sup>2</sup>United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), African Governance Report III: Elections & the Management of Diversity, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, p.1

growth and civil conflicts.”<sup>3</sup> To address this concern and “the challenges faced by [ECOWAS] members, in ...relation [to] their... adequate funding [of] and regularity in the organisation of elections,”<sup>4</sup> ECONEC commissioned this study.

To that end, ECONEC selected two countries each from each of the major linguistic zones in the region (Anglophone, Francophone and Lusophone) for the study. The main objective is to “identify the factors driving up the cost of elections in the ECOWAS member states, with a view of proposing actionable recommendations for the management and the control of election costs in the region.”<sup>5</sup>

## II. Conceptual and Methodological Issues

### Conceptual Note

As used in the study, “cost of elections” refers to the sum total of the aggregated “variable costs” that constitute the main line items in each country's election budget, as approved by the national legislature or other approving authority, provided for in the country's constitution or electoral law, for specific general (legislative and presidential, and presidential run-off) elections in each general elections year.<sup>6</sup> But, where documents of cost of elections, such as an Electoral Management Body's (EMB's) Annual Report, or its General Elections Report for an election year outlines the main line items in the election budget and disaggregates them into sub-line or sub-head items, the election budget is analyzed as follows: (a) approved Election Budget; (b) actual amount released; (c) actual amount spent; and (d) deficit or surplus, in considering the cost of elections for each set of elections. As used in the study, cost of elections does not refer to the social, “non-monetary” costs of elections, such as the effect of election funding in triggering pre- and post-election violent, sometimes decimating conflicts, and fueling inflationary pressures and other socio-economic distortions.<sup>7</sup> It also does not include political party funding and fund-raising activities of political parties.

In calculating the cost of elections, as variable cost, however, the study distinguishes between 'direct costs' and more 'diffuse' ones that are difficult to identify and that are, therefore, excluded from the calculation of the “cost of elections.” Examples of diffuse costs include those incurred for security and policing purposes that are not included in the election budget as main line or disaggregated

---

<sup>3</sup>Ibid, p.179.

<sup>4</sup>ECOWAS Network of Electoral Commissions (ECONEC)Concept Note: Study on Cost of Elections in West Africa, December 2017, p.2

<sup>5</sup>Ibid,

<sup>6</sup> The variable cost of elections or the election budget should be distinguished from the fixed cost or annual budget for the general or operational, day-to-day functioning of election management bodies, regardless of the conduct of elections in an election year. But, as the study also shows, there are occasions, especially in the year leading up to, and during the election as well, when there is a spill-over from the variable cost of elections or election budget into the fixed cost or annual budget of the electoral management body.



## Executive Summary

main line items in an election year. Support provided by the donor community and other external bilateral, multilateral organizations, as well as international non-governmental actors to civil society organizations, and election-related costs expended by various domestic state and non-state institutional actors are not included in the calculation of “cost of elections” for the study, if they are not included in the election budget.<sup>8</sup>

An important conclusion from the findings of the six country studies is that, although the social and the rising direct and diffuse monetary costs of elections raise questions about the cost of elections as an unbearable burden, the cost constitutes and should be viewed as an investment in democracy and development. Indeed, the underlying *raison d'être* of the study views elections “as a key instrument for building democratic and participatory governance”<sup>9</sup> in West Africa and elsewhere in Africa. *raison d'être* of the study views elections “as a key instrument for building democratic and participatory governance”<sup>10</sup> in West Africa and elsewhere in Africa.

### Methodology

As the study is essentially a “cartographic” or mapping study, given the timeline of thirty days for the study stipulated by ECONEC, the methodology used is not a rigorously full-blown and statistically sophisticated one. Rather it attempts to throw a “penumbra” of light to illuminate and provide pathways towards the understanding and deeper explorations of a complex phenomenon. As a result, the methodology utilized the following research instruments:

- a. Desk research to find out the mandate (powers, functions, and institutional structure) of each country's electoral management body (bodies), in the broader context of the dynamics of each country's history of competitive party and electoral politics, its political economy, and its interface with election budgetary and procurement processes. Doing this required unbundling the sources and the level or quantum of funding, the factors that drive them and with what consequences; and
- b. Opinion survey made up of, interviews with election management bodies, selected state stakeholders in the executive and legislature, and selected non-state stakeholders in each country, on the nature and challenges of election-related budgetary appropriations and releases; and/or focus group discussion with a stratified cross-section of between 10-15 relevant stakeholders.

---

<sup>7</sup>ECA, African Governance Report III (AGR III), pp. 181-183

<sup>8</sup>However, in some countries the electoral management bodies, with the approval of their national governments, accept funding of some line items, which are duly reflected in the election budget of the countries or in their Reports of General Elections. But in a number of such cases, the practice, as is exemplified by Liberia's case, the practice is for the development partners to disburse the funds themselves, although the expenditure enter into the cost of elections and are reported as such by the electoral commission.

<sup>9</sup>ECONEC, Concept Note, p.1

<sup>10</sup>ECONEC, Concept Note, p.1



**Study Questions:** Table II outlines the major questions that framed the study.

**Table II: Study Questions**

Area of Focus	Main Focus/Questions
A: Context	(i) What are major landmarks in the country's history of competitive and electoral politics, and how did it impact the evolution of the country's electoral management body (EMB)?
B. Structure, Power & Functions of EMB	(i) What are the constitutional provisions & derivative legislation on powers and functions of EMB, especially relating to its administrative and financial independence?
C. Types & Sources of EMB Funding	What are the major types of funding and their sources for the EMB, and what are the implications for EMB's mandate to conduct credible elections?
D. Variable Costs of Elections I: Statutory Provisions/Overview	(i) Who determines, and through what process, the election budget; and with what consequence? (ii) What is the procurement process – is there a separate procurement process and authority for the EMB, from the civil service process? (iii) Does the procurement process facilitate or constrain the autonomy of the EMB and the timely conduct of elections?
E. Variable Costs of Election II: Major Line Items in Election Budget: Trends & Gaps Analysis Variable Costs of Elections III: Major Line Items in Election Budget: Trends & Gaps Analysis	(i) What cultural, economic and political factors/forces drive and circumscribe the election budget and procurement processes?

## Executive Summary

<p>F. Variable Costs of Elections III: Factors driving/circumscribing cost of elections.</p>	<p>(i) What items typically go into the election budget?  (ii) What does the budget show about the relative weight/importance attached to each item?  (iii) Do the items vary or are they consistent in their appearance on the budget and in the weight attached to them across election cycles/from one election to the other?  (iv) What explains the variation or consistency across election cycles?  (v) What are your reflections on the opportunities, problems and challenges arising from your study?  (vi) What are your reflections on the specific issue of the cost/benefit analysis of the economics and politics of election budget, and the cost of elections in the country the country?</p>
<p>G. Major Findings</p>	<p>(i) What are your major findings, and what trend do they show in the cost of elections in the country.</p>
<p>H. Recommendations</p>	<p>(i) Provide recommendations, based on your findings to “equip ECONEC with empirical advocacy tool on the provision of adequate financing for election on behalf of member EMBs”; to “develop a matrix for the assessment and classification of the overall costs of elections in ECONEC member states.</p>

### **III. Major Findings**

#### **Context**

The six country studies show the impact of each country's history and political economy on the development of its competitive party and electoral politics, and into which its EMB is embedded. In all six countries, constitutional and political reform, impelled by popular struggle for constitutional and political reform to make the political and socioeconomic environment reflect requirements for electoral integrity and for protecting the peoples' vote, as articulated in various African and international codes and standards, such as the 2001 ECOWAS 2001 Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, and the African Union's Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, to which the countries have acceded or have the moral responsibility to conform with because of their membership of the ECOWAS and the AU. The codes and standards provide accelerators and benchmarks for determining the democratic character of competitive and electoral politics, and of electoral integrity in the countries. As the Benin study observes:

“The period from 1990 to the present day, characterized by Democratic Renewal, dating from the Conférence Nationale des Forces Vives of February 1990. This National Sovereign Conference gave birth to a regime of democratic liberties, and a liberal economy, where Human Rights and public freedoms are recognized and enshrined in the Constitution of December 1990.”

#### **Structure, Power and Functions of EMBs**

The post-1980s constitutional and political reform in the six countries reflected the driving objectives of the democratic struggles of the mid-1970s 1980s in Africa to insulate EMBs in Africa from partisan, especially executive branch or ruling party control, as was typically the case earlier. The insulation is demonstrated by the fact that both the colonially-inherited models of a “fully government controlled EMB,” and the government-controlled but decentralized EMB have virtually disappeared in Africa. [See Table III below].

In defining the power and functions of EMBs, as democracy-promoting institutions, the new democratic governance architecture provides for their autonomy/independence, although the nature, characterization, and extent of the insulation, revolving around the administrative and financial of its EMB varies from country to country. In Nigeria, to a large extent, as the country





## Executive Summary

study shows, the financial autonomy of INEC has been considerably enhanced by the constitutional provision that makes its budget a first line charge on the consolidated revenue fund. What is clear, however, is that, no matter how defined, the embeddedness of the EMBs in competitive party and electoral politics, especially the politics of presidential succession, as well as in the bureaucratic politics of the national budgetary and procurement politics, means that their independence or autonomy is constrained by the very fact of political embeddedness that is significantly driven by a zero-sum, winner-takes-all and rent-seeking political culture that tends to define the politics of succession in the typical African state.

Another factor impairing the administrative and financial independence of the EMB is due mainly to human, financial and logistic capacity deficits that are rooted significantly in the material structure of state power and politics. This situation derives from the fact of underdevelopment and a general political culture that breaches the essence of the separation of politics from administration. These deficits and cultural orientations also contribute significantly to impairing the efficient and effective pursuit and performance of the EMBs' mandates. For example in the case of Nigeria, the Nigeria country study recounts how two former chairpersons of the country's electoral commission lamented undue limits placed on the administrative and financial independence of the commission by its by budgetary and procurement processes being tied to and guided by the rules of the country's civil service.

The other country studies make similar points about limits to the autonomy of EMBs in the countries. Having noted that the CNE, under the provisions of Law No. 56/VII/2010 of 9 March 2010, is an independent body “that is endowed with administrative and financial autonomy, [and] not hierarchically subject to any organ of political power,” the Cape Verde study observes that the CNE's “financial autonomy is limited because its operational costs are supported by the budget approved and allocated by the State, through the country's Ministry of Finance.”

### **The Benin country study makes the same point, as follows:**

But it is at the level of the Government /EMB report that problems about CENA's autonomy arise. They relate to problems over the management autonomy of CENA arising, for example, because of the Ministry of Finance's attempt to exercise a priori control of CENA's expenditure, instead of only ex-post control provided through a Financial Control Delegate and a Manager directly appointed by

the Minister of Finance. This fact is all the more significant since some EMB expenditures can be blocked by the Ministry of Finance, leading to dysfunctions in the electoral administration. Secondly, another problem is the dependence of the CENA on the Executive to obtain the electoral funds, and the blackmail that may ensue, which is not without consequences for the diligent accomplishment of CENA's mandate.

Also instructive in this respect is the following observation in a study of EMBs in West Africa:

Formal guarantees [of independence] do not in practice provide a criterion for an effective comparison between the institutions, given that the EMBs studied have almost identical legal provisions protecting their independence, yet have widely differing degree[s] of independence in practice. Although the different systems of appointment and composition do have an impact, other factors often play at least an important and sometimes more important role. A political party commission like the CENA in Benin, whatever its defects, has sometimes conducted elections with more independence and competence than an expert commission such as [that] in Nigeria; while the governmental model in Cape Verde has a longer tradition of effective performance and independence in action than has the system of the same type in Senegal. Issues such as the size of the country (Nigeria vs Cape Verde), the relative balance of powers among political parties (Benin vs Sierra Leone) and the strength of other institutions (the courts and the civil service in general) are all critically important. Nevertheless the configuration of the EMB can make a difference.<sup>11</sup>

The findings in the country case studies suggest that the autonomy of the EMBs is better viewed in terms of partnership and cooperation between them and the large body of institutions in state and society that also have mandates that are election related. A good model of such partnership, based on mutuality and recognition between an EMB and critical state and non-state election stakeholders, is Nigeria's INEC Election Security Strategy, which draws on its "Knowledge-Based Election Management." The strategy emphasizes knowledge learning, including training, and production. It provides a partnership framework for establishing an Interagency Consultative Committee on Election Security (ICCES), the Election Operations Support Centre, and the Situation Room, as well as linkages to political parties and election observers.<sup>12</sup> The aggressive and painstaking effort of INEC since 2011 to build confidence in its determination to conduct credible elections in partnership with critical stakeholders has paid off well. Unrelenting political pressures from pro-democracy forces in state and society also contributed to INEC's securing significant exemptions from civil service budgetary and procurements rules.

<sup>11</sup>Ismail Madior Fall, Mathias Hounkpe, Adele Jinadu, and Pascal Kambale (co-authors) *Election Management Bodies in West Africa: a comparative study of the contribution of electoral commissions to strengthening of democracy*; Open Society Foundation, 2011, pp.4-5. See also: S. Mozaffer and A. Schedler, "The comparative study of electoral governance – introduction," *International Political Science Review*, 25, 1, p. 15.

<sup>12</sup>Okechukwu Ibeanu, *Knowledge Production, Strategic Planning and Election Management*, mimeo, n.d., especially pp.5-11.

## Executive Summary

What the country studies also bring out is the fact that national constitutions or electoral laws differ between, on the one hand, Benin, Nigeria, and Liberia, where there is only a single EMB in each country;<sup>13</sup> and, on the other hand, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, and Senegal, where there are hybrid EMBs, in each country [See typology of African EMBS in Table III]

**Table III: Models of African EMBs**

Classificatory model	General characteristics	Country examples
Single independent EMB	Full responsibility for management and conduct of elections, with members chosen on their personal merit and integrity or professional background and/or party political affiliation	Angola, Benin*, Botswana, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe Gambia, * Ghana, * Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, * South Africa, Uganda
Two or more independent EMBs	Shared responsibility, with one EMB responsible for election management and administration and the others for regulating party political activities and finance or constituency delimitation	Sierra Leone,* Tanzania
Hybrid EMB: Government/civil service-based EMB, under an independent oversight supervisory body of experts, usually judges	Main or core electoral functions undertaken by the civil service, but under the supervision of an independent body	Cape Verde, * Côte d'Ivoire, * Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea,* Guinea-Bissau,* Senegal.*

<sup>13</sup>Because of Nigeria's federal system, the 1999 Constitution provides for an EMB, the State Independent Electoral Commission (SIEC) at the state (i.e. sub- unit) that is empowered to conduct elections to only local government councils only in the state. The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) conducts elections for president and for the national assembly (House of Representatives and Senate), and for the Governor and House of Assembly at the state level.

Fully government controlled EMB**	Management and administration of elections are solely under the control of government.	
Government-controlled but decentralized**	Limited control, co-ordination and supervision of a national authority independent of government	

**\*ECOWAS Member States.**

\*\* Note: These two models hardly still exist in West Africa. This results from a trend of replacing non-autonomous or fully government-controlled EMBs inherited at independence (notably in francophone and lusophone countries), with autonomous or semi-autonomous ones. For example, constitutional and political reform designed to insulate EMBs from executive branch control led to the hybrid EMBs replacing inherited government-controlled EMBs in Cape Verde and Senegal.

Source: Abstracted from Adele Jinadu, Lessons from Electoral Management and Processes in West Africa, Occasional Paper 194.<sup>14</sup>

**Types and Sources of Funding**

Regarding the funding of the cost of elections, the studies show that in the six countries the major source of funding, indeed “the revenue base” of each EMB, is the national government in each country. Another source of funding elections cost is provided by African and extra-African development partners. Such contribution can be included in the election budget, as in Benin or Liberia, or they can be indirect, in not being on the election budget item, in the form of contributions to voter education, training and capacity building, and support for election-related activities by civil society organizations (CSOs) in all six countries.

Thus, in Senegal, the country's study points out that, although the country “regards elections as a matter of absolute sovereignty and admits of no external funding for the organization of elections in

<sup>14</sup> *Governance and APRM Programme, South African Institute of International Affairs SAIIA), July 2014, p. 8. For the larger study, which Jinadu's SAIIA Occasional Paper 194 summarizes, see Ismail Madior Fall, Mathias Hounkpe, Adele Jinadu, and Pascal Kambale (co-authors) Election Management Bodies in West Africa: a comparative study of the contribution of electoral commissions to strengthening of democracy; Open Society Foundation, 2011; See also, Hounkpe M & IM Fall, Electoral Commissions in West Africa: A Comparative Study. Abuja: Friedrich Ebert-Stiftung, 2010; Lopez-Pinto R, Electoral Management Bodies As Institutions of Governance, Bureau for Development Policy, UN Development Programme, 2000; Kambale P, 'Overview: The contribution of electoral management bodies to credible elections in West Africa', in Fall, Hounkpe, Jinadu and Kambale, op. cit.*





## Executive Summary

the country,” it makes exception for external election funding that is provided on the initiative of external donors or development partners to finance awareness-raising activities, related to voter education.” In the case of Cape Verde, “Cape Verde's National Electoral Commission is financed exclusively by state funds.”<sup>15</sup> Since the country's 2007 electoral law, “each of the three key bodies involved in election management [in the country has been] funded separately.”

What emerges from the country studies is the trend towards a substantial reduction over the years in the direct external funding of election budgets in a number of the six countries. For example, the Liberia study shows that, “while the greater part of funding for the 2005 and 2011 general elections was provided by Liberia's international partners, the funding has, thereafter, substantially ebbed. Thus, development partners contributed about US\$5 million (roughly ten per cent (10%)) to the 2017 election budget of about US\$36 million.” But it is a different matter in the case of Guinea-Bissau, where the country study points out that, “in the last elections, the contributions of these partners amounted on average to about 70% of the costs of elections in Guinea-Bissau.”

There is a third type and source for funding the election budget of the EMB, as exemplified in Nigeria's Electoral Act, 2010 (Section 3 (1)). The Act provides that “there shall be established for the Commission a fund to be known as Independent National Electoral Commission Fund.” It further provides that, “the following types of payments shall be made into the INEC Fund for carrying out its functions and purposes under the Constitution and this Act-- such sums as may, from time to time, be credited to the Fund by way of interest from investments made for the Fund; aids, grants that may from time to time accrue to the Commission in order to carry out its functions.”

In the case of Liberia, the country study points to the EMB's internally generated revenue currently only in the form of fees paid by candidates for elections and for registration by political parties as another source of funding elections. NEC's IGR is currently limited to fees paid by candidates for elections and for political party registration by political parties. Thus, if there are 900 candidates, each paying the required US\$500 to stand for election, this will generate a revenue of US\$ 450,000 into NEC's coffers each election year. Other potential source of IGR includes establishing a printing press for commercial purposes. But, as the Liberia country study points out, “in view of Liberia's public financial management law, the [IGR's] proceeds are paid into a general escrow account of the government. As a result, NEC does not have unhindered access to or control over the account. Rather, monies accruing to NEC in the account are subject to deduction from the approved election budget in the process of disbursing the budget to NEC during the election”

<sup>15</sup> ECA, African Governance Report III (AGR III), p.185

## **Variable Cost of Elections 1: Statutory Provisions/Overview**

The EMB in each country typically prepares an election budget proposal that is then submitted, through the Ministry of Finance, for consideration in the broader national budgetary appropriation process. Liberia provides an example, in this regard, that broadly reflects the practice in the other five countries in the study. Liberia's country study points out that, "guided by the country's Public Financial Management Act, 2009 and its [NEC's] own financial regulations, the NEC now generally prepares the election budget about a year before the general elections takes place." Thereafter, as the study also points out, "the election budget proposal approved by the Board of Commissioners of NEC shall be submitted at least four months before the start of the government financial year to the Minister of Finance, who "shall examine the budget proposals and advise the President and Legislature accordingly... With the passage of the election budget in the Legislature and the presidential assent to it, the Minister of Finance is required, under the Public Finance Management Act 2009, to notify NEC "on final decision on level of funding from the National Budget," and to request NEC "resubmit a revised budget should funding be different from the amount requested."

But across the six countries, there is concern that the election budgetary process is not broadly consultative, although, according to the Benin country study, "... the vocal voice of public opinion...the legitimate expression of citizens' concerns about the soaring cost of elections puts additional pressures on the CENA, which is torn between the obligation to rationalize election expenses and organizing elections acceptable to all."

The procurement process after the approval of the election budget requires compliance with each country's procurement or financial management law. But Nigeria's case represents a deviation from this typical procurement requirement. For example, the Nigeria country study refers to "the progressive alignment of INEC's procurement process with the country's procurement law and the exemption granted INEC to approach the country's Federal Executive Council directly for approval of budget for the procurement of sensitive security electoral materials, such as ballot papers and results sheets."

What the country studies also bring out is the generally protracted experience of the EMBs in navigating the complex bureaucratic process of election budget and procurement approvals. In the case of Benin, the country study observes that "due partly to obstruction caused by strategically placed individuals interested in procurement contracts, and partly due to lack of goodwill towards

## Executive Summary

CENA within the government, CENA has had occasion to approach the Constitutional Court or mount pressure through the mass media to force the release of delayed election funds. Another problem is that, on a number of occasions, the amount released is far short of the approved amount.” Pointing to the similar experience of Liberia's NEC, the Liberia country study observes that “faced with such challenges [of navigating the procurement process] NEC has had occasion to approach the President directly in order to accelerate the approval process, bypassing the procurement process.”

### Variable cost of election: III: Main Line Items

The typical main aggregated line items in the election budgets in the six countries, as reflected in the Nigeria study, are Voter Registration, Elections (legislative and presidential), and Voter Education. The items are disaggregated into registration materials and logistics, election materials and logistics, employment, feeding and honoraria of temporary staff, training, and security.

Table IV and Table V below summarize the approved election budget for Liberia's general elections (2005, 2011 and 2017); and Table IV for Guinea-Bissau's 2009 presidential elections and the country's 2012 and 2012 legislative and presidential elections.

**Table IV: Summary Liberia's Approved Election Budgets, 2005, 2011 & 2017 General Elections**

Election Activities	2005 (US\$)	2011 (US\$)	2017 (US\$) Actual Amount Released	Total (US)
Voter Registration	4,961,871.55	7,162,081	16,599,228.63	28,723,181.18
Voter Education & Public Consultation– Voter Registration	N/A	N/A	2,631,567.00	2,631,567.00
Voter Education	2,615,953.80	2,394,085.00	N/A	5,010,038.80
Voter Education & Public Consultations- Elections	N/A	N/A	1,910,665.00	1,910,665.00
Elections	4,522,850.54	6,633,026.00	11,537,367.89	22,693,244.43
Presidential Run-off Elections	1,099,031.00	3,335,505.00	5,607,696.75	10,042,232.75.
Referendum	N/A	3,116,629.00	N/A	3,116,629.00
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>13,199,706.89</b>	<b>22,641,326.00</b>	<b>38,286,525.27</b>	<b>74,127,558.16</b>

Table IV shows that the total cost of elections over the 2005, 2011, and 2017 elections in Liberia was US\$74,127,558.16. The cost reflects an increase of 290 per cent between the 2005 elections and the 2017 elections. Major highlights in Table IV indicate that “Voter Registration” consumed the highest cost each election year, with a total of US\$28,723,181.18 for the three elections, followed by elections cost, with a total of US\$22,693,244.43.

Voter Registration and Elections cost account for N51, 416,425.3 (or approximately 69 per cent) of the total election cost of US\$74,127,558.16 for the three elections in Liberia.

But when disaggregated, as the Liberia country study shows, the increase was mainly due to the rise in the integrity cost related to the administration of the elections. This includes the increase in the number of registration units and polling units; the importation of high technology registration and election kits, ballot paper/boxes, other election materials; and increased cost of the recruitment, training, and deployment of more temporary staff. This partly explains why the cost of voter registration rose from US\$4,961,871.55 in 2005, to US\$7,162,081.00 in 2011, and to US\$ US\$16,599,288.63 in 2017, an increase of approximately 232 per cent over the three election cycles [Table V, Liberia country study].

As the disaggregated items in Table III of the Liberia country study also shows, for the 2011 and 2017 general elections in Liberia, the total personnel cost of temporary staff for Voter Registration for the two election years was US\$6,018,200; for Elections, US\$5,270,150; and for Presidential-Run-off Elections, US\$3,266,850.

In the case of Guinea-Bissau, as shown in Table VI, there was a decrease in personnel expenses between the presidential elections of 2009 (US\$3,798,041) and the 2012 presidential elections (US\$2,166,409).

But there was an increase from the 2012 figure [US\$2,166,409] to US\$4,304,055 for the 2014 legislative and presidential elections, apparently due to the combination of legislative and presidential elections that year. But as Table IV also shows, a much higher rise in cost is reflected in the cost of electoral operations from US\$2,108,237 for the 2012 presidential elections to US\$6,177,350,00 for the combined 2014 legislative and presidential elections.



## Executive Summary

**Table V: Summary Main Line Items in Guinea-Bissau's Election Budget, 2009, 2012, and 2014.**

( USD)			
	Presidential Elections 2009	Presidential Elections 2012	Legislatives and Presidential Elections 2014
Personnel expenses	3.798.041,00	3.166.409,00	4.304.055,00
Civic education, training and	2.863.891,00	1.247.853,00	2.517.056,00
Political Parties and candidates charges/ Subventions			928.038,00
Electoral Administration	1.662.353,00	1.150.784,00	2.902.980,00
Electoral operations	3.187.797,00	3.108.237,00	6.177.350,00
Current transfers	52.946,00	104.991,00	249.396,00
Debts past elections			447.834,00
	4.878.679,00	4.259.000,00	9.080.330,00

*Source: Guinea-Bissau country study in this Report (It does not include data regarding coverage by the media, police and security and GTAPE Budget as well)*

### Variable Cost of Elections II: Factors driving cost of elections

It is valuable to understanding the factors that drive the cost of elections in the six countries to proceed within a theoretical framework about the nature of politics, as they relate to competitive party and electoral politics, in the six countries, as set out in the following hypotheses. Despite the historical and contextual/institutional differences among the six countries, the hypotheses provide, behind the complex tapestry woven by the differences, interconnected and underlying sinews of thread to give the tapestry meaning. The hypotheses seek to explain not only to “the challenges of election funding in Africa,” but also the faltering progress towards democratization in the ECOWAS region and elsewhere in Africa.

The first hypothesis is the way in which the political economy of underdevelopment circumscribes electoral administration and management in the six countries. To understand how underdevelopment circumscribes not only electoral administration but also governance in the six countries, one needs, as the study does, to point to the intertwined massive problem of the structural- material condition, on the one hand, and the constraining human and finance resource capacity of the African state, on the other hand, under which elections are conducted: budget deficits, the high recurrent and capital costs of governance, poor roads, poor communications, including weak technology, poor transportation, related deficits logistic facilities, difficult, sometimes inaccessible topography, and huge human security deficits—poverty, high illiteracy, poor water and sanitation, and poor educational and health facilities. In short, these resource deficits account, by and large, for the hugely high cost of the acquisition of technology and of personnel cost, incurred over deployment and training of election personnel.

The second hypothesis is the weak commitment or lack of political will of the mainstream political leadership to the broader normative anchors of liberal democracy that should drive and not circumscribe politics as a vocation in search of the public interest. It has, through its spill-over effects, not only corrupted and weakened institutions in state and society but also diminished social capital and trust. The result is an escalation of the integrity cost of elections, which now accounts as a major factor in the spiraling cost of elections in the six countries. It partly explains why there is more and more use of high technology by the EMBs as an investment in building trust as a social capital and in advancing high technology as an investment designed not only to build trust as a social capital but also to advance electoral integrity, despite the double-edged nature of technology as a medium which can be used properly to strengthen, or wrongly or abused to undermine electoral integrity.

The third hypothesis is the way in which the bureaucratic politics of the national budgetary and procurement processes creates the daunting challenge of the approval of election budget, and the timely release of approved election funds to the electoral commissions. The process is embedded in prolonged discussions between electoral commissions, executive branch agencies, such as the ministries of finance and procurement agencies, and the legislatures in the six countries.

The discussions typically take place within a murky environment, characterized by the complex combination of bureaucratic red-tape, diminishing revenue flows to the government, competing demands from ministries, departments and agencies of governments, and significantly mutual



## Executive Summary

distrust that is fed by assumptions of rent-seeking opportunities in contracting and in procuring election materials. What this also shows is that, unless pressures are mounted by public opinion, the bureaucratic politics of the budgetary and procurement processes reflects an underlying lack of understanding or awareness of the grave consequences of prolonged delays in approving the budget or releasing procurement approvals by the relevant ministerial departments and procurement agencies.

**The challenge this situation poses is well captured in the observations in Box II, from the AGR III:**

### **Box II: Challenges of election funding in Africa**

States sometimes hold off providing their share of election funding...which adversely affects the election timetable in planning for activities like voter registration and education. This may result in adjusting the election calendar or executing these election-related activities poorly. Changing the election schedule or poorly organized pre-election activities usually raises voters' anxieties and sometimes generates political tensions, which if not well managed may distort or undermine the entire electoral process.

*Source: UNECA, AGR III, p.186*

The bargaining and the delays in the release of approved election funds, sometimes deliberately engineered, and the opportunities they throw up for rent-seekers to exploit, contribute to the escalating cost of elections in the countries. For example, the Benin study refers to, "corridor games" by political parties through their representatives in the CENA. In the past, CENA members tended to adopt a partisan political posture, dictated more by party political considerations and instructions from their parties, than the public interest when considering the election budget. In fact, the election budget of the CENA offers a major opportunity for the political parties to restore their "financial health," through procurement contracts, the selection of service providers, car rental, purchase of consumables, catering service for restaurant, and preparation of election documents (newsletters, counting sheets etc.) The way the procurement contracts are awarded reveals the backstage manoeuvres that influence the process and their contribution to the escalation of the cost of elections in the country."

To sum up, the following provides an overview of the major highlights of the six-country study on the cost of elections:

- (i). The rise in elections costs is due to the increasing integrity cost of elections, as reflected in the escalation in the technology and administrative costs of elections. Drivers of the rise must be set in the broader context of the general cost of governance, lack of trust among the political class, fed by the underlying anti-democratic political culture and related ethics and accountability deficits that constrain and sully political and electoral competition, diverting it from its public interest objectives.
- (ii). Delayed releases or deep cuts in releases of approved funds in the election budget are major factors in the rising cost of elections.
- (iii). Access to information on election budget is not easy, and is due either to poor record keeping or to resilient bureaucratic reluctance to provide access. Even when records are made available, there are inconsistencies, lack of clarity and duplication in the records, reflecting what can be characterized as a “weak” or flawed expenditure monitoring system within the EMBs.
- (iv). There is increasing awareness among the EMBs on the need for strategic planning, focused on/targeted at internal administrative reform and investment in resource capacity building as measures to reduce or stabilize election cost in the medium- to long-term, and reduce the integrity cost of elections.
- (v). The politics of the election budgetary and election procurement processes is a major encumbrance on the ability of the EMBs to pursue its mandate effectively and efficiently. In most cases it results in delays and “emergency” purchases, giving the impression that the EMBs lack the sufficient administrative and financial independence to engender confidence and credibility in their activities.
- (vi). Reliance on donor support of, or contribution to the election budget is progressively decreasing over election cycles but this needs to be situated against the high dependence of some of the countries on donor support for their national budget-a development, which offsets the advantage of national ownership brought about reduced donor funding of elections.



## Executive Summary

- (vii) Donor support, particularly from the international development partners, is generally not under the control of, and disbursement by the EMBs.
- (viii) ECOWAS support of and monitoring of election-related activities points to the potential positive democracy-promotion role that regional economic communities can and should play in democratic consolidation in their respective regions.
- (ix) Although the private sector (national and multinational) benefits hugely from election procurements, there is an equal need for the sector to invest in democratic institutions on a regular basis and particularly to democracy-promoting institutions such as EMBs.
- (x) The capacity of, and opportunity for the EMBs to explore sources of their internally-generated revenue to strengthen their financial independence, reduce cost, and provide a safety net against delayed release of, or cuts in approved election budget line items, are constrained by legislation.

#### IV. Recommendations

Box III synthesizes the major recommendations from each of the country study, categorized into sets of recommendations for each of the following:

- (a) National Government;
- (b) The national EMB; and
- (c) ECONEC and ECOWAS

#### **Box III Recommendations**

##### **A. The National Government**

##### **Each National Government to**

1. Amend the constitution or electoral law to strengthen the administrative and financial independence of EMB, to provide for:
  - (a). Reservation of a per cent of the national budget for elections, as a charge on the country's consolidated revenue fund, deposited into an escrow account or Trust Fund, managed by the EMB but with strict accountability and transparency oversight exercised by a board of trustees of eminent citizens outside of the public bureaucracy, put in place.



- (b) A three-year election rolling plan for the election-budget, passed three-years before the general elections, with twice-yearly releases and disbursement in January and June of each of the two years before the elections.
  - (c). Establishment of an EMB Trust Fund, if none currently exists, under the control of the country's EMB, but subject to transparency and accountability requirements, for which grants to NEC and internally generated revenue of NEC can be deposited for use by the EMB.
  - (d) EMB to source for internally generated revenue, if no such provision currently exists, deposited into an escrow account or an Election Trust Fund, for use by and under control of the EMB, with accountability guarantees.
  - (e). Exemption from the provisions of the national procurement laws for the procurement of sensitive security election materials, such as ballot papers and results forms, under specified conditions, such as approval by the country's President or national cabinet.
  - (f). Holding of elections as applicable or relevant, outside of the rainy season in the country.
  - (g) Coordination and integration of the budget line items of the different bodies and institutions involved in the administration and management of elections, in countries with more than one EMB, to avoid duplication of similar activities and parallel spending.
  - (h) Holding all elections simultaneously, where feasible, on the same day or closely following each other.
2. Consider imposing an Election Tax, to be administered by eminent national citizens outside government or the public service, under an Election Trust Fund, in line with the logic of the binding AU-wide levy of 0.2 per cent on eligible imports adopted at the first AU Heads of State and Government Retreat, towards commitment to self-reliance, and the earlier imposition of Education Trust Fund in some ECOWAS



## Executive Summary

member states on the private sector, as an investment by the private sector in elections as a mechanism for democracy, development, peace and security in the ECOWAS region.

### **B. EMBs**

Each EMB to consider the following as measures, designed around adopting, or strengthening current strategic planning and capacity-building, and streamlining administration, financial planning and training on which to anchor their activities:

1. Prepare and submit timeously the election budget for consideration, by statutorily designated public authorities, as provided in national constitutions and relevant national legislation.
2. Strengthen its internal mechanisms by plugging and constraining leakages and rent seeking activities in its procurement activities.
3. Initiate or continue processes to reinvent and re-energize itself by pursuing the following action and/or initiatives:
  - (a). Partner with the relevant stakeholders to undertake a five- to seven- year Strategic Planning, to rationalize its activities; envision futures scenarios, build and enhance capacity, especially in critical financial management, logistics and ICT areas through research and training; trim waste, undertake a management audit to avoid duplication of activities and its departments; decentralize its operations, particularly those relating to contract award, procurement of election materials, and the recruitment of ad hoc staff at lower levels, such as the centrally deployment of staff and election materials from its headquarters field offices.
  - (b) Establish an in-house think tank for applied comparative policy research on trends in West African regional and African continentally electoral and political behavior that can help the EMB adopt and implement cost saving strategies in planning for elections, especially related to the high technology and integrity costs of elections.
  - (c) Carry out regular, and especially post-election audit of election materials and

resources, laying emphasis on avoiding theft and wastage, especially by identifying and taking measures for the safe storage of re-usable election materials, in order to save on replacement cost of procuring them every election year.

- (d) Pursue on-going efforts, or begin, to integrate its voter registration exercise into the country's national identity card program. If the National ID card is yet to take off firmly or there are problems with effecting the integration in the short-term, explore the cost/benefit implications of gradually introducing biometric data registration, using direct data capture or other credible options to replace the current wholesale voter registration exercise before every election, with continuous voter registration.
- (e) Embark on or strengthen on-going confidence-building outreach to political parties and civil society. Poor relations with the two critical stakeholder often can, and often add to the cost of elections.
- (f) Explore, using the instrumentality provided by ECONEC, election cost-saving strategies, such as the importation of electoral materials from ECOWAS member states, and elsewhere in Africa, from countries that have comparative advantage in the production of election materials.

### **C. ECONEC & ECOWAS**

- 1. ECONEC and, through it, ECOWAS should consider the following to help reduce or stabilize the cost of elections, in the medium- to long-term, in ECOWAS member-states, in line with their obligations under the 2001 ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance; and the 2007 African Union Charter on Democracy, Elections and Government:
  - (a) Deploy their power of moral suasion to encourage the ECOWAS member states take a proactive interest in helping to strengthen the independence of their EMBs, in line with the recommendations in this study
  - (b) Encourage ECOWAS member countries to impose an Election Tax, to be





## Executive Summary

administered by eminent national citizens outside government or the public service, under an Election Trust Fund, in line with not only the logic of the binding AU-wide levy of 0.2 percent on eligible imports adopted at the first retreat of the AU Heads of State and Government Retreat, towards commitment to self-reliance, but also the earlier imposition of Education Trust Fund in some ECOWAS member states on the private sector, as an investment by the private sector in elections as a mechanism for democracy, development, peace and security in the ECOWAS region.



## **COUNTRY STUDY OF BENIN REPUBLIC**

### **A. Background**

The political history of Benin since the 1960s can be divided into three phases:

- The period 1960 - 1972, that is, the post-independence period characterized by chronic political instability as reflected in the record number of coups in Africa at that time;
- The period 1972 - 1990 of the revolutionary regime, characterized by a Marxist-military, one-party rule and deprivation of democratic freedoms;
- The period from 1990 to date, marked by the Democratic Renewal, which began with the National Conference of Living Forces in February 1990. This Conference ushered in a regime of democratic freedoms and a free market economy where human rights and public freedoms are recognized and enshrined in the December 1990 Constitution.

It is the period of Democratic Renewal which is of particular interest to us in this study. Indeed, in parallel with the expression of fundamental rights and public freedoms, including the right to freely choose leaders, it became necessary to remove election administration from the usual prerogatives of the Ministry of the Interior, a Department systematically controlled by one of the officials in the presidential camp, and shield it from the control of a public administration in view of the increasing politicization and lack of trust between political stakeholders. This led to the establishment of the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENA) in 1994 against the advice of the Government of the time but with the support of the Constitutional Court.<sup>1</sup>

Under Law No 2013-06 of 25 November 2013 on the Electoral Code in force, the CENA is in charge of the substantive organization and implementation of electoral operations, including « the preparation, organization, conduct, supervision of voting operations and centralization of results » (Article 15 of the Electoral Code). Although the CENA is at the heart of the electoral administration, the electoral architecture of Benin includes a whole series of institutional stakeholders: the Constitutional Court (legislative and presidential elections), Supreme Court (local, communal or municipal elections), High Authority for Audiovisual and Communication (HAAC), Ministry of the Interior and Security, Ministry of Decentralization and Territorial Administration, Ministry of National Defense, Ministry of Communication, Ministry for Relations with Institutions. To these stakeholders must be added a more recent one, the Guidance and Supervision Council of the Permanent Electronic Voting List (COS-LEPI). This body is not

---

<sup>1</sup>DCC No 34-94 of 23 December 1994

## Country Study of Benin Republic

directly involved in the electoral process, but it is responsible for upgrading, reviewing and updating of the electoral register, which must be done every year whether there are elections or not!

### B. Structure, Power, Functions & Mandates of the EMB

The Electoral Code of Benin devotes its entire Title III to the electoral management structure. Indeed, according to Article 13, « Elections shall be managed by a permanent administrative structure called the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENA).

*The Independent National Electoral Commission (CENA) has real autonomy compared to the institutions of the Republic (The Executive, National Assembly, Constitutional Court, Supreme Court, High Court of Justice, Economic and Social Council, High Authority for Audiovisual and Communication) ... ». Subsequently, Paragraph 2 stipulates that the CENA « shall draw up and manage its operational budget and the budget for the organization of elections and referenda in compliance with the budget and public accounting rules in force. These different budgets shall be integrated into the Overall National Budget ».*

The Table below, drawn from an outstanding UNDP/Benin study in October 2003, gives an idea of the distribution of the budget for the elections among the various stakeholders in Benin.

**Table 1: Cost of Benin's 2003 Communal and Legislative Elections (in millions of CFA Francs)**

Structures	Communal 2002/03	Legislative 2003
Min. of the Interior, Security and Territorial Administration	505	337
Constitutional Court	---	328
Ministry of National Defense	500	250
Min. Culture & Communication		
Supreme Court	150	375
HAAC	400	65
Min. Justice, Legislation & Human Rights	140	92
Min. of Mines & Energy		
DSL	30	26
Office of the President of the Republic	50	50
	82	50
	30	50
<b>Total</b>	<b>1 887</b>	<b>1 573</b>

*Charles Djèkpo, Joseph Gnonlonfoun, Sé N'bouro, Ouorou Boun: « Study on the strengthening of the electoral system in Benin ». UNDP/Benin, October 2003.*

Article 14 emphasizes that the CENA shall be provided with the necessary means from the State for its permanent functioning and the accomplishment of its mission. The powers of the CENA are extensive and somewhat upstream and downstream of the electoral operations. Benin's CENA is primarily responsible for the « *preparation, organization, conduct and supervision of voting operations and centralization of results; [...] organization and supervision of elections and referenda ...* » (Article 16). The Law also grants the CENA « *full powers of investigation to ensure free and fair elections* ». The CENA is required to file its general activity report no later than 30 days after the declaration of the results of elections. This report shall be sent to all institutions concerned by the elections and published on its website (Article 16, Paragraph 5).

The CENA is composed of 5 members, all appointed by the National Assembly among personalities recognized for their competence, probity, impartiality, morality, and sense of patriotism. Two (2) of the five (5) members of the CENA are appointed by parliamentary majority, two (2) by parliamentary minority and one (1) sitting judge, by the General Assembly who proposes to Parliament a list of three (3) sitting judges having served continuously for at least fifteen (15) years. Parliament chooses the sitting judge based on this list by two-thirds (2/3) majority vote (Article 19). Appointed by Decree of the Council of Ministers, members of the CENA have a non-renewable term of seven (7) years (Article 20). Before assuming duty, they take an oath of office before the Constitutional Court in a formal sitting (Article 25). The CENA is led by a three-member office elected by their peers including a President, a Vice President and a Budget Coordinator.

According to Article 27, « *the financial and accounting management of the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENA) shall be carried out by the Head of the Unit responsible for drawing up the preliminary draft budget under the supervision of the President of the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENA). The financial management is subject to the control of the Audit Chamber of the Supreme Court.* »

### **C. Types and Sources of Funding**

Law N° 2013-06 of 25 November 2013 lays down the general framework for financing of elections in Benin. It charges the expenditures related to the organization, management and monitoring of the regularity of electoral operations to the state. However, the technical and financial partners make significant contributions towards the funding of the elections. By way of comparison, this situation makes a significant difference with the case of Senegal which claims and applies the principle of absolute sovereignty in electoral expenditures, and therefore, does not accept contributions outside



## Country Study of Benin Republic

the electoral budget. Returning to the case of Benin, contributions from technical and financial partners can be direct, that is, in quantifiable financial inflows incorporated into the overall budget for the elections, or they can be indirect, especially when they form part of other contributions meant for the smooth running of the elections. This is the case, for example, of some donations of election materials (ballot boxes, voting booths, indelible ink etc.). Thus, two main types of funding elections can be highlighted:

- **Direct funding:** it comes from both the state and the technical and financial partners and constitute the general budget of elections. This budget amounted to fourteen billion, eight hundred and thirty-seven million, one hundred and fifty-three thousand, three hundred and four (14,837,153,304) CFA for the 2016 presidential elections. The budget for the 2015 legislative elections was three billion, eight hundred and eight million, seven hundred and sixty-six thousand, two hundred and sixty-one (3,808,766,261). The technical and financial partners include among others, Switzerland, Belgium, USA, Germany, Federal Republic of Nigeria, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the Delegation of the European Union in Benin, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) ... We can also mention here international NGOs such as the European Center for Electoral Support (ECES), Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA) etc.
- **Indirect funding:** It comprises other forms of funding other than cash and comes from both the state and technical and financial partners. In fact, indirect funding by donor countries or agencies include, for example, donations of election materials such as indelible ink, seals, ballot boxes, voting booths or even computer equipment. ..., providing the CENA with election experts in logistics, training and management of electoral operations (UNDP) or in other specific areas. It also involves technical support in the framework of training of polling agents (ECOWAS), donation in the form of vehicles (Federal Republic of Nigeria) etc. The indirect funding from the state may take the form of the provision of law enforcement agents to candidates for their security, airtime in public broadcasting houses for media campaign, transportation of election materials by the military, sample ballot papers for voter awareness campaign by candidates and political parties etc.

Though, over the last few elections, the trend in the financing of election campaign by the technical and financial partners is decreasing, it is worth mentioning that it may have been very high in the past. This is the case of the 2011 presidential and legislative elections during which Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, European Union and UNDP financed the elections through a « basket fund » amounting to US \$ 7, 674,105.



Some years earlier, for the 2007 legislative elections, the share of external contributions amounted to US \$ 1, 499, 299.87, or CFA Francs 749, 649, 935.

However, contributions of the technical and financial partners to the election budget do not necessarily create ambiguous relationships between them and the EMB, nor do they unduly impede the proper functioning of the EMB. Experience has shown that the CENA has often remained the sole authority for the organization of elections even when there has been significant funding. On the other hand, it has often had to pay attention to the concerns expressed by donors in terms of additional measures for transparency, or, where appropriate, appeasement measures and accountability during and at the end of the process (often multiple technical and financial reports prepared according to fairly strict criteria). Hence, a kind of administrative cost which is often significant.

However, it is at the level of Government/ EMB report that the inappropriate involvement comes to light. First of all, it concerns the questioning of the management autonomy of the EMB, particularly by the Ministry of Finance, which in fact, establishes the ex-ante monitoring of the institution's expenditure – instead of only the ex-post monitoring provided through a Financial Control Representative and a Regulator directly appointed by the Minister of Finance. This is even more important since some EMB expenses can be blocked by the Ministry of Finance, thus leading to electoral administration dysfunctions. We will provide greater detail later on the real facts about the CENA budgetary autonomy. Secondly, another direct involvement is reflected in the reliance of the EMB on the Executive to obtain electoral funds and the blackmail that may ensue, which will consequently impact the accomplishment of their missions. The disbursement of funds for the benefit of the EMB is therefore, primarily dependent on the political will of the government. When the funds are released late, it causes dysfunctions in the whole electoral chain: non-respect of commitments made, delays in the orders, delays in the implementation of the electoral calendar, socio-political tensions, exacerbation of mistrust, risk of postponement of elections, glossing over procedures, overbidding by service providers and consequent increase in the cost of elections etc. Thus, for example, the CENA may have to engage in de facto procedures with direct award of contracts that systematically contribute to higher cost of elections. In the same vein, late disbursement of electoral funds means that the training of electoral staff may be incomplete or even non-existent, unusual non-standard materials may be acquired, all with the unfortunate consequences of undermining the electoral process and the exacerbation of the already strong mistrust of political stakeholders towards the CENA.



## Country Study of Benin Republic

### D. Variable Costs of Elections (I): Legislative Provisions / Overview

The practice in Benin involves the drafting of a preliminary budget of election expenses by the CENA which is the subject for discussion and arbitration by the Minister of Finance during the budget conference in which the CENA participates as well as the other structures / institutions involved in the organization of elections, with the CENA as the lead authority. Ultimately, it is the Executive, through the Minister of Finance, which determines and sets the budget for the elections according to its own desiderata. It must be observed, on this point that, this practice is not exactly in the spirit of the electoral law which rather gives the CENA the prerogative to convene « *in conjunction with the Minister of Finance, a budget conference for the study, amendment and adoption of the general budget for the elections* »<sup>2</sup>. In other words, following the legal provisions, it is the CENA which determines and approves the budget for the elections, unlike the current situation described, which refers it to the state. The same is true for the conduct of the budget process, a process in which the other institutions involved in the organization, management and monitoring of elections directly submit their respective election budgets to the Minister of Finance in the same way as the CENA during the budget conference. However, Article 107, Paragraph 2 of the Electoral Code, stipulates that the CENA shall include in its preliminary draft budget, the budget proposals of other institutions involved in the organization, management and monitoring of elections and election related activities within their jurisdiction. After the centralization of the election budgets, the CENA shall convene, in conjunction with the Minister of Finance, the conference budget mentioned earlier.

It is worth mentioning that the experiences of many CENAs in the past did not always elicit trust in their management of the public funds made available to them on several occasions. At a certain point, not so long ago, the CENA was perceived as a kind of black box where the political parties that had won the fight to be represented, had a unique opportunity to enrich themselves at the same time as their representatives grew rich. This favored a kind of tightening, a take-over by the state, in the case of the Executive which had not done much in terms of the financial autonomy for the EMB. This may explain the current situation only to some extent. While we can understand the concerns of the Executive that taxpayers' money should be better managed, which is also what we expect from them of what they are directly involved in (apart from elections), it is clear that the solution does not lie in setting aside the law, in particular, the violation of the principle of autonomy of the CENA. We must find a respectful balance of the law, a balance that could be found in the full autonomy of the CENA so that it can best accomplish its missions and conduct an effective ex-post monitoring and where necessary, be strengthened. In comparison with Senegal, the second francophone countries covered in this study, where the budget discussion process to determine the budget for the elections seems more participatory, in Benin, and in the light of what the relevant stakeholders say, this process is hardly participatory or only appears as such. The Minister of Finance appears all powerful and the CENA in Benin is treated like any administration without taking account of the specific requirements of electoral issues. Drastic cuts are made harshly and without regard to the

---

<sup>2</sup>Article 107, Paragraph 2 of the Electoral Law

repercussions that this could have on the quality and speed of the electoral process, thus without taking account of the relevance of the items considered. Some budgets can also be rejected outright. Thus, for example, in anticipation of the 2019 legislative elections in Benin, the CENA submitted early 2018 a budget to carry out a series of pre-election activities. Unlike Senegal where, between 2017 and early 2018 the DGE had already launched most of the preparatory activities ahead of the 2019 presidential elections (including procurement), in Benin, the CENA has not received a dime since its pre-election budget suffered outright rejection from the Government! As regards the procurement process, it involves three key stakeholders namely the Budget Coordinator, Budget Authorizing Officer and the Representative of the Financial Controller to the CENA. The latter is appointed by Order of the Minister of Finance on the proposal of the Financial Controller<sup>3</sup>. Thus, the Budget Coordinator is the initiator of the procedure in that it is incumbent upon him to make a proposal for any expenditure on the purchase of goods and services. This commitment proposal is then captured in a purchase order or contract initiated in the forms required by the Budget Coordinator, then submitted for approval by the Representative of the Financial Controller as well as the Budget Authorizing Officer who shall determine the appropriateness before sending notification to the supplier or service provider<sup>4</sup>. Article 17 of the Financial Regulations rightly recalls that « prior to the making of any purchase of supplies, equipment, services, the Budget Coordinator shall observe the rules of competitive bidding, including those prescribed by the implementation of public expenditure procedures and the Public Procurement Code applicable in the Republic of Benin ». In other words, any procurement process carried out by the CENA is strictly subject to an open tender whose rules are prescribed in the Public Procurement Code and it must be necessarily be controlled and validated by the Representative of the Financial Controller to the CENA.

#### **E. Variable Costs of Elections (II): Sources, Processes and Factors**

The issue of financing of elections has not been expressly addressed in the Constitution. Law N° 2013-06 of 27 September 2013 on the Electoral Code of the Republic of Benin deals with the financing of elections, in its Article 107. Under the 1st Paragraph of this Article, « *the expenses relating to the organization, management and monitoring of the regularity of electoral operations shall be borne by the State* »<sup>5</sup>. The election budget is thus to a large extent increasingly financed by the contribution of the Benin Government and support from foreign donors. This budget is approved by the Minister of Finance.

During the preparation of the election budget, some factors may emerge and influence the process. First, it is the “corridor game” of the political parties through their representatives within the CENA. In the past, we saw CENAs whose members obeyed instructions from their party leaders and/or party alliances than from their hierarchy within the institution! In fact, the preparation of the election budget of the CENA constitutes a major stake for these political parties which find in the elections some quasi-legal opportunities to gain or restore financial health. Of course, this mechanism for the extraction of public resources could be achieved using illegal or unorthodox means: award of procurement contracts

<sup>3</sup>Article 13 of the Financial and Accounting Rules of the CENA

<sup>4</sup>See Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Financial and Accounting Rules of the CENA

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.



## Country Study of Benin Republic

under dubious conditions, terrible disputes within this institution even in public between EMB members for the choice of service providers: hiring of cars, purchase of consumables, catering services, preparation of election documents (ballots, counting sheets etc.) ... These means and practices reveal the behind-the-scenes maneuvers that influence even the very process of election budget and its implementation, with a consequent impact on the final cost of the elections.

The other important factor that influences the election budget preparation process is undoubtedly the criticisms and the near systematic watch by public opinion which does not hesitate to point out to the CENA the rise in the cost of elections each time it prepares its budget or when it releases the figures of its preliminary draft election budget. Thus, the expression of citizens' concerns about the soaring cost of elections, although legitimate, puts additional pressure on the CENA which is thus torn between the obligation of rationalizing electoral expenditure and that of organizing elections acceptable by all with the resources earmarked. In addition, the pressure of the state departments, for that matter, the Ministry of Finance, and the Sword of Damocles which constitute the audits are elements that compels the CENA to improve its management. Finally, it should be mentioned that the environment has changed a lot. While we cannot attest that the previously described practices have disappeared, the fact is that the extent is probably not the same today. One of the interesting and significant indications is the fact that the appointment of members of the CENA which has for a long time been the subject of vigorous fights between parliamentarians is mainly dispassionate today. This description was made with reference to the last three elections (2015 – 2016) which took place quite calmly without clashes and practically with some degree of consensus. In addition, the process for the preparation of the election budget differs from that of the EMB's annual budget or operating budget during an election year. On the other hand, regarding the period or the time, the preparation of the election budget of the CENA is done in the pre-election year, that is to say, the year preceding a year during which the elections will be organized, while the operating budget is systematically developed each year. From the foregoing, it can be noted that the operating budget is drawn up on an annual basis while the election budget is drafted in the pre-election year. On the other hand, when it comes to the substantive procedure, the CENA, while drawing up the preliminary draft of its election budget (in pre-election year), thus include, as indicated earlier, the budget proposals of the other institutions involved in the organization, management and monitoring of elections. This procedure is conducted separately from that which leads to the adoption of the operating budget of the institution, even in the election year. In other words, in the election year, the CENA has both its operating budget, which is the ordinary or annual budget and its election budget that will be used to cover the election expenses. However, the process for the development of the election budget of the CENA is fraught with some difficulties. These can be summed up in the delay in the transmission of the preliminary draft budgets of the Ministries and institutions involved in the electoral process and the cumbersome administrative procedures that have negative effects on the processing of files. Indeed, the transmission of preliminary draft budgets by the bodies and institutions involved in the chain of elections is a prerequisite for the adoption of the said budget by the Minister of Finance. The CENA which is generally on schedule is often



delayed by other institutions whose preparation of the preliminary budgets suffers from significant lack of speed which adversely affects the adoption of the overall budget.

Then, in the disbursement process, it is the endless cumbersome administrative procedures that constitute the major constraint. Indeed, disbursement usually depends on the goodwill of the government which can delay the provision of the required funds to the CENA. In fact, the CENA has to go to great lengths and sometimes proceed by condemnations and pressure through the media or in desperation, resort to the Constitutional Court to decide or force the government to provide funds earmarked in the budget for the elections. Generally, either the funds do not get to the CENA by the date required or do not represent the percentage of disbursement desired and planned by the EMB. Yet still, the CENA must have a free hand in the implementation of its budget. This does not seem to be the case when reference is made to the practice and the provisions of the Financial and Accounting Regulations of the CENA. Indeed, under Article 13 of the said regulation, the Representative of the Financial Controller to the CENA, « [...] shall monitor the fiscal, legal and financial regularity of the operating expenditures of the CENA, [...] verify the genuineness of the expenditure estimates [...] ». Two observations can be made when reading these provisions. The first is the implementation of the ex-ante monitoring over the entire operating expenditure of the CENA. The second observation is that of the ex-ante monitoring implementation body, the Representative of the Financial Controller. However, the Electoral Code, reference text for elections in Benin, instituted only an ex-post monitoring which is exercised exclusively by the Audit Chamber of the Supreme Court<sup>6</sup>. Thus, with this provision, the electoral law remained in the logic of the guarantee for « real autonomy » that it conferred on the CENA compared to the institutions of the Republic (Executive, National Assembly, Constitutional Court, Supreme Court, High Court of Justice, Economic and Social Council, High Authority for Audiovisual and Communication)<sup>7</sup>. In practice, this ex-ante monitoring which is clearly contrary to the spirit and the letter of the electoral law, even though it is provided for by a regulation, is also a source of delays in the management process of the electoral funds of the CENA. In addition, taking into account the hierarchy of standards, the Decree on the Financial and Accounting Regulation of the CENA cannot go further than the law, which however seems to be the case here. Regarding ex post monitoring, apart from that of the Chamber of Accounts provided for by the law, the Ministry of Finance conducts audits. The current CENA has undergone as least two audits within one year. The delay in the disbursement of funds for the elections may have led, in several cases, to obstructions or threats of obstructions of electoral activities by election officers, including the agents of the branches of the CENA. The latter complain about not getting their allowances in time even though the CENA has completed all the formalities required to obtain the necessary funds.

---

<sup>6</sup>See Article 27 of the Electoral Law.

<sup>7</sup>See Article 13 of the Electoral Law



## Country Study of Benin Republic

### F. Variable Costs of Elections (III): Main Election budget / Analysis of Trends and Gaps

The election budget generally includes nine (9) budget items which are structured around the following elements:

1. Election materials (ballot boxes, voting booths, trunks, counting and results processing software)
2. Election documents (ballot papers, counting sheet, various registers...)
3. Election supplies and consumables (seals, rechargeable electric lamps, wax, cartridges, calculators, scissors, pens...)
4. Cost of electoral staff (allowance to members at the distribution centers, regulators' mission expenses, other various allowances and fees)
5. External services (rental for transportation of heavy and sensitive equipment, rental of vehicle for regulator, rental leases...)
6. Fuel (provision of fuel for the transportation of equipment, provision of fuel to move equipment from districts to polling stations...)
7. Communication (sensitization, artists, media coverage, communication of district coordinators)
8. Other miscellaneous expenses (medical emergency, creation of CENA website + accommodation, facilitation and maintenance, election night...)
9. Contingencies.

**Table 2: Budgets of CENA Benin 2015 Legislative 2016 Presidential Elections**

BUDGETS OF CENA - BENIN		
Legislative 2015		Presidential 2016
Items	Costs in CFA Francs	
Election materials	27,800,000	9,617,153,304
Election documents	1,188,448,930	
Electoral supplies and consumables	216,128,100	
Cost of electoral staff	1,694,392,000	
External services and rental charges	355,065,000	
Fuel	73,650,000	
Communication	25,460,000	
Other miscellaneous charges	139,720,000	
Contingencies	88,102,231	
Total	3,808,766,261	

An analysis of the cumulative budgets of the 2015 legislative and local government elections shows that the election documents and staff expenses constitute the most expensive budget items, with 5,810,183,896 CFA Francs and 3,358,418,500 CFA Francs respectively. Followed by supplies and consumables amounting to 1,789,801,709 CFA Francs and external services costing 773.002.304 CFA Francs. The high cost of staff can be explained by the multiplicity of stakeholders involved in the electoral process. Also, in an election year, it is not unusual to find that the election budget is not always separate from the operating budget of the institutions and bodies involved in the electoral process. Officially, the election budget is always 100% implemented by all stakeholders in the electoral process. The reality is often more complex and subtler. Some information shows several scenarios: sometimes the budget is implemented in its totality, other times, there are leftovers which are never declared: a persistent practice in the local public administration wishing that one never declares the budget balances for fear of having to pay them back and, above all, to be cut off from future budget allocations. Or in another case, the budget is prepared in a way as to provide niches to cover expenses relating to the operating budget or ordinary budget of the institution or body concerned. In other words, the election budget is used to fill gaps in the ordinary budget. Finally, in the last scenario, the budget allocated for the elections is insufficient and the institution concerned is obliged to draw funds from its regular operating budget to finance electoral costs. These are overruns of the election budget due to insufficient electoral funds granted.<sup>8</sup> This is a scenario contrary to the previous one. In this case, it is the regular budget of the EMB that makes up for the shortfall in the election budget and thus serves to carry out expenditure of the same nature. This was the case of the 2015 legislative and local government elections where most of the budget items were overrun. Thus, the item related to supplies and consumables were executed at 247%, representing an overrun of 1,063,877,559 CFA Francs. The same applies to the item on election materials executed at 273%, or an excess of 416,955,344 CFA Francs. The item on election documents was overspent by 170% of 2,393,175,076 CFA Francs in excess.

Analysis of the election budgets since 1996 shows an increase in the overall cost of elections as indicated in the Table below:

**Table 3: Trends in the cost of elections in Benin since 1996**

Presidential		Legislative	
Year	Cost	Year	Cost
1996	1,491,000,000	1999	3,665,000,000
2001	6,223,000,000	2003	6,668,000,000
2006	12,285,786,000	2007	
2011	8,858,778,250 (*)	2011	(*)
2016	14,837,153,304	2015	5,725,286,999

<sup>8</sup>See also, in the Annex, the Financial Report of the CENA 2011.

## Country Study of Benin Republic

(\*) This is the cumulative budget of the 2011 presidential and legislative elections. This cumulative budget was CFA Francs 8 858 778 250 including CFA Francs 5 788 423 700 under the National Budget and CFA Francs 3 070 354 550 under contribution of Development Partners represented by UNDP Benin.

Moreover, it is equally important to note that several budget lines are not usually included in the general budget for the elections, partly because they have been financed indirectly. For example, the use of official vehicles, fuel, mission expenses, use of administrative equipment, provision of election experts for the CENA, donations of means of transport, training members of the CENA and election officers, transportation of election equipment by the military engineers etc, are significant cost items that are not usually included in the general budget for the elections and yet represent a significant portion which should be taken into account to obtain actual election costs.

**Table 4: Summary of expenses incurred or not (2011 Presidential and Legislative Elections).**

Items	Amounts
Expendable /non expendable equipment/ national budget	1 979 867 870
Operations of the CENA and its branches	1 754 054 002
Other operating costs	160 588 090
Expendable /non expendable equipment /UNDP	2 253 639 550
Other operating costs CEC & CEA/ UNDP	82 215 000
Statement of CEC support staff in the process of being paid	55 390 000
Blank statement paid and to be justified by the regulator	269 893 200
Off-budget expenses paid	386 599 200
Night shift / performance allowances CED/CEC/CEA	702 975 000
Total	7 645 221 912

*Source: CENA General Report, November 2011 (presidential and legislative elections).*

### G. Variable costs of elections (IV): Opportunities and Challenges

- Elections are expensive, but it would be unfair to attribute it solely to EMBs. In the case of Benin, for example, at least eight (8) institutional stakeholders are added to the CENA. We should be able to question the relevance of each of the links in the electoral chain, related costs and the possibility of finding alternative solutions.
- Institutions such as Parliament, while being indirect stakeholders here, also contribute upstream to the higher cost of elections. As an illustration, a few years ago, the National

Assembly of Benin decided to add 2 new members including 1 representative of the Parliamentary majority and 1 representative of the Parliamentary minority appointed by Parliament to the 3 members of the polling station (Article 76 of the Electoral Code). This addition may seem superfluous because the CENA was already required to respect the minimum balance between the political forces in the composition of the polling stations. In addition to the real difficulty of political stakeholders in actually finding the people required (30 000 assuming there are 15 000 polling stations!), such a requirement creates additional costs especially since Parliament bears the said costs through the budget of the CENA!

- The election budget policy as implemented in Benin is likely to increase the cost of elections. Budgeting for the cost of elections, making funds available in time, organizing the necessary expenditure in time (for example in the pre-election year) ... helps to reduce the cost of elections. On the other hand, carrying out the same operations in an emergency greatly contributes to the high cost of elections. This is the case, for example, of the order of ballot papers which is subjected to the blackmail of providers because it is almost always done at the last minute as a matter of urgency. According to the information gathered, the unit cost of ballot papers would drop by at least half if the order was placed in time through proper planning.
- It is advisable to recommend that the government discuss with the CENA since it is true that the members of the EMB are still those who, despite their position that could be described as both judge and party, are able to suggest interesting and judicious lines of action to reduce the cost of elections.
- In Benin and in Senegal as well, it seems there is a lack of specific and comprehensive mechanism for coordinating the preparation of the election budget. All stakeholders participate in the budget conference, although the CENA takes on the mantle of leadership in dealing with the Ministry of Finance. Better still, the budget allocated to the other institutional stakeholders in the electoral process passes through the CENA of Benin. But, that is all ! Beyond that, there is no specific mechanism for any kind of feedback to have a clear view of the actual use of the budget for the elections by each of the stakeholders concerned. Thus, each stakeholder, taken individually, can say how they have implemented their budget. But, none can speak for the others. »  
All these makes the exact assessment of the cost of elections complex and difficult beyond the projected costs. This is even more important as it is obvious that, despite the open-mindedness and the sincere cooperation of some stakeholders that we should acknowledge and thank – which allowed us to feed this study – most remain reluctant to be transparent about the reality of the actual election expenses, about the sharing of documents with figures while being vocal on the other aspects.





## Country Study of Benin Republic

### H. Major findings

- As Gino ALAVO<sup>9</sup> writes in his internship report on election expenses in Benin : « [...] election expenses are constantly increasing (growth rate) from one election to the next ; the trends are however different depending on the elections : +80% between 2001 and 2006, + 24% between 2011 and 2016 for presidential elections, + 33% for the legislative elections from 2007 to 2011, slight stability for two elections from 2006 to 2011 (presidential) and from 2007 to 2011 (legislative) ... ».
- The large share of electoral personnel expenses in the electoral budget: this situation can be explained, on one hand, by the multiplicity of stakeholders involved in the electoral chain and, on the other, by the inappropriate nature of certain expenses relating to this budget item. With regard to the multiplicity of stakeholders, the legislator, as already mentioned, thought it necessary to increase the number of members at the polling stations due to the longstanding mistrust between the political stakeholders, through Article 76 of the Electoral Code. This measure had a significant financial impact that the legislator imposes on the election budget of the CENA. With regard to the inappropriateness or irrelevance of certain expenses, we shall take for example the mission expenses of regulators for the payment of election officers and allowances to journalists. Indeed, the CENA could have proceeded to pay election officers through mobile money payment (Moov and MTN) as did the UNDP during the 2016 presidential elections for the observers of the civil society platform that it managed. As for as the allowances to journalists are concerned, they could be taken directly into account by the High Authority for Audiovisual and Communication (HAAC) or the Ministry of Communication instead of appearing separately in the budgets of the various institutions.
- The heavy financial impact of emergency procedures: the election budget process, from the preparation to the disbursement of funds, highlights a quasi-inertia in pre-election years and almost at the eve of elections, there is a sudden eagerness marked by the implementation of emergency procedures that generate additional costs that are inappropriate and, in any case, perfectly avoidable. However, anticipating and implementing certain activities in the pre-election year should help to reduce or maintain, in reasonable proportions, related expenses.
- The absence of a binding mechanism of accountability for the use of election funds by the Ministries and bodies involved in elections: An important factor which is not conducive for transparency in the implementation of electoral budget is the fact that state institutions that have received electoral funds are not obliged to publish activity reports providing details on the execution of budgets allocated to them. Consequently, it is difficult to have an idea, and worst till, obtain budget documents of these bodies after the elections. The practice therefore remains, unfortunately, a total freedom in the management of funds without any

<sup>9</sup>Gino ALAVO: The cost of an election in Benin. Analysis of the cost of expenses of the two stakeholders: the CENA and the political parties. 2017.



obligation for accountability from one election to the other. To this accountability must be added a systematic post electoral audit of the budget received and used during the election in question.

- The non-inclusion of indirect financing in the election budget: certain non-financial contributions from both the state and foreign partners are not included in the election budget lines. However, these contributions have non-negligible financial that should be included in the budget for the elections to have a more realistic cost overall election cost.
- The longstanding mistrust between political stakeholders has led them to demand additional transparency measures, which may result in an increase in the election budget. One of these measures has already resulted in a significant increase in the cost of ballot papers, for example, during the 2011 presidential elections due to the production of ultra-security ballot papers.

## **I. Recommendations**

- An objective assessment of the cost of elections in Africa necessarily involves the inclusion of elements that are not taken into account in the budget lines but ultimately contribute to the overall cost of elections, including the depreciation of various of equipment. To this end, all indirect contributions whether from the state or partners should be recorded in a quantified statement or assessed in order to determine their actual cost. This would give an overall idea of the real cost of the elections.
- The rationalization of the election budgets necessarily involves anticipation, timely implementation and compliance with legal procedures for the award of contracts. To avoid additional costs, it is preferable and more appropriate that certain preparatory activities and, for that matter, certain expenses should be carried out in the pre-election year. Procurement made according to regular procedures and without pressure will be at the normal cost and will contribute to the reduction of the overall cost of elections.
- Make the budgetary autonomy of the CENA effective by giving it a free hand in the preparation, disbursement and implementation of its election budget. For this purpose, it is necessary to review modalities for the ex-ante monitoring in a way as to take account of the specific nature of electoral expenditures.
- There is also the need to reconcile the compliance with financial procedures with the specific nature of electoral operations and time constraints.



## Country Study of Benin Republic

- Coordinate, in practice, and cross-check the items and budget lines of the various bodies and institutions involved in the elections to avoid duplication of similar activities and parallel spending.
- Establish a rigorous mechanism for the recovery, storage and maintenance of electoral material at the level of the CENA.
- Set as principle and require any body or institutions that has benefited from public electoral funds to produce and publish budget execution reports for the said funds back by supporting documents
- Systematically conduct an audit of institutions that received public funds for election expenses. Publish the related audit reports.
- Strongly encourage ECOWAS countries to fully fund their elections as part of respecting their sovereignty.
- Standardize and generalize within the ECOWAS space a three-year strategic budget planning based on Senegal's example with specific disbursement plans; and release funds on schedule
- Conduct, at the national level, reflections on the harmonization of measures aimed at financially taking care of all support staff employed by institutions responsible for the electoral process.

## J. ANNEXES

### ANNEX 1

#### FINANCIAL REPORT /CENA 2011

Sworn in on 25 January 2011 by the Constitutional Court, the CENA which had the heavy responsibility for organizing the 2011 presidential and legislative elections was put to work very early.

The budget unit prepared a draft budget for an amount of CFA Francs 13,527,126,200. After a study, analysis and amendment with the government and discussions with the UNDP, the budget sum adopted stood at EIGHT BILLION, HUNDRED AND FIFTY MILLION, SEVEN HUNDRED AND SIXTY-EIGHT THOUSAND, TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY (8,858,778,250) CFA FRANCS including:

- 5,788,423,700 from the national budget;
- 3,070,354,550 from UNDP funding.

#### **This report presents for the two presidential and legislative elections:**

- Transfer or payment orders as of 05 June 2011 as indicated in the statement of account on 31/05/11;
- Expenses incurred and executed as of 05 June 2011;
- The statements prepared in the process of being paid;
- Difficulties encountered
- Approaches to solutions.

# Country Study of Benin Republic

## ANNEX 2:

### DETAILED BUDGET FOR THE 2007 LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS SUPPORT PROJECT

Heading	Amount		
	CFAF	US\$ *	Euro**
<b>Output 1: An effective election management system is in place</b>			
1.1. Advocacy, exchanges/political dialogue for installation of the CENA and its branches on the right date.			
1.2. Travel	5 000 000	10 000	7 622.45
1.3. Communication	10 000 000	20 000	15 244.90
<b>Total Output 1</b>	<b>15 000 000</b>	<b>30 000</b>	<b>22 867.35</b>
<b>Output 2: All election equipment acquired and distributed on time</b>			
2.1. Preparation of the inventory of needs expressed			
2.2. Purchase of heavy election equipment	150 000 000	3 587	3 049
2.3. Purchase of light equipment	350 000 000	700 000	533 571.56
2.4. Movement of election equipment to the EDCs, CECs, ECAs and Polling stations	2 000 000	3 587	3 049
<b>Total Output 2</b>	<b>502 000 000</b>	<b>710 761</b>	<b>542 719</b>
<b>Output 3: Enhanced election information quality and voting well conducted</b>			
3.2. Selection of institutions, media organizations and NGOs that provide services	500 000	1000	762.245
3.3. Organization of different types of training	10 000 000	20 000	15 244.90
3.4. Observation on election day	45 000 000	90 000	68 602.05
3.5. Counting and data processing	20 000 000	40 000	30 489.80
3.6. Preparation and submission of observation report	PM	PM	PM
<b>Total Output 3</b>	<b>75 500 000</b>	<b>151 000</b>	<b>115 099.00</b>
<b>Output 4: The Project is effectively managed</b>			
4.1. Recruitment and establishment of the project unit	14 630 000	29 260	22 303.29
4.2. Establishment of steering committee	500 000	1 000	762.24
4.3. Development of detailed operations plan	PM	PM	PM
4.4. Supervision of project activities/Missions within the country	2 000 000	4 000	3 048.98
4.5. Regular meetings of the steering committee	1 000 000	2 000	1 524.49
4.6. Project Audit and Evaluation	15 000 000	30 000	22 867.35
<b>Total Output 4 :</b>	<b>33 130 000</b>	<b>66 260</b>	<b>50 506.35</b>
<i>Contingencie s (5%)</i>	<i>31 281 500</i>	<i>62 563.00</i>	<i>50 095.62</i>
UNDP management fee	32 860 575.00	65 721.15	50 095.62
<b>TOTAL BUDGET</b>	<b>690 072 075.00</b>	<b>1 380 144.15</b>	<b>1 052 008.10</b>
Contribution from UNDP and the Netherlands	591 967 750	1 183 935.50	902 449.02
Expected contributions from other partners	98 104 325	196 208.65	149 559.08

\* : US \$ 1 = CFAF 500

\*\* : 1Euro = CFAF 655.957

**ANNEX 3:**

**TABLE OF SUMMARY OF BUDGET FORECASTS AND ACTUAL  
 EXPENDITURES FOR THE 2015 ELECTORAL PROCESS**

N°	INSTITUTIONS	MUNICIPAL, COMMUNAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS	LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS	TOTAL MEF DISBURSED	EXECUTION
1	CENA	5,245,739,155	3,712,766,261	12,824,221,428	13,418,882,436
2	SUPREME COURT	550,000,000	100,000,000	650,000,000	650,000,000
3	HAAC	350,000,000	220,000,000	570,000,000	570,000,000
4	MDGLAAT	205,000,000	150,000,000	355,000,000	355,000,000
5	MISPC	500,000,000	400,000,000	900,000,000	900,000,000
6	MDN	500,000,000	400,000,000	900,000,000	900,000,000
7	MCTIC	240,000,000	210,000,000	450,000,000	450,000,000
8	MCRI	70,000,000	30,000,000	100,000,000	100,000,000
9	CONSTITUTIONAL COURT	0	502,520,738	502,520,738	502,520,738
		7,660,739,155	5,725,286,999	17,251,742,166	17,846,403,174

**SOURCE : DCAF/CB/CENA (Benin)**



## Country Study of Benin Republic

### ANNEX 4

**TABLE OF SUMMARY OF BUDGET FORECASTS AND ACTUAL EXPENDITURES FOR THE 2016 ELECTORAL PROCESS**

N°	INSTITUTIONS	ELECTORAL ALLOCATIONS 2016	EXPENDITURES 2016
1	CENA	9,617,153,304	9,596,759,373
2	SUPREME COURT	120,000,000	120,000,000
3	HAAC	500,000,000	500,000,000
4	MDGLAAT	250,000,000	250,000,000
5	MISPC	1,100,000,000	1,100,000,000
6	MDN	1,500,000,000	1,500,000,000
7	MCTIC	250,000,000	250,000,000
8	MCRI	200,000,000	200,000,000
9	CONSTITUTIONAL COURT	1,300,000,000	1,300,000,000
		14,837,153,304	14,816,759,373

**SOURCE : DCAF/CB/CENA (Benin)**



## **COUNTRY STUDY OF CABO VERDE**

### **A. Introduction, Objectives and Methodology**

This report was prepared within the framework of the regional study commissioned by ECOWAS Network of Electoral Commissions (ECONEC) on the cost of legislative and presidential elections in the ECOWAS region. It provides information on the cost of national elections (presidential and legislative) in Cabo Verde.

The overall goal of this study is to identify the factors behind the escalating cost of elections in ECOWAS Member States and make practical recommendations for the management and control of the full costs of elections in the sub-region.

#### **In specific terms, the study intends to:**

- Compare and analyze elections cost in the ECOWAS sub-region;
- Develop a matrix to assess and rate the overall cost of an election using the electoral project approach;
- Identify the sources, trends and innovations regarding election funding in ECOWAS Member States;
- Point out best practices, in terms of compliance with the principles of transparency and accountability in planning election budgets, as well as the best practices, rules and regulations for the allocation and control of election funds;
- Suggest new guidelines for election cost management and control policies in the ECOWAS sub-region.

In this study, the terms, "cost of elections" refers to "variable operational costs" related to the holding of elections, which constitute the entire budget for a specific election, for example, specific general elections (presidential and legislative elections) in election years. According to current elections theory and standard practice, the main expenses are incurred on the following activities: voter registration, demarcation of constituencies, ballot operations, vote counting and transmission of results, tabulation of results, voters' education and information, political parties and candidates' campaigns and the observation by political parties' representatives and national and international observers<sup>1</sup>. For analytical purposes, we will disaggregate the election approved budget into (i) approved budget; II) amount released; and (iii) amount of actual costs incurred. The study will

<sup>1</sup> Goodwin-Gill, Lopez-Pinto 2000; OSCE 2001, EU 2002, IDEA 2002



## Country Study of Cabo Verde

target the last three general elections in each of the six countries covered by the study. The six countries are: Liberia and Nigeria (Anglophone); Republic of Benin and Senegal (Francophone); and Cabo Verde and Guinea-Bissau (Lusophone). It will be our responsibility to carry out the study in these two ECOWAS Portuguese-speaking countries. As this study is essentially a "mapping" or "cartographic" study, the methodology used is not a full-blown one, but it will involve the use of the following research/ study tools: desk research: mandate (powers, functions and institutional structure of the electoral management body in each country) in the broader context of each country's history of competitive party and electoral politics; political reform and national economic policy; procurement procedures and their implications for budgetary allocations to the electoral management body; unbundling of funding sources for the electoral management body and their impact on credible and timely elections; and the linkage between the electoral management body and key stakeholders, etc.

### B. Country Context

Cabo Verde is a small island state that belongs to the group of low middle income countries. The country has a stable democracy and has experienced three alternations of power, both at legislative and presidential elections, since the adoption of a multi-party system in 1991. Political reforms to establish the country as a liberal democracy started in 1990 and they facilitated the first free multi-party legislative and presidential elections in the country in 1991. The multi-party system was enshrined in the 1992 Constitution and the two major parties in the country - Movement for Democracy (MPD) and African Party for the Independence of Cabo Verde (PAICV) - were in power alternately for 10 and 15 years respectively.

In the meantime, besides the Independent and Democratic Union of Cape Verde (UCID) which was created before the political opening, other 5 political parties were created in the pluralist democracy period, some of them being inactive for several years as shown in the table in Annex 1. From 2006 to 2016, the period under review, the number of candidates to each legislative and presidential election are indicated in the following table:

**Table 1: Number of candidates per election cycle**

Elections /Year	2006	2011	2016
Presidential	2	4	3
Legislative	5	5	6

The economic and social development of Cabo Verde in a pluralistic context focused on promoting a market economy and human development, through efforts to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). This started with the National Development Plan (NDP) 1997-2000 and had significant developments in the NDP 2002-2005 and in the three Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers: PRSP I 2006-2007, PRSP II 2008-2011 and PRSP III 2012-2015. In 1997, the planning took a strategic dimension, based on the 1997 and 2002 editions of "Grand Options Plan" document as the pillars for the construction of the long-term development vision. The successive Governments of Cabo Verde have managed to build successfully a Nation, by promoting human development, poverty alleviation, economic growth and increase in revenues, which led the country to its graduation to middle-income country status in 2008. The country made progress in its human development index (HDI), having increased its score from 0.532 in 2000 (when the index was first published in Cabo Verde) to 0.648, in 2015, above the average of 0.631 for the group of middle income countries and above the average of 0.523 for Sub-Saharan Africa countries<sup>2</sup>.

The recent international rankings show that Cabo Verde has made major strides in its efforts to achieve social and economic development. The Index of the Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU) ranked Cape Verde in 23rd place out of 167 countries in 2016<sup>3</sup>, while Freedom House ranked Cabo Verde among the first countries according to the Freedom in the World Index. Cabo Verde was always ranked among the top three countries on the continent by the Mo Ibrahim Foundation Index of African Governance. Abstention rates and political bipolarization are striking features of liberal democracy in Cabo Verde, as well as the unequal access to opportunities for the people, in an insular and archipelagic environment where the so-called outer islands are at a slower pace as regards democracy and development. The Government is committed to strengthening democracy, especially through the continuous modernization of the electoral system. In the Government Program for the 9th parliamentary term, 2016-2021, "the Government makes a firm commitment to do all it can to promote a wide-ranging debate with civil society and other political actors, a detailed review of (...) democratic path and the actual 'compliance' with the Constitution to improve the quality of the democratic system and experience in the country, so that the Cape Verdean democracy becomes more participatory, increasingly meets the legitimate aspirations of the citizens and draw closer to the level of more advanced democracies".<sup>4</sup>

### **C. Structure, Power and Functions of the EMBs**

Electoral administration and management bodies are structured according to voter registration, administration, monitoring and supervision functions. The electoral code, revised in 2010, covers in a segregated manner, voter registration institutions, administrative institutions and monitoring institutions, such as:

<sup>2</sup>Human Development Report 2016, Cabo Verde, [http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr\\_theme/country-notes/CPV.pdf](http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/CPV.pdf)

<sup>3</sup>the Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU).[https://www.eiu.com/public/topical\\_report.aspx?campaignid=DemocracyIndex2016](https://www.eiu.com/public/topical_report.aspx?campaignid=DemocracyIndex2016)

<sup>4</sup>[http://www.governo.cv/images/Programa\\_do\\_Governo\\_da\\_IX\\_Legislatura\\_2016-\\_2021.pdf](http://www.governo.cv/images/Programa_do_Governo_da_IX_Legislatura_2016-_2021.pdf)



## Country Study of Cabo Verde

- National Electoral Commission (CNE - Portuguese acronym)
- Voter Registration Commissions (CRE - Portuguese acronym)
- Directorate General for Support to the Electoral Process (DGAPE - Portuguese acronym)

In Cabo Verde, the National Electoral Commission is the highest independent election management body with powers to supervise, regulate and oversee all voter registration activities and electoral operations. Although it is located near the National Assembly, CNE is an independent body with administrative and financial autonomy and does not report to any political body. However, the financial autonomy enjoyed by CNE is limited to financial management because operational expenses are supported by the budget allocated by the State, through the Ministry of Finance. The National Electoral Commission is governed by Law No. 56/VII/2010 of 9 March and by its Internal Regulations, which govern its internal functioning.

In Cabo Verde, the electoral logistics is under the direct responsibility of the Directorate General for Support to the Electoral Process and the Voter Registration Commission. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Communities (Directorate General of Communities, Consular Affairs and Emigration) is responsible for voter registration in the Diaspora. The current Electoral Code of Cabo Verde, which amended the procedure for general voter registration, also adopted a system where each island corresponds to a constituency. It should be noted that this division was previously a municipality, except for the island of Santiago, the largest and most populated island of the archipelago. With this change, this island has been divided into two constituencies: Santiago North and Santiago South. In terms of management of the electoral process, the Electoral Code reinforces the powers of the National Electoral Commission (CNE) by assigning to it most of the functions formerly performed by the Directorate General for Support to the Electoral Process (DGAPE), the institution in charge of administration and elections data base management.

The current legislation imposes the principles of impartiality and transparency on the State bodies, especially in the two months preceding the elections, during which inaugurations and the sod cutting for public projects are prohibited.

### **In accordance with the Electoral Code (Article 18), the CNE powers are to:**

- Ensure freedom and regularity of elections, equal opportunities and equal treatment of candidates and the respect for other fundamental principles of the electoral process, set out in the Constitution, this Code and other legislation, by adopting all the necessary measures;



- Guarantee citizens' equal treatment and the fairness, impartiality and objectivity of all electoral administration services and agents in the performance of their duties;
- Promote, organize, direct and supervise, in line with the Electoral Code, the establishment of polling and tabulation stations during elections, within the framework of its powers;
- Issue generic instructions to voter registration bodies and polling stations on the interpretation and application of the law, without prejudice to their functional independence and the provisions regarding objections to the validity of elections;
- Monitor and control the operations of voter registration and voting, adopting measures and promoting efforts to ensure their compliance with the law;
- Promote citizens' understanding of electoral operations;
- Create a group of staff for polling stations in the country and abroad;
- Promote, support and certify electoral training for delegates, voter registration authorities and polling stations staff, with the assistance of the central services that provide support to the electoral process;
- Widely disseminate the legislation that sets the dates of elections;
- Handle complaints which are submitted within the context of the electoral process;
- Initiate, instruct and decide infringement proceedings and apply the appropriate fines;
- Refer electoral crimes, brought to its attention, to the prosecutor's office;
- Assess the conformity of election accounts;
- Carry out any other function assigned by the Electoral Code and other legislation, such as: announce the election results, without prejudice of their dissemination by the media; prepare and publish the election calendar; appoint, accredit and define the duties of its representatives, in national constituencies and abroad; organize the draw of broadcasting time and distribute the State subsidy according to the election results, etc.



## Country Study of Cabo Verde

The Directorate General for Support to the Electoral Process (DGAPE) was established in 2001, following the transformation of the Service Directorate with the same name by the Decree-Law No. 20/2001 of 29 October.

### **The functions of the of DGAPE<sup>5</sup> are to:**

- Coordinate the activity of Voter Registration Commissions and organize, maintain and manage the electronic voter registration;
- Receive the voter registration lists from the Voter Registration Commissions located abroad;
- Publish the tables with the overall results of voter registration;
- Promote the design and printing of ballot papers;
- Arrange the delivery to city councils, for distribution, of the material essential to the work of polling stations;
- Announce the composition of polling station tables, as well as citizens who will vote in each one of them;
- Study and propose improvements to the electoral system, as well as the electoral process<sup>6</sup> ;
- Collect and process information on electoral matters<sup>7</sup> ;
- Conduct research and analysis about electoral matters, namely in the field of electoral sociology<sup>8</sup> ;
- Recommend and organize dissemination and information actions aiming at citizens' effective participation in voter registration and electoral acts<sup>9</sup> ;
- Propose and administer training to members of Voter Registration Commissions and other local actors<sup>10</sup> ;
- Ensure the compilation of statistical data concerning voter registration, elections and other scrutiny, publicizing the respective results<sup>11</sup> ;
- Organize the records of citizens elected to sovereign bodies and local government<sup>12</sup> .

<sup>5</sup>Electoral Code articles 39, 63, 67, 79, 156, 159.

<sup>6</sup>Article 18, al. of Decree-law 47/2003 of November 10

<sup>7</sup>Idem 3

<sup>8</sup>Idem 3

<sup>9</sup>(19, al.g) of Decree-law 47/2003 of November 10

<sup>10</sup>Idem 6

<sup>11</sup>Idem 3

<sup>12</sup>(Art. 18, al.1) of Decree-law 47/2003 of November 10

DGAPE worked in the past under the Ministry of Interior and since 2016 it has been under the Ministry of Justice and Labor.

#### **D. Types and Sources of Funding**

In general, and in the case of Cabo Verde, the election budget is part of the consolidated State General Budget (OGE - Portuguese acronym), which is approved annually. In non-election years, the budget for electoral authorities is usually a budget line of the OGE or it will be integrated in the budget of the Ministry responsible for elections. In election years, the respective budgets are financed by the OGE through ordinary or extraordinary procedures. The budgets of the Electoral Management Bodies (EMB) are prepared by the EMB themselves and submitted to the Ministry of Finance, in the case of DGAPE, and to the National Assembly, in the case of CNE. Budgets for the CNE, voter registration (CRE), DGAPE and for police and security activities and the media are submitted for consideration. The CNE also proposes a budgetary heading for election funding and the funding of political parties and candidates.

EMBs funding in Cabo Verde, on a permanent basis, is taken into account directly in the General National Budget, which includes in the OGE budget appropriations for the CNE, DGAPE and voter registration (CRE), that were previously approved by the National Assembly.

The funding of voter registration is permanent, but in election years there will always be special election budgets. Also, the EMB prepares the budget for the main items of electoral expenses (logistics and voting operations).

#### **All these funds are distributed under the following main headings:**

- Funding of electoral administration and management
- Funding of electoral operations
- Funding of political parties and presidential candidates.

The main source of funding EMBs' budget is the OGE, with State revenue. For some actions linked to electoral processes, namely training and awareness-raising, procurement of voter registration kits, as well as election observation, Cabo Verde, has relied on the support of the United Nations System (UNDP), European Union and ECOWAS.

#### **E. Variable Costs of Elections (I): Statutory Provisions/ Overview**

In Cabo Verde, the election budget is proposed by CNE, but the budget for voter registration and DGAPE fall under the responsibility of the Ministry in charge of this matter (in this case, the Ministry of Interior until May 2016 and the Ministry of Justice and Labor, since then). The

## Country Study of Cabo Verde

budgetary procedure begins with the preparation of the proposal by CNE, which in conjunction with all stakeholders, submits to the National Assembly the budget covering voting operations, counting and tabulation of results.

The national police, the media (public) the Agency for Communications Regulation, CRE and the City Councils are also involved in the election budgetary procedure. Consultations with these bodies aim to obtain inputs for cost determination regarding their election coverage for which they usually submit proposals to DGAPE. According to the electoral code in force, for the funding of the election campaign (Campaign Subsidy) of political parties and candidates an amount should be included in the OGE to co-fund the reimbursement of campaign expenses of candidates who have received at least 10% of the votes cast, and, in the case of a second round, the limit of expenses established in the Electoral Code is increased by one half<sup>13</sup>.

For the national police, for example, the budgets covered by DGAPE, both for presidential and legislative elections were as follows:

**Table 2: Expenses regarding police and security for elections (in USD, exchange rate at the end of 2016)**

Year	National police				
	Meals	Fuel	Communications	Total	% Total
2016	20,227.68	18,166.07	5,873.18	44,266.93	0.4%
2011	20,227.68	18,166.07	5,873.18	44,266.93	0.5%
2006	41,158.18	56,062.50	8,742.35	105,963.03	1.4%

The public media have received during the last three election cycles the amounts indicated in the following table:

**Table 3: Expenses on the media for elections coverage (in USD, exchange rate at the end of 2016)**

Year	Legislative			Presidential		
	Data in USD average exchange rate at the end of the year					
	Funding	Source	Expenses	Funding	Source	Expenses
2016	143,798.68	DGT/DGAPE	75,581.79	a)	DGT/DGAPE	21,314.56
2011	228,903.47	DGT/DGAPE	226,191.25	76,320.89	DGT/DGAPE	71,224.19
2006	358,154.25	DGT/DGAPE	324,203.56	b)	RTC,SA	12,195.63

<sup>13</sup>Cabo Verde Electoral Code, Section III, articles 390 and 391

Public procurement in Cabo Verde is regulated for the entire civil service, including the National Assembly and independent bodies, as it is the case of CNE. There are exceptions in situations that may jeopardize the smooth running of the electoral process, both for the administration and management of electoral procedures and political parties and candidates. To import goods and equipment for elections, the candidates benefit from customs exemption, which serves as an indirect funding to parties and candidates.

## **F. Variable Costs of Elections (ii): Sources, Procedures and Factors**

The legal provisions governing the funding of elections as stated in the constitution and electoral code are as follows:

The main source of election funding is the OGE and the election budget is submitted by CNE and DGAPE and approved by the National Assembly. Regarding the financing of political parties and candidates standing for elections in Cabo Verde, the Electoral Code<sup>14</sup> lays down the rules and procedures of access to election campaign funds which must be subject to dedicated accounting records, separated from any other personal, professional or institutional accounting of candidates and donations in kind. These funds must be accounted for in detail.

### **The current legal framework stipulates that the election campaign can only be funded through:**

- a) National political parties' contribution;
- b) Subsidy from the State;
- c) Donations from national natural or legal persons living in the country;
- d) Donation from voters living abroad;
- e) Proceeds from pre-campaign activities or election campaign;
- f) Candidates' contributions;
- g) Loans from credit institutions established in the country.

Contributions from political parties are recorded in documents issued by competent bodies, with the identification of those who contributed. The donations from natural or legal persons, including candidates' contributions, are written documents signed by the donor and the electoral administrator. In the case of donations in kind, their respective supporting documents must clearly indicate their number or quantity, purpose, and the value assigned to them, which should not be lower than their market value.

<sup>14</sup>Electoral Code, 2010 Revision, Section VI, Articles 123 to 130





## Country Study of Cabo Verde

Candidates and political parties are entitled to a subsidy from the State, determined by the National Electoral Commission within the framework of the applicable law and based on the votes obtained.

However, presidential candidates, political parties, coalitions and lists proposed by a group of citizens are prohibited from receiving any pecuniary or in-kind contributions from foreign natural or legal persons.

No presidential candidate, party, coalition or list proposed by a group of citizens can spend on any electoral activity more than 80% of the total amount of the State subsidy provided for the election concerned and cannot receive as a State subsidy for each electoral activity more than 60% of the overall amount of State subsidy for the elections concerned. For expenses on each electoral activity, the principal and interest of loans cannot exceed 50% of the total amount of the subsidy the State anticipated for those elections. Within 90 days after the official announcement of the election results, each presidential candidate, political party, coalition or list proposed by a group of citizens must submit detailed accounts of their candidacy and electoral campaign to the National Electoral Commission.

For the submission of electoral accounts, the electoral administrator and, as applicable, the presidential candidates, the competent organs of political parties or coalitions and the list proposed by a group of citizens are jointly and severally liable. The main constraints facing electoral management bodies in Cabo Verde in the preparation and disbursement of budgets have been the difficulty in creating conditions for a permanent voter registration and some delays in the provision of funds for a number of important expenditures.

### **G. Variable Costs of Elections (iii): Major Line Items in Election Budget: Trends and capacity analysis**

The election budget covers essentially costs of funding for electoral authorities, voter registration, elections and political parties. The following table presents a detailed template of the election budget for the purpose of examining electoral costs:

**Table 4: Budget template: Main line items**

**Election Budget**

**Personnel**

- Extraordinary Services
- Representatives of the State administration
- Law enforcement
- Electoral Commissions
- Polling station agents
- CNE Representatives
- General tabulation assembly

**Operating expenses**

- Forms and ballot papers
- Packing and distribution of ballot papers
- Purchase of screens and ballot boxes
- Placing, collection and transportation of ballot boxes
- Storage of election materials
- Paper, pens and other material for polling stations
- Voters' transportation
- Transportation for polling tables, officials and counting and tabulation officials
- Office supplies
- Telephones
- Support services for the Electoral Commission
- Information on Election Day
- Provisional counting and communication of results
- Institutional information campaign targeting the voter
- Expenses related to the establishment of the information collection center
- Coordination of the meeting with other public departments
- National information center
- Contingencies

## Country Study of Cabo Verde

### Payment to other institutions

Police and security services  
 Radio, television and newspapers  
 News agency  
 Communications Regulatory Agency

### For evaluation purposes of elections costs, we can divide the accounts in three major groups:

- Administration, management and supervision of the elections
- Election Operations
- Funding of political parties and candidates (subsidies)

Annex 2 shows the trends in the main line items of the election budget in Cabo Verde and the trends in the costs for large aggregates according to the following table:


**Table 5: Main line items of election costs 2006, 2011 and 2016**  
 (USD, exchange rate at the end of 2016)

LEGISLATIVE AND PRESIDENTIAL 2006, 2011, 2016			
	Legislative and Presidential 2006	Legislative and Presidential 2011	Legislative and /Presidential 2016
Election Administration and Management	3,151,047.66	4,892,677.14	4,069,444.30
Personnel Expenses	186,356.32	838,846.71	4,941,467.93
Election Operations	3,576,853.16	7,701,179.54	8,804,492.07
Expenses on representatives, candidates/parties and subsideis	1,629,656.08	5,052,834.03	2,118,392.73
Total	6,727,900.81	2,593,856.68	12,873,936.37

Chart 1 illustrates the trend in of the main line items in all three electoral cycles, highlighting the main expenditure headings, such as electoral administration and personnel expenditures in electoral operations, costs related to political parties and candidates and current bank transfers. It should be noted that electoral operations account for more than 50% of expenditures (on average), followed by expenses on political parties and candidates and have been above 30% since 2011. The decrease in this item, in 2016, is due to the high abstention rate in every election cycle and the fact that there was a single round of the presidential election. Regarding 2011 election year, the figures are much higher compared to the other years under review, because there was a first round with high turnout and two elections, with a good turnout (abstention rate 24%). The following chart illustrates the high cost of electoral operations (51% in 2011, 36% in 2016 and 29% in 2006) and expenses on political parties and candidates (40% in 2011, 24% in 2016, and 13% in 2006).

On the other hand, in 2016, the low figures recorded, especially with respect to candidates and political parties' costs, are due to a high abstention rate (33% for legislative and 60% for presidential) in both elections, and to just one round of presidential elections, with only three candidates.

**Chart 1. Cost of Elections in Cabo Verde 2006, 2011, 2016 (Main Budget Lines)**



## Country Study of Cabo Verde

Data collected indicate the cost of voter registration and elections in Cabo Verde as presented in the following table:

**Table 6: Cost of presidential and legislative elections 2006, 2011 and 2016.**

LEGISLATIVE AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2006, 2011, 2016: cost per voter			
	Legislative and Presidential 2006	Legislative and Presidential 2011	Legislative / Presidential 2016
Actual cost	6,727,900.81	12,593,856.68	12,873,936.37
Number of voters	323,564.00	304,621.00	361,221
Cost per voter	20.8	41.3	35.6

A comparative table of the cost of elections in Cabo Verde, with countries such as Burkina Faso and Spain<sup>15</sup>, for example, shows how high the electoral costs in Cabo Verde are in relation to regional and global average.

**Table 7: Comparative table 1996, 2004, 2006 and 2011**

Countries	1996	2004	2006	2011
Burkina Faso	9	15		
Spain	1	4.3		
Cabo Verde			12.1	30.2

### H. Variable Costs of Elections (iv): Opportunities, Problems and Challenges

The emerging democracies have shown signs of progress everywhere and the West African sub-region is no exception, showing evidence of stronger democratic mechanisms and processes as well as strategic investments in the democratic rule of law.

Cabo Verde is considered as a good example in this noble task of democratic consolidation and development, where investment in liberal democracy is considered as the priority challenge for the preparation and improvement of conditions aiming at free and fair elections in the country and a prerequisite for the promotion of social and economic development.

<sup>15</sup>UNDP, 2005 Global survey on the cost of registration and elections. CORE Center for International and Post-conflict Governance, IFES Bureau for Development policy, UNDP



The level of human development in Cabo Verde and its openness to the world, coupled with a Diaspora highly interested in the development of the country and the availability of partnerships for the development of democracy and good governance, are important opportunities that the country has taken advantage of. In the Government Program for the 9th parliamentary term, 2016-2021, the Government proposes to "Improve the electoral system by evaluating the various solutions, including the mixed system, ensuring in particular and at the same time the rapprochement between elected officials and voters, the participation of organized civil society, good governance and representation of the islands. It also intends to strengthen the independence, impartiality and fairness of the electoral administration by computerizing the process, improving the mechanisms to ensure confidence in it (...)"<sup>16</sup>

But the big opportunity, in terms of cost effectiveness of elections and in a long-term perspective, will always be the investment in democratic consolidation institutions. Election cost reduction will always depend on investment in democratic structures, in particular in EMBs, as well as progress in promoting democracy and freedom. As Rafael Lopez\_Pintor & Jeff Fischer<sup>17</sup> advocate, "important electoral costs may be reduced with the development of democracy. And they add that, "just as investments in national security infrastructures, transportation and communication are paramount in determining costs, State-building is a key determinant in reducing election costs"<sup>18</sup>.

In this respect, one of the major challenges for Cabo Verde and the countries in the sub-region will be the continuous investment in democracy consolidation, electoral training and awareness and citizenship. These are long-term investments with a positive impact on cost reduction. The data show that electoral practices serve as a mechanism to reduce costs, particularly during the democratic consolidation phase<sup>19</sup>.

It has not been easy to assess the costs of elections in emerging democracies, but conclusions of studies indicate that investment efforts on capacity building in electoral administration will help reduce the overall costs in the long term. These findings also support the idea that the establishment and consolidation of a permanent electoral administration has highly positive impacts, particularly in reducing electoral administration costs.

However, in consolidated democracies, electoral costs tend to increase due to personnel expenses and high-tech investment and special efforts targeting certain populations. For example, Rafael Lopez\_Pintor & Jeff Fischer state that the postal voting in-country and overseas tends to grow and it is quite expensive.

<sup>16</sup>[http://www.governo.cv/images/Programa\\_do\\_Governo\\_da\\_IX\\_Legislatura\\_2016-\\_2021.pdf](http://www.governo.cv/images/Programa_do_Governo_da_IX_Legislatura_2016-_2021.pdf)

<sup>17</sup> UNDP, IFES, 2005, A global Survey on the Cost of Registration and elections

<sup>18</sup> Idem 1

<sup>19</sup> Idem 1



## Country Study of Cabo Verde

Practices, including those of Cabo Verde, show that the permanent voter registration promotes transparency and reduces costs, particularly when it is periodically updated with corrections, additions and deletions without forcing voters to register again. The reforms implemented and underway in Cabo Verde were aimed at permanent voter registration although this procedure is not followed regularly, especially in the case of the diaspora.

In this regard, it will also be helpful to assess the mandatory use of voter cards, or accept a variety of identification documents, such as an identity card, a driver's license or a passport. On the other hand, we acknowledge the benefit of having a single identification document, including for the elections. In that sense, Cabo Verde seems to be considering this approach as regards administrative modernization.

According to Rafael Lopez\_Pintor & Jeff Fischer<sup>20</sup>, the expenditure items that have recorded the largest reductions are staff (Canada), voter education (Australia) or voter registration following the implementation of a permanent voter registration system (Cambodia and Canada).

The funding of political parties and candidates and campaign expenses can be reduced to a large extent, taking into account their relative weights in election costs. In Cabo Verde they amount to approximately 30% of the total costs. It should be noted, that even in consolidated democracies, the election budget is prepared by the electoral authority and processed through the Ministry responsible for finance for approval in Parliament. The Ministry does not have the authority, at least formally, to restrict or change the election budget prepared by the electoral authorities. However, the Government and the legislature can exercise strong and constant pressure on the electoral authorities for an upward revision of budgets.

### **I. Major Findings**

The interaction with Cape Verdean authorities and voters on the cost of elections in the country has enabled us to evaluate the resources used, both for the permanent funding of EMBs and elections in the electoral cycles from 2006 to 2016, as well as their cost effectiveness.

The establishment and development of a modern and comprehensive electoral system that ensures the smooth holding of free and democratic elections during the multi-party period in Cabo Verde, can be considered as one of the largest investments in the construction of the democratic rule of law and in the efficient management of resources for electoral purposes.

---

<sup>20</sup>Idem 1

A Constitution that defines and ensures the broadest freedoms and guarantees to citizens and a modern electoral code, that regulates and guarantees fairness and transparency in the entire electoral process, are obvious gains from investments made.

In fact, Cabo Verde has invested strongly over the past 25 years in the organization of the entire electoral system, from voter registration, to the organization and modernization of the electoral data base, to the introduction of electoral information systems and in the institutional development as well, with a clear segregation of the functions regarding voter registration, electoral and administrative operations logistics, and election supervision.

Nevertheless, the country continues to face important challenges due to its insularity and an important diaspora which increases the costs of elections and the entire administration. These costs have a bigger dimension and an important weight in the OGE, when three elections take place in the same year (legislative, presidential and municipal) in Cabo Verde.

The most significant election costs have to do with electoral operations, candidates and political parties' funding and personnel expenses. The budget line for travel and accommodation always had an important weight in election coverage due to an important Diaspora with a reasonable political participation. Consequently, the comparative cost per voter in Cabo Verde in relation to the global and sub-regional average is high because of a small and highly dispersed constituency.

## **J. Recommendations**

The study on election costs in Cabo Verde, taking into consideration the last three election cycles, made it possible to examine the Cape Verdean electoral system from the perspective of cost analysis and the above findings indicate the need for a continuous investment in the consolidation of the system in order to optimize costs.

We cannot expect a cost reduction in all items. Some, by their very nature, always tend to increase with the increase of voters and votes. A few cost reductions may be explored under the budget line for political parties and candidates' funding and the election campaign by tackling certain legal gaps that still exist.

Political parties can receive public subsidies and public international aid, which are relatively easy to control and take into account. They can also receive funds from their members (often unpublished), private donors, revenues from investments and bank loans, which can be difficult to quantify or even estimate.



## Country Study of Cabo Verde

Therefore, the strengthening of the legal framework should be the first step towards transparency and the potential reduction of funding costs for political parties and electoral campaigns. Research efforts in this area have been undertaken by UNDP and IDEA<sup>21</sup>.

Also in relation to training and awareness-raising and even to voter registration, the voluntary collaboration of NGOs may help in reducing costs with gains also in the promotion of citizenship. It may also be desirable for Cabo Verde to hold two or three elections simultaneously, because this would entail a significant cost reduction in electoral operations. Similarly, the administrative modernization aimed at permanent voter registration as well as the existence of a single identification document replacing the voter card can be important for cost optimization.

### K. Annexes

#### Annex 1: Existing political parties in Cabo Verde

Party	Acronym*	Political Orientation	Date of Establishment	Situation
African Party for the Independence of Cabo Verde	PAICV	Left-wing social-democrat	1956, former PAIGC	Active/ opposition 29 MPs
Cape Verdean Independent and Democratic Union	UCID	Christian Liberal	1974	Active/ opposition 3 MPs
Movement for Democracy	MPD	Popular Democrat	1990	Active/Ruling party 40 MPs
Social-Democrat Party	PSD		1992	Active/ opposition
Democratic Convergence Party	PCD	Popular Democrat	1994	Inactive
Democratic Renewal Party	PRD		.2001	Inactive
Labor and Solidarity Party	PTS	Social-Democrat	2001	
Popular Party	PP		2016	Active/ opposition

\* In Portuguese

<sup>21</sup>Idem 1

**Annex 2**

Detailed budget for legislative and presidential elections 2006, 2011 and 2016

Cabo Verde (DGAPE and CNE)			
Budget Line	LEGISLATIVE AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2006, 2011, 2016		
	Legislative and Presidential 2006	Legislative and Presidential 2011	REC 2015/2016 and Legislative and Presidential 2016
Expenditures	83.45	83.45	83.45
Personnel Expenses	186 356 32	838 846 71	4,941,467.93
<i>Fixed and permanent wages</i>	186 356 32	838 846 71	4 941 467 93
<i>Remuneration and allowances</i>	177 908 65	620 933 27	769.387,92
Hired Staff	177 908 65	620 933 27	769.387,92
<i>Variable and occasional allowances</i>	8 447 67	217 913 45	4.172.080,01
Permanent bonuses			
Permanent subsidies			75.050,70
Occasional bonuses			32.210,90
Overtime	7 642 40	4.612,07	38.455,31
Meal allowance			
Civic education, training and functioning of MAV	805 27	213.301,38	4.026.363,09
Procurement of goods and services	832 754 21	2.084.472,97	2.774.560,01
Procurement of goods	31.854,80	707.920,12	260.540,69
Raw material			1.628,20
Clothes and Footwear			2.398,21
Office supplies	25.594,33	14.331,14	135.864,23
Parts and transportation			2.540,44
Fuel and lubricants	2.556,98	3.355,30	7.849,01
Maintenance and repair material	923,38		1.292,26
Other electoral goods and materials	2.780,11	690.233,67	108.968,33
Procurement of services	800.899,41	1.376.552,85	2.514.019,33
Rentals and leasing	18.803,15	17.996,80	63.084,13
Communications	2.897,12	9.240,26	17.383,79
Transport			
Publicity and propaganda	251.568,00		143.184,52
Travel and accommodation	13.285,82	26.293,28	187.619,59
Surveillance and security			42.977,54
Fees			12.564,41
Other services, election operations	511.667,06	1.323.022,50	1.672.729,62
Technical assistance	2.678,25		359.496,70
Non-resident technical assistance			14.979,02



## Country Study of Cabo Verde

Current Transfers	1.137.849,99	1.053.879,22	-
Current Transfers	1.137.849,99	1.053.879,22	
Charges with representatives candidates/ parties and subsidies	1.629.656,08	5.052.834,03	2.118.392,73
Other Expenses	-	-	-
Other Expenses			
Arrears from previous elections and preparation		952.098,26	985.323,91
<i>International Organizations</i>	-	-	124.528,17
Other International Organizations - Current			124.528,17
Public Administration	2.918.042,14	3.390.406,64	2.925.220,38
Autonomous Funds and Services	112.114,75		119.292,99
Embassies and Consular Services			
Other Transfers to Public Administration	2.805.927,39	3.390.406,64	2.805.927,39
Electoral Operations in the Diaspora			
Administrative Equipment	23.242,06	173.417,11	114.295,31
Procurement of Administrative Equipment	23.242,06	173.417,11	114.295,31
	6.727.900,81	12.593.856,68	12.873.936,37



## **COUNTRY STUDY OF GUINEA- BISSAU**

### **A. Introduction, Objectives and Methodology**

This report was prepared within the framework of the regional study commissioned by ECOWAS Network of Electoral Commissions (ECONEC) on the cost of legislative and presidential elections in the ECOWAS sub-region and provides information on the cost of national elections (presidential and legislative) in Guinea-Bissau.

The overall goal of this study is to identify the factors behind the escalating cost of elections in ECOWAS Member States and make practical recommendations for the management and control of elections costs in the sub-region.

#### **In specific terms, the study intends to:**

- Compare and analyze elections cost in the ECOWAS sub-region;
- Develop a matrix to assess and rate the overall cost of an election using the electoral project approach;
- Identify the sources, trends and innovations regarding election funding in ECOWAS sub-region;
- Point out good practices, based on the respect for the principles of transparency and accountability, concerning planning and election budgets, as well as the best procedures, rules and regulations for the allocation and control of election funds;
- Suggest new guidelines for the management of election costs and control policies in the ECOWAS region.

In this study, for methodological purposes, the term "cost of elections" refers to "variable operational costs" related to the holding of elections, which constitute the entire budget for a specific election, for example, specific general elections (presidential/ national elections) in election years.

According to the current elections theory and standard practice, the main expenses are incurred on the following activities: voter registration, demarcation of constituencies, ballot operations, vote counting and transmission of results, tabulation of results, voters' education and information, political parties and candidates' campaigns and the observation by political parties' representatives and national and international observers<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Goodwin-Gill, Lopez-Pinto 2000; OSCE 2001, EU 2002, IDEA 2002



## Country Study of Guinea-Bissau

For analytical purposes we will disaggregate the approved election budget into (i) approved budget; II) amount released; and (iii) amount of actual costs incurred. The study will target the last three general elections in each of the six countries covered by the study. The six countries are: Liberia and Nigeria (Anglophone); Republic of Benin and Senegal (Francophone); and Cabo Verde and Guinea-Bissau (Lusophone). It will be our responsibility to carry out the study on these two ECOWAS Portuguese-speaking countries.

As this study is essentially a "mapping" or "cartographic" study, the methodology used is not a full-blown one, but it will involve the use of the following research/ study tools: desk research: mandate (powers, functions and institutional structure of the electoral management body in each country) in the broader context of each country history of competitive party and electoral politics; political reform and national economic policy; and procurement procedures and their implications on budgetary allocations to the electoral management body; unbundling of funding sources for the electoral management body and their impact on credible and timely elections; and the linkage between the electoral management body and critical stakeholders, etc.

### **B. Country Context**

Guinea-Bissau is a State located on the West African Coast and a member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP). After its independence in 1974, Guinea-Bissau experienced frequent political upheavals and repeated economic crisis that hindered the development of the country.

The social and economic gains that Guinea-Bissau achieved in previous years were reversed by political crisis, especially in 2012, when the country was once again plunged into a political and economic turmoil.

In Guinea-Bissau the Head of State (the President) and members of parliament are elected. The People's National Assembly of the country has 102 members, elected for terms of 4 years. The electoral system is multi-party and the parties can run the country alone, after being elected, or in coalitions. The country has conducted multi-party elections since the political openness in the country in 1994.

In spite of the political instability that has marked its political system, Guinea-Bissau organized three legislative elections and three presidential elections considered as free and fair.

The country has also developed a voting system based on the electoral legislation of 2013, which lays the foundations for the organization of voter registration, preparation, implementation and monitoring of legislative and presidential elections. Other legislations are:

- Law No. 11/2013 on voter registration,
- Law No. 10/2013, Electoral Law for electing the President of the Republic and People's National Assembly
- Law No. 12/2013 on the National Electoral Commission
- And Law No. 4/94 on International Election Observation

In Guinea-Bissau, during the period under review, about 13 to 15 parties contested each legislative election and 10 to 13 candidates stood for presidential elections. Annex 1 presents a list of the political parties in Guinea-Bissau.

From 2008 to 2016, the period under review, the number of candidates to each legislative and presidential election held is indicated in the table below:

**Table 1: Number of candidates per electoral cycle**

Elections/ year	2008	2009	2012	2014
Presiden tial		13	10	13
Legislativ e	19	19		15

In Guinea-Bissau, the course of economic and social development has been marked by some political instability, but the country's economy continues to expand despite the political stalemate and the reduction in donor flows to the country. After achieving a growth rate of 5% in 2016, projections for 2017 indicate a 5.5% growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP). It is expected that real GDP growth will be on average 5% from 2016 to 2018.

The levels of investment and the pace of growth in the country lie far below its potential, which offers possibilities to mobilize funds for structuring investments, including for the implementation of important reforms.

In relation to the HDI (Human Development Index), Guinea-Bissau was ranked 176th in UNDP (United Nations Development Program) Human Development Report for 2013.



## Country Study of Guinea-Bissau

The HDI in sub-Saharan Africa as a region increased from 0.366 in 1980 to 0.475 presently, placing Guinea-Bissau below the regional average. Life expectancy in Guinea-Bissau is 48 years.

### **C. Structure, Power and Functions of the EMBs**

In Guinea-Bissau, election administration, management and supervision are carried out by the National Electoral Commission, which takes all the functions of election administration, oversight and supervision. The Technical Office for Support to the Electoral Process (GTAPE) provides technical support to voter registration in conjunction with CRE.

#### **The electoral system includes the following bodies:**

- National Electoral Commission (CNE - Portuguese acronym)
- Directorate General for Support to the Electoral Process (GTAPE - Portuguese acronym)

The National Electoral Commission, in Guinea-Bissau, is the highest election management body with powers to supervise and oversee electoral operations. It is an independent and permanent body that works closely with the People's National Assembly - ANP which plays an oversight role and organizes and manages the electoral and referendum procedures.

#### **CNE is the only entity for local, legislative and presidential elections and it consists of:**

- a) An Executive Secretariat
- b) One representative of the Republic in legislative and municipal elections;
- c) One representative of the Government;
- d) One representative from each political party or coalition of parties;
- e) One representative of the National Council for Social Communication;
- f) One representative of each candidate in the presidential election.

The Executive Secretariat, a permanent collegiate management body, is composed of four members, namely: a president, an executive secretary and two deputy executive secretaries. The members of the Executive Secretariat are elected by two thirds of ANP members in office, for a four-year term, renewable for an equal period.

The candidates to the presidency of CNE must be judges of appeal, proposed by the Superior Council for the Judiciary.

#### **CNE is organized into various departments and offices, as follows:**

- a) Administration, Finance and Human Resources Department;
- b) Statistics and IT Department;



- c) Property and Logistics Department;
- d) Civic Education and Training Department;
- e) Media and Legal Affairs Department;
- f) President's Office headed by the equivalent to a Head of department.

For the implementation of policies, guidelines and directives outlined by the Executive Secretariat within the framework of its duties, Regional Electoral Commissions – CRE were also created.

Under the Electoral Legislation of the Republic of Guinea Bissau<sup>2</sup>, the duties of CNE are to:

- a) Supervise and inspect voter registration;
- b) Approve electoral registration forms, voter registration lists, voter card, and ballot paper;
- c) Design, print, distribute and control ballot papers;
- d) Determine the polling stations after consultations with the Regional Electoral Commissions (CRE);
- e) Organize and lead presidential, municipal and legislative elections, as well as referendums;
- f) Organize the records of citizens elected to sovereign bodies and to local government;
- g) Manage its own budget and any other matter under its responsibility;
- h) Create the stamp template for polling stations sheets and any other document necessary for the viability of the electoral process;
- i) Promote the citizen's civic awareness, about issues relating to the electoral process through the media;
- j) Allocate broadcasting time on radio and television to the various candidates;
- k) Assess the conformity of revenues and expenditures of the candidates;
- l) Create and ensure the functioning of CREs and appoint, through a public tender, the respective chairpersons, in accordance with the law;
- m) Tabulate and publish election results;
- n) Submit to ANP the final report for each electoral process or referendum.

GTAPE has been operating under the Ministry of Territorial Administration and it is responsible for the organization and management of voter registration.

#### **D. Types and Sources of Funding**

In Guinea-Bissau, the CNE prepares its operational budget proposal. Budgets for all Electoral Management Bodies (CNE, GTAPE/CRES) fall under the responsibility of CNE and the Ministry responsible for the GTAPE (Ministry of Territorial Administration).

---

<sup>2</sup>Law no 12/2013 of 27 December



## Country Study of Guinea-Bissau

Resources are mobilized most often by CNE and the Government from the main partners. Until the most recent elections held in the country, electoral budgets have always been the responsibility of CNE and resources were mostly mobilized from external partners.

Budgets for the operation of EMBs, voter registration (GTAPE/CRE), election coverage by the police and security forces and the media are also taken into consideration.

The voter registration is not yet carried out on a permanent basis, as it is conducted mainly in the pre-electoral and electoral years. In those years, special budgets are prepared for the elections.

In Guinea-Bissau, all budget proposals are prepared by CNE, including the budget for the main expenditure headings of electoral logistics.

This funding is allocated through the following main budget lines:

- Funding of election administration and management
- Funding of voter registration
- Funding of electoral operations

EMBs budget has external partners as the main source of funding under the guidance from the ministries responsible for finance and international cooperation. For most activities linked to the electoral process, namely training and awareness-raising, procurement of voter registration kits, as well as election observation, Guinea-Bissau relied on the support of the United Nations System (UNDP), European Union, ECOWAS, Nigeria, China, and East Timor.

In the last three elections under review, the contributions of these partners accounted for 70% of electoral expenses, on average.

### **E. Variable Costs of Elections (i): Statutory Provisions/ Overview**

In Guinea-Bissau, the election budget is submitted by CNE, including the budget for voter registration of the electoral logistics department (GTAPE). In this case, the CNE prepares the budget in conjunction with the Ministry responsible for GTAPE (Ministry of Territorial Administration). The costs of CNE are covered by funds allocated in the State General Budget. CNE has administrative and financial autonomy in the execution of its budget<sup>3</sup>.

<sup>3</sup>As per article 18 no. 1 and 2 of law no. 12/2013 of December.

It should be noted, however, that contrary to the provisions of that law, CNE has been operating with the budget which is submitted to the Government for approval and release of funds. The budget process begins with the preparation of the proposal by CNE, which in conjunction with all stakeholders, submits to the People's National Assembly a budget that covers vote operations, counting and tabulation of results.

The national police and the media (public) are also involved in the election budget process. The consultation of these bodies aims to obtain elements for cost determination regarding election coverage by those entities, which usually submit proposals to CNE. The provisions regarding the funding of the election campaign (Campaign Subsidy), political parties and candidates just indicate who can fund the campaigns and the possibility of funding by the State, revenue accounting and monitoring and accountability<sup>4</sup>. There are headings in the electoral budget for purposes, such as civic education, training and expenses on representatives of candidates/parties and subsidies. As for elections coverage by the police, the amounts available for this purpose are captured in the police and security budget line.

Similarly, for coverage by national public media there is a specific budget line in the budget for electoral logistics. Public procurement in Guinea-Bissau is regulated for the entire administration, including the National Assembly and independent bodies such as CNE. There are exceptions for cases that could hinder the smooth running of the electoral process, both for the administration and management of electoral processes and political parties and candidates. We found no published provisions on public procurement regarding procurement related to elections. However, we got information on existing practices and exemptions and facilitation on imports for electoral purposes.

#### **F. Variable Costs of Elections (ii): Sources, Procedures and Factors**

In constitutional terms and as per the electoral legislation of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau<sup>5</sup>, the legal provisions for the funding of elections are as follows:

##### **The funding of the electoral campaign may be done through:**

- Contribution from the State;
- Contribution of similar parties;
- Voters' voluntary contribution;
- Contribution from candidates themselves and political parties;
- Proceeds from the activity of the election campaign.

<sup>4</sup>Law No. 10/2013, Law for the election of the President of the Republic

<sup>5</sup>Compilation (Law n°11/2013 (Voter registration) Law n°10/2013 Electoral Law for the Speaker of the People's National Assembly; (Law n° 12/2013 (National Electoral Commission Law and Law n°4/ 94 (Law of International Election Observation)



## Country Study of Guinea-Bissau

As for the financing of political parties and candidates to elections in Guinea-Bissau, the electoral legislation provides a general framework. Contributions from political parties are supported by documents issued by competent bodies, with the identification of those who made those contributions. The donations of natural or legal persons, including candidates' contributions, are written documents signed by the donor and the electoral administrator. When it comes to donations in kind, their respective support documents must clearly indicate their quantity, purpose, and the value assigned to them, which should not be lower than the market value. Candidates and political parties will have access to a subsidy from the State, according to the availability and the law does not specify the amount and allocation.

Within ninety days after the official announcement of the election results, each presidential candidate, political party, coalition or list proposed by a group of citizens submits detailed accounts of their candidacy and electoral campaign to the National Electoral Commission. For the submission of electoral accounts, candidates and their representatives are jointly and severally liable. The main constraints facing electoral management bodies in Guinea-Bissau in the preparation and disbursement of budgets have been the difficulty in creating conditions for a permanent voter registration and some delays in the provision of funds for a number of important expenditures.

### **G. Variable Costs of Elections (iii): Major Line Items in Election Budget: Trends and Gaps Analysis**

The election budget covers essentially costs of funding for electoral authorities, voter registration, elections and political parties. The following table presents a detailed template of the election budget:

#### **Election Budget**

##### **Personnel**

- Extraordinary Services
- Representatives of the State administration
- Law enforcement
- Electoral Commissions
- Polling stations agents
- CNE Delegates
- General tabulation assembly
- Extraordinary Services
- Representatives of the State administration

### **Operational services expenses**

Forms and ballot papers  
Packing and distribution of ballot papers  
Purchase of screens and ballot boxes  
Placing, collection and transportation of ballot boxes  
Storage of election materials  
Paper, pens and other material for polling stations  
Voters' transportation  
Transportation for polling tables delegates and counting and tabulation delegates  
Office supplies  
Telephones  
Support services for the Electoral Commission  
Information on election day  
Provisional counting and communication of results  
Institutional information campaign targeting the voter  
Expenses related to the establishment of the information collection center  
Coordination of the meeting with other public departments  
National information center  
Contingencies

### **Payment to other institutions**

Police and security  
Radio, television and newspapers  
News agency  
Communications Regulatory Agency

**For the purposes of assessing elections costs, we can divide the accounts into four major groups:**

- Administration, management and supervision of the elections
- Election operations
- Funding of political parties and candidates (subsidies)
- Technical assistance and elections observation

Annex 3 shows trends in the main line items of the election budget in Guinea-Bissau and the trends in the costs for large aggregates:



## Country Study of Guinea-Bissau

**Table 2: Main line items of election costs in Guinea-Bissau 2009, 2012 and 2014**

Main Line Items of Election Costs in Guinea -Bissau 2009 -2014 <sup>6</sup>			
Source =CNE, ( data provided in USD)			
	PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 2009	PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 2012	LEGISLATIVE AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2014
Personnel expenses	3.798.041,00	3.166.409,00	4.304.055,00
Civic education, training and functioning and election operations	2.863.891,00	1.247.853,00	2.517.056,00
Expenses on representatives, candidates / parties and subsidies			928.038,00
Electoral Administration	1.662.353,00	1.150.784,00	2.902.980,00
Election Operations	3.187.797,00	3.108.237,00	6.177.350,00
Current Bank Transfers	52.946,00	104.991,00	249.396,00
Arrears from previous elections and preparation			447.834,00
	4.878.679,00	4.259.000,00	9.080.330,00


Chart 1 illustrates trends in the main line items in all three electoral cycles, highlighting the key expenditure headings, such as electoral administration and personnel expenditures, electoral operations, costs related to political parties and candidates, current bank transfers, civic education and training.

The budget lines for personnel expenditures and election operations were the largest resource consumers in all three electoral cycles. Because the institutional development of the EMBs is not consolidated yet and everything happens during the election year, the costs increase due to greater need for human and material resources related to electoral operations.

The irregularity of the electoral cycles and the conduct of early elections caused higher costs according to the available data. Many electoral costs were not available, such as those related to the police and public order, radio and television and many of the subsidies.

<sup>6</sup>It does not include data regarding coverage by the media, police and security

Chart 1



The data obtained indicate trends in the cost of voter registration and elections in Guinea-Bissau, as shown in the following table:

**Table 3: Cost per voter for legislative and presidential elections 2009, 2012 and 2014**

Guinea-Bissau: LEGISLATIVE AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2009, 2012, 2014 costs per voter			
	Presidential 2009	Presidential 2012	Legislativ e/Presiden tial 2014
Actual cost	4,878,679.00	4,259,000.00	9,080,330.00
Number of voters	595,765.00	595,765.00	775,508.00
Cost per voter	8,188,931.878	7,148,791.889	11,708,879.86



## Country Study of Guinea-Bissau

A comparative table of the cost of elections in Guinea-Bissau, with countries such as Burkina Faso and Spain<sup>7</sup> and Cabo Verde, for example, points to a reasonable level of election costs (costs related to election coverage by the police and security, media and DGTAPE budget were not made available) in relation to regional and global average.

**Table 4: Comparative table cost of elections in Guinea Bissau, Cabo Verde, Spain and Burkina**

Countries	1996	2004	2006/2009	2011/2012	2014/2016
Burkina Faso	9	15			
Spain	9	15			
Cabo Verde			20.8	41.3	35.6
Guinea-Bissau*			8.2	7.1	11.2

\* It does not include election expenses data regarding police, public order, media and DGTAPE budget.

### H. Variable Costs of Elections (iv): Opportunities, Problems, and Challenges

The emerging democracies have shown signs of progress everywhere and the West African sub-region is no exception, showing evidence of stronger democratic mechanisms and procedures as well as strategic investments in the democratic rule of law.

Guinea-Bissau is considered a fragile State and in a situation of some political instability, which could adversely affect the pace of institutional development and democratic consolidation. Yet the country has recorded progress in creating the institutional infrastructure for the democratic rule of law, namely the pillars of the electoral system. The investment in liberal democracy is assumed to be the challenge for the preparation and improvement of conditions for free and democratic elections in the country.

The level of human development in Guinea-Bissau and instability constrain investments in democracy and in the consolidation of the institutional development within the electoral system.

However, the authorities in Guinea-Bissau acknowledge that a huge opportunity, in terms of cost effectiveness regarding electoral costs in the long term, will always be the investment in institutions

<sup>7</sup>UNDP, 2005 Global survey on the cost of registration and elections. CORE Center for International and Post-Conflict Governance, IFES Bureau for Development policy, UNDP

of democratic consolidation. Election cost reduction will always depend on investments in electoral democratic structures, in particular in EMBs, and progress in promoting democracy and liberties. As Rafael Lopez\_Pintor & Jeff Fischer<sup>8</sup> advocate, "important electoral costs may be reduced with the development of democracy". And they add that "as well as investments in national security infrastructure, transportation and communication are paramount in determining costs, state-building is a key determinant in reducing election costs"<sup>9</sup>.

In this respect, one of the greatest challenges of Guinea-Bissau and of the countries of the sub-region will be the investment in the consolidation of democracy, electoral training and awareness-raising and citizenship. Those costs will be long-term investments with benefits. The data indicated that electoral practices serve as a mechanism to reduce costs, particularly during the phase of democratic consolidation<sup>10</sup>.

It has not been easy to assess the costs of elections in emerging democracies, but conclusions of studies indicate that investment efforts in the electoral administration capacity building will help reduce the overall costs in the long term. These findings also support the idea that the establishment and consolidation of a permanent electoral administration has a highly positive impact, particularly in reducing electoral administration costs.

The practice shows that permanent voter registration promote transparency and reduce costs, particularly when they are periodically updated with corrections, additions and deletions without forcing voters to register again. Democratic stabilization constitutes an important challenge for Guinea-Bissau, i.e. regular voter registration, legislative and presidential elections in the established cycles.

Another challenge is the country's administrative modernization with new technologies to introduce improvements in the electoral data base for permanent voter registration and electoral cost rationalization.

According to Rafael Lopez\_Pintor & Jeff Fischer<sup>11</sup>, budget lines that have recorded the largest reductions are staff (Canada), voter education (Australia) or voter registration after establishing a permanent voter registration system (Cambodia and Canada).

In Guinea-Bissau the budget lines that include electoral operations expenses can be reduced to a large extent, taking into account their relative weights in election costs.

<sup>8</sup>UNDP, IFES, 2005, A global Survey on the Cost of Registration and elections

<sup>9</sup>Idem 7

<sup>10</sup>Idem 7

<sup>11</sup>Idem7



## Country Study of Guinea-Bissau

It should be noted that even in consolidated democracies, the election budget is prepared by the electoral authority and submitted through the ministry responsible for finance for approval by parliament. The Ministry does not have the authority, at least formally, to restrict or change the election budget prepared by the electoral authorities. However, the government and the legislature can exercise strong and constant pressure on the electoral authorities for an upward revision of budgets.

### **I. Major Findings**

The study about costs of elections in Guinea-Bissau, covering the last three election cycles, made it possible to have a better understanding of the electoral system in Guinea-Bissau and the above situations call for a continuous investment in the development and modernization of the system for cost optimization. The interaction with the electoral authorities of Guinea-Bissau on the cost of elections in the country has enabled us to evaluate the resources used for the permanent funding of EMBs and the electoral cycles from 2009 to present. This exercise led to the following conclusions:

The continuous voter registration remains a challenge for Guinea-Bissau but this is a way the country will be able to cut down on the cost of electoral administration. Democratic stabilization resulting from regular voter registration and legislative as well as presidential elections with the established frequency remain important challenges for Guinea-Bissau. The difficulties in complying with the electoral cycle, in accordance with constitutional provisions, including the holding of regular elections, contributed to some extent to the increase in the cost of elections.

It will be necessary to continue to invest in the consolidation of a modern and comprehensive electoral system that ensures the improvement of the entire process of conducting free and fair elections, including through the intensification of ongoing reforms for the organization and modernization of the whole system. The most important electoral costs relate to electoral operations and personnel expenses. The budget line for civic education has an important dimension in the budget which is also due to the efforts of the government and its partners in this regard. The elections budget is still very dependent on funding from partners, which often has hindered the timely predictability and availability of resources for the preparation and holding of elections.

It should be noted, however, that the country has important partners, such as ECOWAS, United Nations, European Union, Nigeria and China for the necessary investments.



## **J. Recommendations**

The above findings point to the need for strengthening interventions aimed at the improvement of budget preparation and execution as well as resource mobilization for the completion of the ongoing reforms.

**In this regard and to safeguard and take advantage of experiences from previous elections, considered by the international community as free, fair and transparent, we are making the following recommendations:**

- In the framework of the ongoing reforms, it is advisable to organize and update the electoral system through the strengthening of institutions' intervention capacity as well as electoral administration and supervision;
- There is the need to ensure better preparation in order to provide funds for the elections in a timely manner. Election is a matter of national sovereignty, costs resulting from the organization of elections should be included in the State General Budget.
- Funds must be provided to the CNE, in due course, in accordance with the budget approved by ANP and accepted by the Government. Their management should be the responsibility of CNE, in accordance with the legal provisions;
- Strengthen administrative and financial autonomy of CNE in order to improve its ability to act without material constraints or financial pressure at the last minute;
- Strengthen electoral training and awareness-raising activities.

The strengthening of the legal framework should be the first step towards transparency and probable cost reduction in the financing of political parties and election campaigns.

Also, with regard to training and sensitization and voter registration practices, NGOs collaboration may be important for the reduction electoral costs.

## Country Study of Guinea-Bissau

### Annex 1 Existing Political Parties in Guinea Bissau

Party	Acronym *	Political Orientation	Date of Establishment	Situation
African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cabo Verde	PAIGC	Socialist	1956	Ruling party
Party for Social Renewal	PRS			
Democratic Socialist Party	PDS			
Party of People's Manifesto	PMP			
Party for Democracy, Development and Citizenship	PDDC			
Guinean Popular Party	PPG			
Socialist Party of Guinea-Bissau	PSGB			
Workers' Party (Guinea-Bissau)	PTGB			
National Unity Party (Guinea-Bissau)	PUN GB			
Electoral Union	UE			
National Union for Democracy and Progress	UNDP			
Union for Change	UPM			
Resistance of Guinea-Bissau - Bafatá Movement	RGBMF			
United Social Democratic Party	PUSD			
United Platform	PU			
Guinean Democratic Movement	MDG			
Guinean Social-Democrat Civic Forum	FCGSD		2007, 2014 (Merger)	Opposition
United Popular Alliance	APU	Social democracy	1989	Opposition

\*In Portuguese

## Annex 2

### Detailed budget for legislative and presidential elections 2009, 2012 and 2014

Guinea-Bissau: Main budget lines of election costs 2009, 2012 and 2014			
Budget Lines	Budget : LEGISLATIVE AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS		
	Presidential 2009	Presidential 2012	Legislative/ Presidential 2014
Expenditures	data provided in USD		
Personnel Expenses	3,798,041.00	3,166,409.00	4,304,055.00
<i>Fixed and permanent wages</i>	3,798,041.00	3,166,409.00	4,304,055.00
<i>Remuneration and allowances</i>	898,152.00	693,789.00	616,145.00
Hired Staff	898,152.00	693,789.00	616,145
<i>Variable and occasional allowances</i>	2,899,889.00	2,472,620.00	3,687,910.00
Permanent bonuses			
Permanent subsidies			
Occasional bonuses (supervision for GB)	35,998.00	1,145,207.00	242,816.00
Overtime			
Food allowance			
Civic education, training and operations of the electoral process	2,863,891.00	1,247,853.00	2,517,056.00
Expenses on representatives, candidates/ parties and grants		79,560.00	928,038.00
<i>Social Security</i>	-	-	-
Contribution to Social Security			
Procurement of goods and services	1,080,638.00	3,565,211.00	4,776,275.00
Procurement of goods	384,389.00	3,259,524.00	1,284,085.00
Raw material and other inputs			
Clothes and Footwear			
Office supplies	39,891.00	20,059.00	39,891.00
Parts and transportation			
Fuel and lubricants	3,930.00		
Maintenance and repair material			
Other electoral goods and materials	279,209.00	3,108,237.00	1,000,000.00
Renovation and lease of houses for CREs (for GB)	61,359.00	131,228.00	244,194.00
Procurement of services	643,303.00	80,836.00	2,489,440.00
Rentals and leasing			1,395.056

## Country Study of Guinea-Bissau

Communications			19,805.00
Car rental	10,722.00		
Publicity and propaganda			
Travel and accommodation			
Surveillance and security			
Fees			
Other services, election operations	84,081.00	80,836.00	90,240.00
Technical assistance			984,339.00
Non-resident technical assistance	548,500.00		
Current Transfers	52,946.00	104,991.00	249,396.00
Current Transfers			
Operating Fund for CREs and CNE	52,946.00	104,991.00	249,396.00
Other Expenses	-	119,860.00	447,834.00
Other Expenses			
Arrears from previous elections and preparation			447,834.00
<i>International Organizations</i>	-	-	-
Other International Organizations - Current			
Public Administration	-	-	125,525.00
Autonomous Funds and Services			
Embassies and Consular Services			14,724.00
Other Transfers to Public Administration s			
Electoral Operations in the Diaspora			110,801
Administrative Equipment	-	-	179,995.00
Procurement of Administrative Equipment			179,995
	4,878,679.00	4,259,000.00	9,080,330.00



**COUNTRY STUDY OF  
 LIBERIA**

**A. Context: History, Culture and Political Economy**

Liberia has a long history of the conduct of presidential and legislative elections and referenda, dating back to 1840 for legislative elections, 1846 for referenda, and 1847 for presidential elections. As Table I shows, the country conducted fifty-five legislative elections between 1840 and 2017, eighteen referenda between 1846 and 2017; and fifty-one presidential elections between 1847 and 2017. The regularity of the elections, notwithstanding problematic questions about their quality, costs and benefits as mechanisms for democratic political inclusion, participation, and broadly for the democratic management of diversity between 1840 and 1975, and since 2005 is, remarkable.

**Box I: Elections in Liberia, 1840-2017**

<p><b><u>Presidential Elections: Year</u></b>                  1847;1849;1851;1853;1855;1857;1859;1861;1863;1865;1867;1869;1871;1873;1875;                  1877;1879;1881;1883;1885;1887;1889;1891;1893;1895;1897;1899;1901;1903;1905;                  1907;1911;1915;1919;1923;1927;1931;1939;1943;1951;1955;1959;1963;1967;1971;                  1975;1985;1997;2005;2011;2017</p>
<p><b><u>Legislative Elections: Year</u></b>                  1840;1847;1849;1851;1853;1855;1857;1859;1861;1863;1865;1867;1869;1871;1873;                  1875;1877;1879;1881;1883;1885;1887;1889;1891;1893;1895;1897;1899;1901;1903;                  1905;1907;1911;1915;1919;1923;1927;1931;1935;1939;1943;1951;1955;1959;1963;                  1967;1971;1975;1985;1997;2005;2011;2014;2017</p>
<p><b><u>Referendum</u></b>                  1846;1847;1849;1861;1869;1870;1907;1927;1935;1943;1945;1946;1949;1955;1972;                  1975;1984;2011</p>

Source: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections\\_in\\_Liberia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_in_Liberia), accessed 21 February, 2018

Yet, the elections must be set in the broader context of the political economy of underdevelopment and its cultural superstructure that both drive and shape the interface between democracy, on the one hand, and the state-formation and nation-building processes, on the other hand, in the country





## Country Study of Liberia

and elsewhere in Africa. It is a political economy that propels a zero-sum culture of electoral politics, the high premium it tends to place on violence, and on the political mobilization of the country's ethnic divisions, in an economic and political context of structural underdevelopment, and the proliferation of political parties that stood at twenty at the time of the 2017 general elections.

Using “select cases,” spanning the elections between 1870-1871 and 1997, a recent survey concludes that “elections in Liberia have been both a source of violent conflict and the weakening or collapse of the system of governance as well as an instrument used after violent conflicts to jumpstart a system of democratic governance.”<sup>1</sup> This is why, despite the Janus-faced nature of elections in Liberia, there remains a strong faith in them, and particularly following the constitutional and political reform designed after end of the country's fourteen-year civil war, under the *2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement*, the *Agenda for Development* and the National Reconciliation and Healing Program. There has remained since 2003 a strong faith in elections as a mechanism for the democratic management of diversity and for driving development process in the country, despite the escalating costs of the elections.

Set against the imperative of overcoming the lived experience and challenges of the complex history and the political economy of elections in Liberia, as sketched above, the country's Elections Commission (NEC) was established in 1984-1985, as part of the democracy-promoting and confidence-building measures interposed to mediate the transition from military to democratic rule in 1985. NEC continues to occupy a prominent place, albeit now and again playing a controversial role, in view of its embeddedness in the politics of presidential succession, as was exemplified so early in the life of the new commission, during the 1985 presidential elections, when the Commission was accused of complicity in the “fraudulent” elections that declared Samuel Doe as the winner of the elections.<sup>2</sup>

In a sense, therefore, the development of Liberia's NEC is closely tied to the democratic struggle and the consolidation of competitive and electoral politics in the country. In line with recent post-1990 constitutional and political reform and the democratic governance architecture that has risen from it in Africa, Liberia's NEC was reconstituted in 2004, in line with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in August 2003 by parties to the country's civil war. It was designed to be a non-partisan and independent electoral commission, with the mandate to ensure electoral integrity and electoral mandate protection,<sup>3</sup> especially as required under international codes, conventions and standards, such as the ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol on Elections and Good Governance, the African Union African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, among others.

<sup>1</sup>Republic of Liberia Governance Commission, Annual Governance Report: The Liberian Electoral System, p.12, Monrovia, February 2017

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p.8-10

<sup>3</sup>Republic of Liberia, National Elections Commission (NEC), Our Vote, Our Future: Elections 2005 Report, Monrovia, December 2005, iii

## **B. Power, Functions and Structure of NEC**

*The Constitution of the Republic of Liberia, 1986* (Article 89) establishes the NEC as an “Autonomous Public Commission,” with the Legislature empowered under the article to “enact laws for the governance” of the Commission. To this end, Chapter 2 (Section 2.1) of the *1986 New Elections Law (as amended)* provides that the “NEC shall be under the direction and management of seven (7) Commissioners appointed by the President of Liberia, who shall appoint one of them as Chairman, and another as Co-Chairman, all of the appointments subject to consent of the Senate.” Section 2.2 of the amended 1986 Elections Law further provides that the seven Commissioners “shall hold their office during good behavior for a period of seven (7) years effective as of the date of their Commission [and that] they may be removed upon proof of misbehavior.”

The broad range of the authority and mandate [“Powers and Duties”] of NEC, under Liberia's Constitution, to conduct elections, regulate and monitor party political activities, including party finances and their audit, voter registration, civic voter education (CVE), resolution of electoral disputes, constituency delimitation and constituency re-apportionment, is amplified and fleshed out in subsidiary legislation, such as the 2014 Amended New Elections Law, and the 2011 Campaign Finance Regulations for Political Parties and Candidates. Box II contains a number of provisions on the powers and duties of NEC contained in Liberia's 2014 New Elections Law.

### **Box II: Power and Duties of NEC**

#### **Section 2.9: Power & Duties**

- (a) To administer and enforce all laws relative to the conduct of elections throughout the Republic of Liberia;
- (b) To organize the Office of the Commission in a manner as may be necessary and practicable for the effective operation of the Commission;
- (c) To propose to the National Legislature for enactment, amendment to, repeal of, any provisions of the Election Law;
- (d) To give accreditation to, and register all political parties and independent candidates, who meet the minimum regulations laid down by the Commission; by



## Country Study of Liberia

which authority they may exercise political franchise under the relevant provisions of the Constitution;-----

- (e) To suspend registration and accreditation of a registered political party in accordance with Chapter 5;
- (f) Conduct all elections for elective public offices, including chieftaincy election and all referenda and declare their results;
- (g) Formulate and enforce guidelines controlling the conduct of all elections for elective public offices which guidelines shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution and the Election Law; ...
- (h) Maintain a register of all qualified voters which shall be subject to inspection under the provision of this title;
- (i) Establish constituencies in every political sub-division and re-apportion the same when deemed necessary and expedient in accordance with population figure; ...
- (j) Examine into and audit, or cause to be audited the financial transactions of all political parties and independent candidates and their organizations by a chartered public accountant who shall not be a member of any political party or the organization of any independent candidate; ...
- (k) The Commission shall employ officials and staff necessary for the performance of its duties through an open and transparent selection process; ...
- (l) To conduct programs to educate citizens of Liberia about elections and referenda and their democratic rights related to them; and to inform them about voter registration events and election and referendum events.

Source: *Liberia's 2014 New Elections Law.*

The NEC, with its headquarters, “Seat,” in Monrovia and with a decentralized structure in nineteen (19) magisterial offices in fifteen (15) counties across the country, has an administrative Secretariat, under an Executive Director, who is assisted by three Deputy Directors. The Secretariat is divided into the following three departments:<sup>4</sup>

- (a) **Department of Administration**, comprising six divisions, “responsible for staff recruitment and capacity development, management of financial resources, procurement of logistics and supplies,” among others;
- (b) **Department of Operations**, consisting of six sections, with “key responsibilities of...supervision and monitoring of activities of county/regional offices, organization and conduct of training programs, provision and maintenance of communications systems and devices, planning, procurement and distribution of logistics and other materials before, during and after elections”; and
- (c) **Department of External Relations**, divided into three sections, whose “principal duties and responsibilities...include organization and dissemination of elections related education, coordination of media relations and dissemination of election related information, coordination of liaison between NEC and main external actors,” among others. In addition, NEC has two sections, the Legal Section, and the Internal Audit Section, “that provide special and professional/technical services to the Commission and report directly to the Board for their activities.”<sup>5</sup>

### **C. Sources and Types of NEC Funding**

There are three sources and types of funding of cost of elections in Liberia: funding by the Government of Liberia; by Development Partners; and potentially from NEC's internally generated revenue (IGR). As reflected in the budget and cost of the 2017 general elections, the Government of Liberia is now the single largest source of the funding of the cost of elections in the country.

#### **Election funding: Government of Liberia**

The Government of Liberia, through budgetary appropriations, is a major source of funding for the conduct of elections, including presidential run-off elections and bye-elections, by NEC. The approved budget generally constitutes between seven to ten per cent of Liberia's national budget, while only about eighty per cent (80%) of the election budget is actually released to NEC, with the

<sup>4</sup>National Elections Commission of Republic of Liberia, 2011 Elections Report: A Full Account of the 2011 Electoral Process, Monrovia, December 2011, pp.10-11

<sup>5</sup>Tbid., p.11



## Country Study of Liberia

shortfall sometimes provided directly to NEC, at its request through and with the approval of the country's Presidency, by development partners, as additional support to their agreed contribution to the election budget.<sup>6</sup>

*The New Elections Law, 2014* [Section 11.1] makes an implicit distinction between cost or budget of election and the recurrent cost or budget of running the NEC, by providing that “the election expenditure and recurrent expenditure of the National Elections Commission (including salaries and allowances of the employees) shall be a charge upon the National Revenue of the Republic of Liberia.” However, in an election year, there is an inevitable overlap between the recurrent and the election budgets of NEC. Thus, NEC's 2010 recurrent budget covered the 24-month period, July 1, 2010 to June 30, 2012; while its election budget covered the 18-month period, June 1, 2010 to December 31, 2011. NEC's 2017 election budget covered the period July 1 2016 to December 31, 2017.

An example of the overlap is provided by expenditure on some line items under the 2017 election budget to compensate for election-year activities that are not covered by the recurrent budget of NEC, for the following regular operational and security activities at INEC Headquarters and field offices: US\$1,968,321.12 was expended as election allowance, calculated at 40 per cent of gross salary over fifteen months; US\$318,200 on travel and accommodation (local and international); US\$150,000 on “elections related legal issues,” and under NEC Security Operations” line item, US\$200,000 on “Election Security.”<sup>7</sup>

The 2014 New Elections Law further provides that: (a) on approval of the budget, allocations shall be disbursed into an account established by NEC in two instalments on 1 July and 1 January of every fiscal year [Section 12.2]; (b) NEC shall publish an Annual Plan and Audited Account [Section 12.3]; and (c) establish a Finance and Audit Committee “to oversee spending and provide assurance of regularity and propriety.” [Section 12.4]

### **Election Funding: Development Partners**

In view of the role played by development partners in bringing the country's civil war to an end and in securing the adoption the country's post-civil war *Agenda for Development* and the *National Reconciliation and Healing Program*, the international donor community and development partners provide another major source of funding to meet the election budget of NEC. This source of funding flows from the provisions of the *2003 Comprehensive Agreement*, mandating NEC to hold

<sup>6</sup>Notes of interviews with NEC Chairman and Commissioners, between February 19 and 22, 2018; and discussion with development partners, Monrovia, February 21, 2018

<sup>7</sup>National Electoral Commission (NEC)-Liberia, 2017 Election Cycle Budget: Election Budget-July 1, 2016-December 31, 2017



elections by October 2005, and requiring that the “mandate was to be jointly implemented by the United Nations, African Union, ECOWAS and other members of the International Community.”<sup>8</sup>

While the greater part of funding for the 2005 and 2011 general elections was provided by Liberia's international partners, mainly the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), the International Foundation for Election System (IFES), the European Commission (EC) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the funding has, thereafter, substantially ebbed. Thus, development partners contributed about US\$5 million (roughly ten per cent (10%)) to the 2017 election budget of about US\$36 million.<sup>9</sup>

This development shows that the Government of Liberia has become the primary source for funding the costs of elections in the country. But the development also shows that the residual or secondary contribution of the development partners takes the form of the provision of money only for the budget line items in the approved budget that they have chosen to support and fund, after consultations with NEC. The money for the line items so chosen is expended directly by the development partners.

While the distinction between these two sources of funding for NEC needs to be kept in view in looking at the costs of elections in Liberia, it has to be realized that the development partners, through their support for the national budget, particularly support to improve infrastructures and to strengthen the capacity of public institutions generally, also make an indirect contribution to the funding of elections by the Government of Liberia. For example, Liberia's Governance Commission, in its *Annual Governance Report, 2017*, points out that, “Undocumented in this report is the magnitude of the support, especially material and human resource capacity provided to NEC by international partners, especially the United States Agency for International Development. Financial systems, information and communications technology and other capacity, to the extent they exist, can be attributed to support of external partners.”<sup>10</sup>

### **Election Funding: NEC Internally Generated Revenue (IGR)**

An untapped but potentially important source of funding for elections is the internally generated revenue (IGR) of the NEC. For example, NEC's IGR is currently limited to fees paid by candidates for elections and for political party registration by political parties. Thus, if there are 900 candidates, each paying the required US\$500 to stand for election, this will generate a revenue of US\$475000 into NEC's coffers each election year.

<sup>8</sup>National Elections Commission (NEC), *Elections 2005 Report*, p. iv

<sup>9</sup>Notes of interviews with NEC Co-Chair, February 19, 2018.

<sup>10</sup>Liberia Governance Commission, *Annual Governance Report*, p.55



## Country Study of Liberia

But in view of Liberia's public financial management law, the proceeds are paid into a general escrow account of the government. As a result of the law, NEC does not have unhindered access to or control over the account. Rather, monies accruing to NEC in the account are subject to deduction from the approved election budget in the process of disbursing the budget to NEC during the election year.

### **D. The Election Budget: Preparation, Procurement Process, and Bureaucratic Politics**

#### **Process and timeline for preparation of election budget**

Guided by the country's Public Financial Management Act, 2009 and its own financial regulations, the NEC now generally prepares the election budget about a year before the general elections takes place. The internal NEC process of preparing and drafting the budget proposal is driven and coordinated by the Commission's Finance and Audit Committee, for the consideration and approval of the budget proposal by the Board of Commissioners.

The NEC Secretariat, especially the Executive Director and the Department of Administration, plays a central role in the preparation of the budget proposal. It is, therefore, important for NEC, in preparing the election budget proposal, to have “a well rationalized system, a competent staff and transparent and efficient processes, especially in areas of procurement, training and deployment, financial management, and monitoring and evaluation.”<sup>11</sup>

This observation reflects a general perception that NEC needs enhanced human resource capacity to undertake effective, timely, and competent budget preparation, implementation and disbursement plan, in other words, strategic and election management planning, to save election cost. Although informal consultations by NEC with important stakeholders take place, there is concern among civil society organizations, the political parties, and the university community that, in the spirit of the core values of accountability, integrity and transparency espoused by NEC, the Commission should provide a platform for institutionalizing and routinizing stakeholders' input into the Commission's internal election budget preparation and planning process. It is argued that such a platform can also help reduce cost, for example, in planning and training, and provide necessary and vital support and mobilization linkages in NEC's engagement with the executive branch and legislature during the consideration of NEC's election budget.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>11</sup>Liberia Governance Commission, Annual Governance Report, p. 102

<sup>12</sup>Notes from discussion with civil society organizations, political parties and the university community, Monrovia, February 20, and February 22, 2018

Liberia's Public Finance Management Act 2009 (Article IX, Section 40), stipulates that the election budget proposal approved by the Board of Commissioners of NEC shall be submitted at least four months before the start of the government financial year to the Minister of Finance, who “shall examine the budget proposals and advise the President and Legislature accordingly.” The provision, therefore, makes it mandatory that the election budget is subjected to scrutiny by the Ministry of Finance and the Legislature. But the politics of the budgetary process tends to delay the passage of the proposal, despite prior consultations that NEC typically would have had, with the Ministry of Finance, other relevant executive branch ministries and departments, the Legislature, and development partners, while preparing the budget proposal.

With the passage of the election budget in the Legislature and the presidential assent to it, the Minister of Finance is required, under the Public Finance Management Act 2009, to notify NEC “on final decision on level of funding from the National Budget,” and to request NEC “resubmit a revised budget should funding be different from the amount requested.”

### **Procurement requirements and challenges of election budget disbursement**

Beyond securing the approval of the election budget, NEC faces the daunting and, sometimes, frustrating challenges of the tedious bureaucratic politics of not only the preparation and submission of a procurement plan consistent with the transparency procurement requirements and approval under the Public Procurement and Concessions Commission Act 2005, but also the timely releases of approved election funds. To illustrate: The process of reviewing and approving the election procurement plan by the Public Procurement Concessions Commission (PPCC) typically consumes precious time. The process is embedded in prolonged discussions between NEC and the PPCC, within a murky environment that is characterized by the complex combination of bureaucratic red-tape, diminishing revenue flows to the government, competing demands from ministries, departments and agencies of the government, and mutual distrust between the PPCC and NEC, fed by assumptions of rent-seeking opportunities in the procurement plan. But the delay in the process can also be attributed to lack of diligence in NEC's preparation of the budget and delay in its submission by NEC, giving rise to suspicion that the PPCC wants to be rushed into granting approval, under the cover that elections are fast approaching.<sup>13</sup>

Typical of delays in the election procurement process was the delay experienced in the procurement and delivery of the materials for voter registration exercise that were scheduled for delivery in

---

<sup>13</sup>Notes from interview with Liberia's APRM National Secretariat, February 21, 2018



## Country Study of Liberia

December 2016, ahead of the 2017 general elections, but which arrived in January 2017. This was partly because the prolonged procurement process forced two of the vendors contracted to procure the materials to back out, while the third one that agreed to go ahead with it had to sub-contract the production of the materials, because of time constraints. The delay in effect created transportation and other logistics challenges for the timely beginning of the voter registration exercise in 2017 but also created claims for variation due to the delayed release. Faced with such challenges, NEC has had occasion to approach the President directly in order to accelerate the approval process, bypassing the procurement process.<sup>14</sup>

### **Exempting election budget release from procurement law**

In view of the specialized nature of NEC's assignment and the security implications of its electoral mandate for political stability in the country, some have argued that the Commission should not be treated like ministerial departments and agencies. For example, it is suggested that NEC<sup>15</sup> should be able to start the procurement process for such materials, while waiting for action by the PPCC, but with the approval of the government for release of funds. To minimize such a possibility, it is suggested that Section 1(3) (c) of the Public Procurement and Concessions Commission Act, 2005, providing for the non-application of the Act “for the procurement of military and national security equipment, subject to certain conditions...”, provided for under Section 1(5) of the Act, should apply to NEC, especially for the procurement abroad of sensitive election materials, such as ballots and election kits.<sup>16</sup> Including NEC in the no-application group will obviate the present requirements under the PPCC Act that creates an environment that can compromise the independence of NEC, and create an avenue for undue interference in its election procurement activities and program by rent-seeking officials in executive branch agencies.

What the overall election budgetary process points to is that “the NEC's budget support from the government is subject to the vicissitudes of the [broader] process of budget formulation and passage and revenue inflows. This has not been helpful to the election planning process and to timely delivery of financial resources to NEC.”<sup>17</sup> What is needed, according to this viewpoint, is “a new approach for providing NEC's budget. It is not helpful to provide budget support for elections in the year in which the elections are to be held. Planning and budgeting for elections, as well as securing the resources, needed to be completed a year before the voting period, even if resources are to be kept in escrow until needed.”<sup>18</sup>

<sup>14</sup>Interview with NEC Chairman, February 21, 2018

<sup>15</sup>Interviews with NEC Co-Chairman, and NEC Commissioner, February 19 2018; and NEC Chairman, February 21 2018.

<sup>16</sup>Republic of Liberia, An Act Creating the Public Procurement and Concessions Commission Act, Approved: September 8, 2005, published by authority, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Monrovia, Liberia, September 21, 2005.

<sup>17</sup>Liberia Governance Commission, Annual Governance Report, p. 103

<sup>18</sup>Ibid

**E. Election Budget: Major Line Items, Trends and Gaps**

**Approved Election Budget, 2005, 2011 and 2017 General Elections**

The summary of the approved election budgets for Liberia's 2005, 2011 and 2017 general elections are outlined in Table I.

**Table I: Summary Liberia's Approved Election Budgets, 2005, 2011 & 2017 General Elections**

Election Activities	2005 (US\$)	2011 (US\$)	2017 (US\$) Actual Amount Released	Total (US)
Voter Registration	4,961,871.55	7,162,081	16,599,228.63	28,723,181.18
Voter Education & Public Consultation Voter Registration	N/A	N/A	2,631,567.00	2,631,567.00
Voter Education	2,615,953.80	2,394,085.00	N/A	5,010,038.80
Voter Education & Public Consultations- Elections	N/A	N/A	1,910,665.00	1,910,665.00
Elections	4,522,850.54	6,633,026.00	11,537,367.89	22,693,244.43
Presidential Run-off Elections	1,099,031.00	3,335,505.00	5,607,696.75	10,042,232.75.
Referendum	N/A	3,116,629.00	N/A	3,116,629.00
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>13,199,706.89</b>	<b>22,641,326.00</b>	<b>38,286,525.27</b>	<b>74,127,558.16</b>

*Source: National Elections Commission (NEC)--Liberia, February 2018*

What Table I shows is that presidential run-off elections and referendum are costed separately from the cost of the general elections. This is understandable because it is only after the presidential elections are completed and the results announced that it will become clear whether run-off presidential elections are necessary. In the case of referendum, this will take place only when the constitutional process for determining the case for it, and thereafter conducting it, that the date for





## Country Study of Liberia

its conduct will be set. The elections cost for the three general elections (2005, 2011 and 2017) elections would have included chieftaincy elections, had they also been held during the period 2005-2017.

Table I shows that the total cost of elections over the 2005, 2011, and 2017 elections in Liberia is US\$74,127,558.16. Major highlights in the Table indicate that “Voter Registration” consumed the highest cost each election year, with a total of US\$28,723,181.18 for the three elections, followed by elections cost, with a total of US\$22,693,244.43 (Table IA), with both accounting for N51,416,425.3 (or approximately 69 per cent) 1 of the total election cost of US\$74,127,558.16 for the three elections.

**Table IA: Trends in Registration & Election Cost: 2005, 2011 and 2017 General Elections**

Election Year	Voter Registration Cost (US\$)	Election Cost (US\$)
2005	4,961,871.55	4,522,850.54
2011	7,162,081.00	6,633,026.00
2017	16,599,228.63	11,537,367.89
Total	28,723,181.18	22,693,244.43

Another trend that Table I highlights is the huge jump in the total election cost from US\$13,199,706.89 in 2005, to US\$22,641,326.00 in 2011, and to US\$38,286,525.27 in 2017. This represents an increase of about 290 per cent over the course of the three election years. The increase is due to a combination of two major factors. The first factor is the increasing integrity cost of elections that are due to imported inflation from the procurement of ballot boxes, ballot papers, election kits and related high technology election materials, such as indelible ink from abroad.

The second factor is increased political awareness about elections as a mechanism for ensuring the legitimacy of governments, peaceful political succession, accountability, inclusion and participation, in public affairs. This increases the administrative cost of elections, reflected in increased registration units, polling units, registration and election materials recruitment and training and deployment of temporary staff. This partly explains why the cost of voter registration rose from US\$4,961,871.55 in 2005, to US\$7,162,081.00 in 2011, and to US\$

US\$16,599,288.63 in 2017, an increase of approximately 232 per cent over the three election cycles, as outlined in Table I. As the disaggregated items in Table III illustrates, for the 2011 and 2017 general elections in Liberia, the personnel cost of temporary staff for Voter Registration was US\$6,018,200; for Elections, US\$5,270,150; and for Presidential-Run-off Elections, US\$3,266,850.

It is interesting, however, that the aggregated cost of voter education, so vital to raise political awareness about, and to underscore the importance of the ballot, consumed a total of only about US\$9, 552,271, during the 2005, 2011 and 2017 general elections, when compared to the aggregated cost for Voter Registration (US\$ 28, 723, 181, 18; and Elections (US\$22, 693244.43) over the same period. It is likely that the cost of voter education is understated, since it may be diffused through other line items for voter registration and elections and in the election related activities of various agencies of the Government of Liberia, the political parties, the donor community, and civil society organizations. Another significant consideration is that the lower cost of voter education is, partly, due to the fact that it hardly involves the high integrity cost associated with the high technology and administrative cost of voter registration and elections. On a positive note, however, the turn-out for the 2017 presidential elections was a considerable 75.2 per cent, although the turn-out was 55.8 per cent for the 2017 presidential run-off elections.<sup>19</sup>

Yet it remains problematic that, although the number of projected eligible voters in each of the 2011 and 2017 election budgets, was 2,500,000, the actual number of registered voters during each of the 2011 and 2017 electoral cycles fell short of the number of the projected eligible voters, as summarized in Table IB. This suggests that much more vigorous voter. Civic education needs to be undertaken to meet the projected figure of 2,500,000 eligible voters.

**Table IB: Summary of Registered Voters: 2005, 2011 & 2017 General Elections in Liberia**

Election Year	Registered Voters	Per Cent of Male Registered Voters	Per Cent of Female Registered Voters
2005	1,352,730	50	50
2011	1,798,930	51	49
2017	2,183,629	51	49

Source: [www.necliberia.org](http://www.necliberia.org)

<sup>19</sup>[www.necliberia.org/results2017/turnout.html](http://www.necliberia.org/results2017/turnout.html)



## Country Study of Liberia

The cost of the 2011 general elections per eligible voter, with 1,798,930 registered voters, and an election cost of US\$22,641,326.00 was about US\$13. For the 2017 general elections, with the 2,183,629 registered voters, and an election cost of US\$38,286,525.27, it was US\$17.5.

Table II provides a comparative cost of election per voter in the last general elections in Liberia and 8 other selected African countries.

**Table II: Comparative Cost of Election per Voter in Liberia and Selected African Countries<sup>20</sup>**

Country	Year	Cost per Voter (US\$)
Cape Verde	2016	36.5
Democratic Republic of Congo	2011	44/9**
Ghana	2016	18
Guinea-Bissau	2014	11.2
Kenya	2017	25.40
Liberia	2017	15.3
Nigeria	2015	8.5
Rwanda	2017	1.01
Tanzania	2015	5.16
Uganda	2016	4

Source: Desk research by author

\*\*Calculation based on a total US\$1, 400,000,000.00 cost of the election, made up of funding by the DRC Government, donor community and the operations of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in DRC (MONUSCO) for security, and 32,024,199 registered voters. But if the MONUSCO security expenses are excluded, the total cost of the country's 2011 elections, with the same number of registered voters, will be US\$19 per voter.

### **Disaggregated Election Cost 2011 and 2017 General Elections and Presidential Run-Offs**

Table III provides a summary of sub-/disaggregated line items costing over US\$1 million each of Liberia's election budgets for each of the 2011, and 2017 general elections in the country. The total cost for the disaggregated items, added together, is N39, 100,131.75 or 61 per cent, of the total of N60, 927,851.27 of the selected sub-line items of the 2011 and 2017 general elections in the country. For the line item "Voter Registration," the highest cost was expended on Registration

<sup>20</sup>These are rough estimates from various sources, including election management bodies for both voter registration and election cost figures. The estimates are indicative of calculations from both figures that are sometimes incomplete or contradictory or unreliable, even when provided by the election management bodies of the country and on official exchange and parallel market rates that vary daily, and local currencies that are not convertible directly from one country to another. This understandably raises questions about the value of these comparisons, other than for their indicative value.

Personnel (US\$6,018,200) for the two elections. For, the line item, “Elections,” the highest expenditure for the two elections was for Election Materials (N6, 550,357), accounting for the overall highest cost across the disaggregated line items. For the presidential run-off elections in 2011 and 2017, “Polling Personnel” ranked highest with a cost of N3, 266,850.

**Table III: Disaggregated Election Cost: 2011 & 2017 General Elections**

Line Item Description	2011 Election Cost (US\$)	2017 Election Cost (US\$)	Line Item Total Election Cost 2011 & 2017 (US\$)
<u>Voters' Registration</u>			
a) Registration Personnel (Temp)	a) 2,796,600	a) 3,221,600	a) 6,018,200
b) Registration Materials			
c) Registration Logistics			
d) Solar Panel Kit & Materials	b) 2,449,177		b) 2,449,177
e) Voter Registration Materials - Actual		c) 3,237,600	c) 3,237,600
f) Voter Registration Forms & Signs (Actual)		d) 2,892,250	d) 2,892,250
		e) 1,587,362	e) 1,587,362
		f) 1,372,795	f) 1,372,795
Voter Education*			
<u>Elections</u>			
a) Election Personnel (Temp)	a) 2,296,900	a) 2,973,250	a) 5,270,150
b) Election Materials			
c) Election Logistics			
d) Election Forms & Signs	b) 3,205,795	b) 3,344,562	b) 6,550,357
		c) 1,770,725	c) 1,770,357
		d) 1,446,178	d) 1,446,178
<u>Presidential Run -Off Elections</u>			
a) Polling Personnel (Temp)	a) 1,250,000	a) 2,016,850	a) 3,266,850
b) Election Forms & Signs/Election Materials	b) 1,030,547	b) 2,208,308.75	b) 3,238,855.75
Total	13,029,019	26,071,480.75	39,100,131.75

\* No line item costing more than US\$1 million recorded



## Country Study of Liberia

### F. Cost of Elections and the Future of Democracy & Elections in Liberia

The trend of the spiraling cost of elections between 2005 and 2017 (from US\$13,199,706.89, in 2005, to US\$22,641,326.00 in 2011, and to US\$38,286,525.27 in 2017), and with the cost per registered voter rising to US\$17.5 in 2017 from US\$13 in 2011 may raise legitimate concerns that the price Liberia is paying for competitive party and electoral politics through the conduct of general elections every 6 years is progressively becoming unbearably burdensome. Indeed, such concerns are not uncommon in other African countries, where the rise in the cost of elections remains unabated. For example, early in January 2017, the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was quoted as considering postponing general elections scheduled for later in 2017 because of the US\$1 billion election budget submitted by the country's National Electoral Commission (CENI), elections were postponed till December 2018, allegedly because of the security situation in the country and the need for more time to enable the country's electoral commission complete the revision of the voters' register.<sup>21</sup>

These concerns and the political and socioeconomic risks thrown up either by disputed elections, or “when [democratic] elections go wrong,” as in Cote d'Ivoire and the Democratic of Congo in 2011,<sup>22</sup> may seem legitimate, casting doubt about their benefits, in the short term. But a medium- to long-term view suggests that the rising cost and the political risks of failed or flawed elections is a worthwhile investment because of its potential contribution to strengthening and consolidating democracy and development in the country. The rising cost and the risks of democratic politics are best viewed as part of the contradictions, the “perpetual crises” of democracy,<sup>23</sup> which must be confronted not by running away from or abandoning democratic elections. Abandoning faith in democratic elections as an investment will throw up challenges, the political and socioeconomic cost of addressing which may be much more, in both the short and the medium to long-term, than the cost of conducting democratic elections. Moreover, flawed elections are symptoms of underlying anti-democratic tendencies and trends in state and society, for which conducting democratic elections may help to defuse or constrain.

The argument, therefore, is that the medium-to long-term view of democratic elections as a form of social investment, ties in with the imperative of developing a democratic political culture anchored on foundations of electoral integrity and unproblematic political succession. In other words, the medium- to long-term view of the cost of elections looks upon credible, free and fair elections as a necessity not only to avoid backsliding and relapse to authoritarian rule, but also to help deepen and

<sup>21</sup><https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/02/16//congo-government-elections-are-too-expensive-and-may-not-hold>

<sup>22</sup>African Development Bank Group, *Democratic Elections in Africa: Opportunities and Risks*, 24 April, 2012.

<sup>23</sup>Guillermo O'Donnell, “The Perpetual Crises of Democracy,” *Journal of Democracy*, pp.5-11- Vol. 18, Issue 1, January 2007.



sustain democratic development, as a process of providing human security for the generality of the citizenry.<sup>24</sup>

The argument is two-fold. First, there is an intrinsic value to the conduct of democratic elections as mechanisms for political succession that serve to justify it as something desirable for its own sake and for which the struggle to establish and strengthen its institutions and routinize its normative bearings and processes as part of the country's cultural life must be waged relentlessly against anti-democratic elements of the political leaders and such other forces in state and society and their external supporters and sympathizers. Secondly, there is an instrumental value to democracy. This is its potential to provide what Sen refers to as the economic facilities and social opportunities, in the facilitative environment of what he characterized as “political freedoms” and “transparency guarantees.”

Sen argues that the democratization of governance and development processes in social inclusive and participatory ways will promote and ensure human security. According to him, “what people can positively achieve is influenced by economic opportunities, political liberties, social powers and the enabling conditions of good health, basic education, and the encouragement and cultivation of initiatives. The institutional arrangements for these opportunities are also influenced by the exercise of people's freedoms, through the liberty to participate in social choice and in the making of public decisions that impel the progress of these opportunities.”<sup>25</sup>

The potential human security component of investment in democratic elections is, ultimately, of great significance in reducing election cost in the medium- to long-term. The provision of better social infrastructure by the state—better roads, poverty reduction, building more schools and hospitals, reducing illiteracy and the scourge of preventable diseases, among others, can facilitate and help trim down the escalating cost of the deployment of election logistics, and of the high technology and administrative cost of elections—line items, which consume significantly high per cent of the election cost in Liberia, as illustrated in Section V above.

The medium- to long-term perspective is, however, not incompatible with a concern with finding ways to contain, if not lower or trim away leakages and waste in the cost of elections, particularly those associated with procurement of high technology and the administrative cost of election, such as that related to ad hoc or temporary staff, and generally the cost of governance in the country. All stakeholders in Liberia during interactions with them for this study were unanimous on the

<sup>24</sup>For an interesting analysis of the consequences of political regimes, i.e. of the question, “does “democracy (or “authoritarianism /dictatorship”) foster or hinder material welfare?” or “economic development,” see Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Avarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi (co-authors), *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*, Cambridge University Press, 2000. See also, Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom*, Oxford, 1999.

<sup>25</sup>Sen, *Development as Freedom*, p.5



## Country Study of Liberia

farsightedness of the medium- to long-term perspective and of the need to reduce leakages associated with the high technology and the administrative cost of elections in the country. They also proffered recommendations, such as those outlined below, on how to do this, moving ahead to future elections in the country.

But anchoring the perspective and the recommendations flowing from it is a general sentiment that the national budgetary and procurement process needs to take account of the special and strategic security position of NEC, and of its consequential special needs. Deriving from this sentiment is the view that NEC should not be treated as if it was an ordinary department of government. The view was expressed that delays in the budgetary and procurement process and in the release of approved funds for procurement of election materials, under current procurement rules in particular, is also a major cause of the escalating election cost in the country. On this view, such delays can and should be avoided by granting NEC exemptions, such as those extended to procurement of military and national security items, subject to certain conditions under the procurement law.<sup>26</sup>

What follows is a summary of the major recommendations on for addressing the challenges of the election budget and cost that emerged out of the interactions.

### **G. Recommendations**

#### **Financial independence of NEC:**

1. The Government of Liberia and the country's Legislature amend or comply with existing sections of the 2014 Elections Laws, to strengthen the financial and operational independence of NEC, as follows:
  - (a) Reserve a per cent of the national budget for elections, as a charge on the consolidated revenue fund, deposited into an escrow account managed by NEC, but with strict accountability and transparency oversight exercised by a board of trustees of eminent Liberians, outside of the public bureaucracy, put in place.
  - (b). Amend the 2014 Elections Laws to establish a NEC Trust Fund, under the control of NEC, but subject to transparency and accountability requirements, for which grants to NEC and internally generated revenue of NEC can be deposited for use by the commission.

<sup>26</sup>Republic of Liberia, An Act Creating the Public Procurement and Concessions Commission Act, Section 1(3) (c), and Section 1(5).

- (c) Comply faithfully and without undue delay with the provisions of the 2014 Elections Law (Section 12:2) stipulating that, allocations from the approved budget shall be disbursed in two installments on July 1 and January 1 of every fiscal year.
2. Amend the PPCC Act to extend the non-application provisions of the PPCC Act (Section 1(3) (c) to NEC for the procurement of sensitive security election materials such as ballot papers and results forms, “under certain conditions.”

### **Constitutional Amendment**

1. The Government of Liberia and the Legislature to initiate national debate over the desirability of effecting the following constitutional amendments:
  - (a) Remove the conduct of general elections in October, which falls within the rainy season in the country, to the dry season. The current provision, falling within the rainy season, with its serious challenges for deploying election logistics and personnel, due to the country's massive infrastructure deficits, is a significant factor in the spiraling cost of elections in the country.
  - (b) Amend the current provision for presidential run-off elections, because it partly contributes to the spiraling cost of elections. Like the general trend in other items on the election budget, the cost of conducting presidential run-off elections rose from US\$3,335,505 in 2011 to US\$5,607,696.75 in 2017, an increase of 68 per cent. With the proliferation of political parties, the trend is likely to continue as more and more presidential candidates are fielded by the political parties.

### **Strategic Planning, Capacity-Building/Enhancement & Streamlining of NEC**

1. NEC to initiate a process to reinvent and re-energize itself by pursuing the following action and/or initiatives:
  - (a). Partner with the academic community to undertake a more vigorous Strategic Planning, covering the next five to seven years, to rationalize its activities; build and enhance capacity, especially in critical financial management, logistics and ICT areas; trim waste, undertake a management audit to avoid duplication of activities, and departments; decentralize its operations, particularly relating to contract award,



## Country Study of Liberia

procurement of election materials, and recruitment of ad hoc staff at lower levels, as measures to cut down on cost of election activities, such as the centrally deployment of staff and election materials from its headquarters in Monrovia to undertake electoral duties in the counties. .

- (b) To this end, consider establishing an Electoral Institute as an –in-house think tank for applied comparative policy research on trends in Liberia's and West African regional electoral and political behavior that can help NEC adopt and implement cost saving strategies in planning for elections
- (c) Carry out regular, and especially post-election audit of election materials and resources, laying emphasis on avoiding theft and wastage, and the safe storage of re-usable election materials to save on replacement cost of procuring them every election year.
- (d) Pursue vigorously on-going efforts to integrate its voter registration exercise into the country's national identity card program, such as using information captured on national ID card for voter registration purposes, as a way of considerably cutting down on the cost of voter registration exercise. One estimate is that this may result in about 50 per cent reduction in the cost of voter registration, standing at US\$16,599,228.63 for the 2017 elections (See Table IA).
- (e) If, as some have indicated, the National ID card is yet to take off firmly, consider the cost/benefit implications of gradually introducing biometric data registration, using direct data capture or other credible options to replace the current wholesale voter registration exercise before every election, with continuous voter registration.
- (f) Embark more consciously and determinedly on confidence-building outreach to political parties and civil society. Poor relations with the two critical stakeholder often can, and often add to the cost of elections.
- (g) Using the ECONEC network, explore, as a cost-saving strategy, the importation of electoral materials from West Africa and elsewhere in Africa, from countries that have comparative advantage n the production of the materials.

- (h) Carry out regular, and especially post-election audit of election materials and resources, laying emphasis on avoiding theft and wastage, and the safe storage of re-usable election materials to save on replacement cost of procuring them every election year.
- (i) Prepare and submit timeously, as required under the Constitution and Election Laws of Liberia, the election budget.

### **ECONEC & ECOWAS**

1. ECONEC and, through it, ECOWAS should consider the following to help reduce election cost borne by governments in the region:
  - (a) Deploy their power of moral suasion to encourage the Government of Liberia take a proactive interest in helping to strengthen the independence of NEC, in line with the recommendations in this study.
  - (b) Consider the feasibility of ECOWAS member countries imposing an election tax on the private sector in the region, to be administered and used to defray election costs, as part of their corporate social responsibility and investment in the region's democracy and development. The private sector stands to benefit from, and should invest in elections as mechanism for consolidating peace and stability in the region. Collective pressure and agreement at the ECOWAS level will send a powerful message to the private sector.





## **COUNTRY STUDY OF NIGERIA**

### **A. Context: History and Political Economy**

The conduct of elections in colonial and postcolonial Nigeria dates back to 1923 with the election, on a limited income-based franchise, of three unofficial representatives from Lagos, and one from Calabar, elected separately by the residents of each town, who had a minimum income of one hundred pounds sterling. Further elections were held between 1946 and 1959 that saw Nigeria move progressively, under constitutional and political reforms, as part of the decolonization process, from a system of indirect election under an Electoral College system, with limited franchise, to direct elections under universal adult suffrage. Elections were held between 1951 and 1959 to the three regional Houses of Assembly in the East, West and North and, for the first time, to the federal House of Representatives in 1959.

Elections in Nigeria have historically been heatedly contested and controversial. For example, during colonial rule controversy trailed the partisan role of colonial administrators, who manipulated electoral regulations and, therefore, elections, in order to control the pace of decolonization and to ensure transfer of power to their preferred inheritance elites.<sup>1</sup> After independence, ruling political parties at the federal and regional/state levels abused the power of incumbency to gain unfair political and electoral advantage in a matter that sullied and compromised the integrity of electoral administration, even in the first 5 years of independence.

The elections were also violent, during and after colonial rule, reflecting the ethno-regional divisions and mutual fear of domination between and among dominant and minority ethnic groups. It was the controversy and violence that enveloped the December 1964 federal elections, the March 1965 supplementary elections, and the regional elections in the Western Region in December 1965 that provided one of the precipitating causes of the military take-over of government in the country in January 1966. Military rule lasted till October 1979, under a democratic transition program, which ushered in democratic civilian rule. But the new democratic regime was toppled in another military take-over in January 1984, again in the aftermath of controversial and allegedly fraudulent elections held in 1983, which raised issues about stolen election mandates and the legitimacy of the winning party coalition at the federal level legitimacy.

<sup>1</sup>B. J. Dudley, *Parties and Politics in Northern Nigeria*, London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 1968, p.84: "When NEPU [Northern Elements Progressive Union] was inaugurated, its radicalism ... won it considerable acceptance which made itself felt during the 1951 elections even though the electoral regulations eventually operated against it"; Richard L. Sklar, *Nigerian Political Parties: Power in an Emergent African Country*, N.Y. and Lagos: NOK Publishers, 1963, p.30,"In the Northern Region, special techniques were devised to weight the vote in favor of traditional and conservative elements in early elections." also Barry Mason, *Britain rigged elections before Nigeria's independence*, BBC Documentary, 9 August 2007.



## Country Study of Nigeria

From 1984 to 1999, except with short interludes of elections to local government councils in 1987, to the office of Governor and to regional houses of assembly in 1991, and to the bi-cameral Federal Parliament in 1992, as part of another democratic transition program under the military, the country was under military rule. In a way, the annulment of the July 1993 presidential elections presaged the end of military rule and the onset of another transition to democratic civilian rule in the country, which ended with the conduct of local government elections throughout the country, followed by the general elections of May 1999 to the offices of the president of the country, governors of the 36 states and to federal and state legislatures.

Nigeria has, following the 1999 general elections, conducted general elections every four years as provided under the 1999 Constitution in 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015, in addition to elections to local government councils, re-runs and new elections to gubernatorial and legislative elections declared null and void by courts, and several bye-elections. Box I shows some of the elections held in Nigeria between 1923 and 2015.

### **Box I: Elections in Nigeria: 1923-2015**

#### **Elections during colonial period**

1923; 1946; 1951; 1954; 1959.

#### **Elections since Independence**

1964; 1965; 1979; 1987; 1991; 1992; 1993; 1999; 2003; 2007; 2011; 2015

Source: Desk research by author.

The origins and development of Nigeria's electoral commissions and of competitive party and of electoral politics in the country, are therefore, not only intertwined with the country's constitutional, political and electoral history but also overburdened by the social, political and economic costs of minimizing electoral fraud by designing and implementing policies and strategies to achieve and sustain electoral integrity.

The imperative of sanitizing the electoral process became more pressing after the controversy, including the litigation in the aftermath of the 2007 general elections. A major finding of the Electoral Reform Committee (ERC), established following national and international outrage over the conduct and result of the elections, was that “the 85-year old history of Nigeria's elections shows

a progressive degeneration of outcomes. Thus the 2007 elections are believed to be the worst since the first elections in 1922”<sup>2</sup>

The ERC Report gave a welcome fillip to the call for electoral reform, including strengthening the administrative and financial independence of the country's electoral commission and capacitating it, therefore, to bear the burden of the political and economic costs required to ensure electoral integrity. It is remarkable that the measured improvement in electoral integrity experienced during the 2011 and the 2015 general elections were conducted by a reconstituted INEC, under the leadership of a member of the ERC, Professor Attahiru Jega, which vigorously pursued reforms, anchored on investing in the integrity cost of elections to build confidence in the country's electoral administration and electoral process,<sup>3</sup> in a manner to support the finding of a si-country study of electoral commissions in West Africa, that, “among the more important criteria that can affect the independence and effectiveness of an EMB, [is] the strength of the character of the members, especially the chair of the EMB...”<sup>4</sup>

Yet the chequered history of electoral reform, deep-rooted in Nigeria's zero-sum political culture, has made the task of minimizing the cost, particularly the integrity costs of elections in the country, an uphill task. In other words, the cost of elections in Nigeria is bound up with the country's political history and its political economy. The combination of the political and legal culture and the political economy that anchors competitive party and electoral politics remains one that electoral commissions must skillfully navigate, with the active support of public interest advocacy groups and democracy-promoting ones to secure electoral integrity.

## **B. Power, Functions and Structure of the INEC**

It is important to situate the power, functions and structure of Nigeria's Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) within the ambit of the country's federal system of government. Because of the country's federal system, which requires the duplication or a duality of autonomous, co-equal governmental structures and institutions at the national and sub-national levels, exercising powers and functions entrenched in a constitutional division of powers or legislative lists, the country has alternated between federal and state-level electoral bodies, and only one federal body to conduct all elections in the country but depending on whether elections are on the exclusive federal or on the concurrent list. [See Box II]

<sup>2</sup>Electoral Reform Committee (ERC), Report of the Electoral Reform Committee, Volume 1, Main Report, Abuja, 2008, p.39.

<sup>3</sup>See Attahiru M. Jega, Election Management in Nigeria: The Evolution of the Nigerian Electoral Process, 2012-2015, Ibadan: Safari Press, 2015.

<sup>4</sup>Pascale Kambale, “Overview: The contribution of electoral management bodies to credible elections in West Africa, p.5, in Ismaila Madior Fall, Mathias Hounkpe, Adele L. Jinadu, Pascale Kambale (co-authors), Election Management Bodies in West Africa: a comparative study of the contribution of electoral commissions to the strengthening of democracy, Dakar: Open Society Initiative for West Africa, 2011.



## Country Study of Nigeria

It is also an indication of the progressive devolution and disaggregation of power from the centre to the regions, between 1946 and 1960, under the Richards Constitution (1946), the Macpherson Constitution (1951), the Lyttleton Constitution (1954) and the Independence Constitution (1960)<sup>5</sup> leading to the adoption of a federal system of government in the country, that separate electoral bodies in the regions pre-dated the federal electoral body that was established in 1958.

### **Box II: Nigeria's history of dual system of electoral bodies at federal and state levels**

1. A federal electoral management body to conduct federal level general elections and regional electoral management bodies to conduct regional and local government elections (1960-1966, under the 1960 and 1963 constitutions);
2. A federal electoral management body to conduct both federal and state general elections and a state electoral management body to conduct only local government council elections (1979-1983; and since 1999; under the 1979 and 1999 constitutions); and
3. One electoral management body to conduct federal and state general elections and local government council elections...1985-1993, under the partially implemented 1989 constitution

Source: Adele Jinadu, "Nigeria," in Ismaila Madior Fall, Mathias Hounkpe, Adele L. Jinadu and Pascal Kambale (co-authors), *Election Management Bodies in West Africa*, p.121, Open Society Foundations, 2011.

Indicative of how the country's constitutional, political and electoral history intertwines with development of Nigeria's electoral commission are the changes in the names of the country's electoral management bodies, which have variously been: the electoral commission of Nigeria (1958); electoral commission of the Federation (1964); federal electoral commission (1976); national electoral commission (1987); national electoral commission of Nigeria (1994); and independent national electoral commission (1999); "with each change in name...apparently intended to distance each [reconstituted] electoral commission from the ill-repute [of], and controversy surrounding its predecessor and to create the impression that the successor Electoral Commission would be independent and insulated from partisan control, especially by the government."<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup>Kalu Ezera, *Constitutional Developments in Nigeria: An Analytical Study of Nigeria's Constitution-Making Developments and the Historical and Political Factors that Affected Constitutional Change*, Cambridge University Press, 1960

<sup>6</sup>Adele Jinadu, "Nigeria," in Ismaila Madior Fall, Mathias Hounkpe, Adele L. Jinadu and Pascal Kambale (co-authors), *Election Management Bodies in West Africa*, p.121, Open Society Foundations, 2011.



The independent national electoral commission, the successor to earlier federal electoral bodies, is established under the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) Section 153(1) (f), with its Chairman and other members appointed by the country's President, who in exercising the powers “to appoint... shall consult the Council of State,” (Section 154(3), with the appointment subject to confirmation by the Senate.” (Section 154(1)) In addition to the Chairman (the Chief Electoral Commissioner) and twelve other members (National Electoral Commissioners), the 1999 Constitution also provides “for each state of the Federation and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, a resident electoral commissioner who shall be appointed by the President (Third Schedule, Section 14 (2) (a)).

Box III lists the power of the INEC, under the 1999 Constitution (Third Schedule, Section 15).

### **Box III: Power of INEC**

#### **1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as Amended)**

##### **Third Schedule, Section 15:-**

- (a) organize, undertake and supervise all elections to the offices of the President and Vice President, the Governor and Deputy Governor of a State, and to the membership of the Senate, the House of Representatives and the House of Assembly of each state of the Federation;
- (b) register political parties...
- (c) monitor the organization and operation of the political parties, including their finances;
- (d) arrange for the annual examination and auditing of the funds and accounts of political parties, and publish a report on such examination and audit for public information;
- (e) arrange and conduct the registration of persons qualified to vote and prepare, maintain and revise the register of voters for the purpose of any election under this Constitution;
- (f) monitor political campaigns and provide rules and regulations which shall govern the political parties; ....
- (g) delegate any of its powers to any Resident Electoral Commissioner; and
- (h) carry out such other functions as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly.





## Country Study of Nigeria

The Electoral Act, 2010 (Section 2(a)-(c) grants INEC, in addition to the constitutional provisions in Box III, the power to: “(a) conduct voter and civic education; (b) promote knowledge of sound democratic election process; and (c) conduct any referendum required to be conducted pursuant to the provision of the 1999 Constitution or any other law or act of the National Assembly.”

Following the 2011 general elections, INEC began a strategic planning and reform process focused on (a) beginning election preparation early; (b) strengthening the system of recruiting ad hoc staff; (c) more involvement of permanent staff of INEC in elections; (d) addressing the challenge of funding; and (e) improving the training of staff, among other objectives.<sup>7</sup> Significant policies and initiatives that resulted from the reform process included the adoption and implementation of the following (a) Strategic Plan, 2012-2016; (b) Election Management System; (c) Election Project Plan; (d) Business Process Re-Design; (e) Election Risk Management; (f) INEC Citizens Contact Centre; (g) National Inter-agency Consultative Committee on Voter Education and Publicity; and (h) Alternative Dispute Resolution.<sup>8</sup>

A notable aspect of the reform process was INEC's vigorous attempt at the application of high technology, such as the Auto Finger-print Identification System (AFIS), the Permanent Voters Card (PVC) and the Smart Card Readers (SCRs) in the election process. Although INEC introduced the use of technology for voter registration, using optical scanners, updating it with biometric data registration in 2006, the new approach, under a new leadership and newly appointed national electoral commissioners in 2010, was more consciously designed as a confidence-building one to upgrade the use of ICT to strengthen the credibility of elections conducted by INEC.<sup>9</sup>

### C. Sources and Types of INEC's Funding

The 1999 Constitution (as amended) and the Electoral Law 2010 (as amended) provide for the following two major sources of the funding of general elections on the federal Exclusive List in Nigeria, as exemplified by the 2007, 2011 and 2015 general elections in the country: (a) consolidated national budgetary allocations; and (b) “aids and grants” from sources other than the federal government, including notably assistance from international development partners. But a third source is provided under the Electoral Act, 2010 (Section 3 (1)), stipulating that “there shall be established for the Commission a fund to be known as Independent National Electoral Commission Fund.” (See Box IV on relevant provisions of the Act on types of payments into the Fund and what the proceeds from the Fund shall be applied to. Another source of funding for INEC is probably its internally generated revenue.

<sup>7</sup>Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), 2015 General Elections Report, Abuja, 2015, p.28; see also, Okechukwu Ibeanu, Preparations for the 2015 General Elections, mimeo, 2014; INEC, Report of the Registration and Elections Review Committee, 2012

<sup>8</sup>Ibid, pp37-42;

<sup>9</sup>Attahiru M. Jega, Election Management in Nigeria: The Evolution of the Nigerian Electoral Process, 2010-2015, Ibadan: Safari Books Ltd., 2015, pp.1-9

#### **Box IV: Establishment of the INEC Fund**

##### **Types of payments into the INEC Fund**

The Electoral Act, 2010 Section 3 provides that the following types of payments shall be made into the INEC Fund:

- a) Such sums and payments available to the Commission for carrying out its functions and purposes under the Constitution and this Act and all other assets from time to time accruing to the Commission;
- b) Such sums as may, from time to time, be credited to the Fund by way of interest from investments made for the Fund;
- c) Aids, grants that may from time to time accrue to the Commission in order to carry out its functions.

##### **Application of Proceeds from the INEC Fund**

“Section 4 (1); The Commission may, from time to time, apply the proceeds of the Fund . . . to—

- (a) defray the cost of administration of the Commission;
- (b) reimburse members of any committee set up by the Commission for such expenses as may be expressly authorized by the Commission in accordance with the rate approved by it;
- (c) the payment of salaries, fees or other remuneration or allowances and pensions, superannuation allowances and gratuities payable to the officers and servants of the Commission;
- (d) the maintenance of any property vested in the Commission; and
- (e) in connection with all or any of its functions under this Act. “

The establishment of the Independent National Electoral Commission Trust Fund, particularly Section 3 (3) of the Electoral Act, 2010 stipulating that “disbursements from the Fund shall be in accordance with rules set by the Commission,” provides a potential internally generated revenue base to enable INEC strengthen its financial independence and, thereby, anticipate risks, and absorb or deflect shocks to its activities that may arise from shortfalls caused by deficits caused by unreleased funds from approved election budget that might otherwise unduly delay its election procurement, with grave consequences for the conduct of elections.

Election-related grants to INEC from international development partners are paid into a Joint Donor Basket Fund (JDBF), established in 2006 by a consortium, made up of (a) the European

## Country Study of Nigeria

Union (EU); (b) the British Department for International Development (DFID); (c) the Canadian Development Agency (CIDA); and (d) the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The amount so contributed is expended directly by the development partners.

For the 2007, the amount disbursed from the JDBF was estimated at about US\$30 million, of which seventy per cent went to supporting INEC election-related activities and thirty per cent to those of civil society organizations.<sup>10</sup> (See Table I for a summary of some of the activities during the 2011 general elections funded by some development partners).

**Table I: Summary of Support from Selected Development Partners for 2011 General Elections**

S/N	Development Partner	Activity
1	United States Embassy	Purchase of lanterns for all collation centres and indelible cuticle markers during the April 2011 elections
2	Canadian High Commission/CIDA	a) Contribution to the Joint Assistance in the Chairman's Office b) Support for election expert, Ron Gould to visit the Commission and share experience
3	South Korea	Contribution to the JDBF
4	World Bank	Offered to train INEC staff on logistics and procurement
5	DFID	a) Contribution to JDBF b) Support to CSO-INEC Situation Room c) Technical Assistance to Chairman's Office
6	European Union	a) Contribution to the JDBF b) MOU on Election Observation
7	Ford Foundation	a) Payment of the salary of the ICT Consultant for six months b) Media support during the 2011 Elections c) \$900,000

<sup>10</sup>Jinadu, "Nigeria," pp.133-134

8	MacArthur Foundation	a) Payment of salary of two assistants working with the Chief Technical Adviser and Special Assistant to the Chairman b) Technical Assistance to the Chairman's Office
9	UNDP/DGD/JDBF	a) Payment of Emolument of five staff in the Chairman's Office b) Payment of Emolument of ICT Consultant for three months c) Support for Mr. Gupta to share Indian experience with Voter Registration and other Departments
10	ECOWAS	a) Bridge Training Programme on Election Administration b) ECOWAS Election Observation Mission

Source: Abstracted from: INEC, *Report on 2011 General Elections*, pp.129-130

For the 2015 General Elections, the support provided for the elections from development partners amounted to N5, 207,260,433.55 or US\$31,559,154.14, at an exchange rate of N165:US\$.

Table II provides an overview of the range of support for the elections from the Development Partners for the 2015 general elections.

**Table II: Development Partners Funding for the 2015 General Elections**

S/N	Development Partner	Funds Provided (Naira)	Activity Supported	Remark
1	Ford Foundation	165,000,000.00	BPR and Voter Education	\$1 million @N165:US\$
2	UNDP/DGD	177,045,935.55	EMS and Training for Security Officials	\$1,073,005.67 @N165:US\$
3	OSIWA	N13,968,000.00	Prosecution of election offences and Gazette of Electoral Regulation	\$84,764.00 @N165:US\$
4	European Union through UNDP/DGD	1,525,129,488.00	Voter Education and Enlightenment	

## Country Study of Nigeria

5	International IDEA	41,980,000.00	Preventing Conflict and Electoral Violence	Euro 209,900.00@N 200:Euro
6.	UNDP/DGD	10,000.000.00	Sponsorship of pre-election and post-election workshops for Accredited Observers	
7	IFES	112,000,000.00	Training	
8	UNDP/DGD	2,896,118,940.00	Sponsorship of INEC Engagement with Relevant and Strategic Stakeholders, etc.	\$17,552,236 @N165: US\$.
9	MacArthur Foundation	264,000,000.00	Civic Education and Election Monitoring through Yar'Adua Centre	\$1,600,000 @ N165:US\$
TOTAL		N5,207,260,433.55		

*Source, INEC, 2015 General Elections Report, Annexure 20, p.230*

### **D. The Election Budget: Preparation, Procurement Process and Bureaucratic Politics**

In line with Section 81(1) of the 1999 Constitution, the Electoral; Act, 2010, Section 5(1) provides that INEC “submit to the Ministry of Finance in each financial year an estimate of its expenditure and income (including payments to the Independent Electoral Commission) during each succeeding year.” For purposes of accountability, the Act, Section 5(2) provides that “the Commission shall keep proper accounts and records in respect of each financial year and shall cause to be audited as soon as possible after the end of each financial year by the Auditor-General of the Federation.”

These provisions constitute part of the legal framework for INEC's preparation of its election budget. It involves submission of the budget to the Federal Ministry of Finance and to the National Assembly (the Senate and the House of Representatives) for debate and appropriation. For example, INEC 2011 election budget proposals were submitted in two tranches totaling N139, 193, 866,669 in preparation for the 2011 elections. The first tranche was in the 2010 Appropriation Act,



and in the 2010 Supplementary Appropriation Act, which included a supplementary election budget, earmarked for the conduct of a new voters' register, when the reconstituted INEC found the existing one unsatisfactory and compromised in a manner that would gravely undermine the integrity of the 2011 general elections. The second tranche was included in the 2011 appropriation. The election budget for the 2015 general elections covered the 2014 and 2015 financial years and amounted to N116,375,660,903.

But the legal framework for the preparation, approval and disbursement of INEC's election budget enmeshes the Commission in the bureaucratic politics of the wider national budgetary and appropriation processes. This is due to the fact that the election budget has to be defended before and, therefore, vetted by the Federal Ministry of Finance and thereafter incorporated into the estimates of the revenues and expenditures of the Federation for the following financial year and laid before the two houses of the National Assembly in each financial year for appropriation. In this way, the framework provides the opportunity for “indirect” interference in the activities of the Commission by the federal legislature and federal bureaucracy, especially in the areas of contract award, procurement, and timely release of funds for the election operations of INEC. Regarding contract award, Eme Awa, a former Chairman on the National Electoral Commission (NEC, 1987-1989), for example, complained of difficulties the NEC had with securing approval for its contract and procurement process because of the perception of relevant approving federal bureaucrats that “NEC was a gold mine to all those with a solid or precarious interest in 'mining' expected royalties to be paid to them.”<sup>11</sup> Abel Guobadia (INEC Chairman, 2000-2005) also, in referring to the deliberate use of bureaucratic red-tape to frustrate contract award and procurement of elections materials by the Commission, complained about a “pattern of parsimony and delay in the release of budgeted funds,”<sup>12</sup> while INEC's *Official Report on the 2007 General Elections* refers to “...difficulties...created in most cases by the Federal Ministry of Finance... the Central Bank...and the Bureau of Monitoring, Prices and Intelligence Unit.”<sup>13</sup>

However, there has been remarkable improvement in INEC's engagement with the wider national budgetary process over NEC's election budget. Since the observation in the Report of Nigeria's Election Reform Committee that, “generally the nation's electoral bodies have been poorly funded,”<sup>14</sup> there now seems to be a general appreciation within the executive branch and the legislature of the need to fund INEC adequately and grant it a considerable measure of financial and procurement

<sup>11</sup>Eme Awa, “Electoral Administration in the Early Administration,” quoted in Jinadu, “Nigeria,” p.134

<sup>12</sup>Abel I. Guobadia, Reflections of a Nigerian Electoral Umpire, Quoted in Jinadu, “Nigeria,” p.132

<sup>13</sup>Jinadu, “Nigeria,” pp.132-133

<sup>14</sup>Electoral Reform Committee (ERC), Report of the Electoral Reform Committee, Volume 1, Main Report, Abuja 2008, p.9



## Country Study of Nigeria

independence, that is consistent with the equally important need to emphasize accountability and transparency in its activities, including financial and procurement ones. The appreciation is partly the result of the aggressive and painstaking effort of INEC's leadership since 2011 to assume and pursue a transparent, inclusive and strategic planning approach to its mission and mandate as an electoral management body.

It is also not unrelated to unrelenting political pressures from pro-democracy forces in state and society within and outside the country to empower INEC to conduct credible elections, unencumbered by poor funding or deliberate funding starvation by forces within the executive branch and legislature bent on interfering unduly in or controlling its procurement activities. This appreciation is reflected in the amendment of the 1999 Constitution, providing for the recurrent expenditure and salaries of the Commission to be a direct charge on the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Federation<sup>15</sup>; and in the progressive alignment of INEC's procurement process with the country's procurement law and the exemption granted INEC to approach the country's Federal Executive Council directly for approval of budget for the procurement of sensitive security electoral materials, such as ballot papers and results sheets. Thus, Non-sensitive election materials, such as direct data capture machines were purchased by direct competitive procurement through OEMs, other non-sensitive election materials, including vehicles and various spare parts were procured through national competitive bidding, while ballot papers and result forms underwent security items procurement<sup>16</sup>

### E. Approved Election Budget, Released Funds & Major Line Items, Trends and Gaps:

#### Approved Election Budget: 2011 & 2015 General Elections

Table III provides the approved budget for each of the 2011 and 2015 general elections in Nigeria.

**Table III: Approved Election Budget: 2011 & 2015 General Elections**

S/N	Year	Election Cost (N)
1	2010(Main and Supplementary Provision) & 2011 Recurrent Provision	139,193,866,669.
2	2015	116,375,660,902

*Source: INEC Source, emailed to author, April 2018*

<sup>15</sup>Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (First Alteration Act, 2010), adding Subsection (3) to Section 81 and Subsection (8) to Section 84 of the 1999 Constitution.

<sup>16</sup>INEC, Report on the 2011 General Elections, p.11

The Table shows a decrease of N22, 818,205,765 (approx. US\$108,658,123) or (-) 16.4 per cent in the 2015 election budget from the 2011 election budget. The decrease is due probably to expenditure incurred in the purchase of direct data capture and related high technology machines to sanitize the voters' register in 201/2011, ahead of and to enhance integrity of the 2011 general elections, and which was not repurchased for the 2015 general elections. See Table VIII, Item 10 which shows a decrease of N55, 603,530,152 in the expenditure for Electoral Capital Projects, from the N60, 233,464,752 expended for the 2011 general elections in the country to N4, 629,934,600 expended for the 2015 general election, reflecting a decrease of 92.3 per cent. This also shows that the purchase of high technology can have a medium- to long-term potentially huge cost saving implication for future elections.

**Disaggregated Election Cost: 2011 & 2015 General Elections**

Table IV provides a summary of the budget line items, the approved budget and the actual amount/funds released for the 2011 general elections.<sup>17</sup>

**Table IV: Line Items in INEC Election Budget for the 2011 General Elections**

S/ N	DESCRIPTION	2010 APPROVED BUDGET ₦	2010 RELEASES ₦	2011 APPROVED BUDGET ₦	2011 RELEASES ₦	2011 TOTAL ₦
1	Publicity for the election	838,372,000	838,372,000	579,420,000	579,420,000	1,417,792,000-
2	Transportation/ DTA for election officers	6,449,262,000	6,449,262,000	559,193,902	559,193,902	7,008,455,902-
3	Hazards /Feeding allowance for election officers	2,314,781,807	2,314,781,807	5,157,855,992	5,157,855,992	7,472,637,799
4	Election monitoring & Security for election	1,066,500,000	1,066,500,000	231,952,500	231,952,500	1,298,452,500
5	Continuous Voters Registration exercise	16,706,997,100	16,706,997,100	9,162,810,244	9,162,810,244	25,869,807,344
6	Honoraria for election officers	9,918,621,000	9,918,621,000	3,821,373,801	3,821,373,801	13,739,994,801
7	Training of election officers	1,903,248,624	1,903,248,624	523,440,000	523,440,000	2,426,688,624-

<sup>17</sup>Election expenses are usually incurred in the year preceding the election. Therefore, the election budget appropriation typically crosscuts the two financial years (the year immediately preceding the election year and the election itself for each set of general elections. But it is not unusual to have supplementary election budget in a particular year, as happened with the 2011 general elections, when a supplementary election budget was appropriated in 2010 in view of the necessity to undertake new voters' registration.



## Country Study of Nigeria

8	Procurement of election materials	2,783,354,564	2,783,354,564	671,920,900	671,920,900	3,455,275,464
9	Ballot Box Ballot Papers for Election	9,552,515,250	9,552,515,250	127,799,100	127,799,100	9,680,314,350
10	Electoral Capital Projects	59,783,464,752	59,783,464,752	450,000,000	450,000,000	60,233,464,752
11	Result Forms /Transmission of Election Results	1,857,631,033	1,857,631,033	36,688,600	36,688,600	1,894,319,633
12	Monitoring of Political Parties activities	924,300,000	924,300,000	279,000,000	279,000,000	1,203,300,000
13	Litigation/legal books	212,445,000	212,445,000	2,407,500,000	2,407,500,000	2,619,945,000
14	Consultancy Recruitment			324,000,000	324,000,000	324,000,000
15	Operations, recalls and structural review	80,892,000	80,892,000	468,526,500	468,526,500	549,418,500
	TOTAL	114,392,385,130	114,392,385,130	24,801,481,539	24,801,481,539	139,193,866,670

Source: INEC Source, emailed to author, April 2018

The summary shows a total budget appropriation for the country's 2011 general elections, made up of N114,392,385,130 (for the 2010 budget appropriation) plus 24,801,481,539 (for the 2011 budget appropriation), to be N139,193,866,669. It is noteworthy that not only was the approved election budget fully released but also that all of it was spent, with no balances left or deficits incurred.

With a registered voters' list of 73,528,040 and an election cost of N139, 193,866,669 (approx. US\$662,827,936.15), the cost of the elections per registered voter in the country for the 2011 general elections was approx. N1893 or US\$9.

Table V provides a summary of the budget line items, the approved budget and the actual amount/funds released for each budget item for the 2015 general elections.

**Table V: Line Items in INEC Election Budget for the 2015 General Elections**

S/N	DESCRIPTION	2014 APPROVED BUDGET ₦	2014 RELEASES ₦	2015 APPROVED BUDGET ₦	2015 RELEASES ₦	2015 TOTAL ₦
1	Publicity for the election	2,961,000,000	2,961,000,000	1,747,977,587.57	1,747,977,587.57	4,708,977,587.5
2	Transportation/DT A for election personnel	7,936,000,000	7,936,000,000	2,528,089,600	2,528,089,600	-10,464,089,600
3	Feeding allowance for election officials	2,331,518,000	2,331,518,000	-	-	-2,331,518,000
4	Election monitoring /Security for election	1,250,000,000	1,250,000,000	750,000,000	750,000,000	-2,000,000,000
5	Continuous Voters Registration exercise	8,201,125,000	8,201,125,000	6,072,000,000	6,072,000,000	-14,273,125,000
6	Hazard allowance / Honoraria for Election officers	19,078,425,000	19,078,425,000	8,457,046,022.93	8,457,046,022.93	-27,535,471,023
7	Training of Election officers	5,680,000,000	5,680,000,000	750,000,000	750,000,000	6,430,000,000-
8	Procurement of electoral materials	7,131,712,600	7,131,712,600	633,650,600	633,650,600	-7,765,363,200
9	Ballot papers and Boxes for election	25,048,214,020	25,048,214,020	4,038,242,685.50	4,038,242,685.50	-29,086,456,706
10	Electoral capital projects	3,100,000,000	3,100,000,000	1,529,934,600	1,529,934,600	-4,629,934,600
11	Transmission of election results	500,000,000	500,000,000	255,725,186	255,725,186	755,725,186
12	Monitoring of political parties activities	360,000,000	360,000,000	435,000,000	435,000,000	795,000,000
13	Electoral service wide vote	2,000,000,000	2,000,000,000	500,000,000	500,000,000	-2,500,000,000
14	Legal services and Litigations	2,000,000,000	2,000,000,000	400,000,000	400,000,000	-2,500,000,000
15	Delimitation of Electoral constituencies	300,000,000	300,000,000	400,000,000	400,000,000	700,000,000
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>87,877,994,620</b>	<b>87,877,994,620</b>	<b>28,497,666,282</b>	<b>28,497,666,282</b>	<b>116,375,660 ,903</b>

Source: INEC Source, emailed April 2018





## Country Study of Nigeria

The summary shows a total budget appropriation for the country's 2015 general elections, made up of N87,877,994,620 (for the 2014 election budget appropriation) plus 28,497,666,282 (for the 2015 election budget appropriation) to be N116,375,660,902. It is noteworthy that not only was the approved election budget fully released but also that all of it was spent, with no balances left or deficits incurred, as what the case with the 2011 general elections..

With a registered voters' list of 68,833,476 and an election cost of N116, 375,660,902 (approx. US\$554,169,814), the cost of the elections per registered voter in the country for the 2015 general elections was approx. N1691 or US\$8 at the exchange rate of N210:US\$1, slightly down from the 2011 figure per registered voter of US\$8.5.

### **Comparative Cost of Election per Registered Voter: Nigeria and Eight Other African Countries**

Table VI gives a comparative cost of elections per registered/eligible voter in Nigeria and eight other African countries for their last general elections.

**Table VI: Comparative Cost of Election per Voter in Nigeria and Selected African Countries**<sup>18</sup>

Country	Year	Cost per Voter (US\$)
Cape Verde	2016	36.5
Democratic Republic of Congo	2011	44/9**
Ghana	2016	18
Guinea-Bissau	2014	11.2
Kenya	2017	25.40
Liberia	2017	15.3
Nigeria	2015	8.5
Rwanda	2017	1.01
Tanzania	2015	5.16
Uganda	2016	4

Source: Desk research by author

<sup>18</sup>These are rough estimates from various sources, including election management bodies for both voter registration and election cost figures. The estimates are indicative of calculations from both figures that are sometimes incomplete or contradictory or unreliable, even when provided by the election management bodies of the country and on official exchange and parallel market rates that vary daily, and local currencies that are not convertible directly from one country to another. This understandably raises questions about the value of these comparisons, other than for their indicative value.

\*\*Calculation based on a total US\$1, 400,000,000.00 cost of the election, made up of funding by the DRC Government, donor community and the operations of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in DRC (MONUC) for security, and 32,024,199 registered voters. But if the MONUC security expenses are excluded, the total cost of the country's 2011 elections, with the same number of registered voters, will be US\$19 per voter.

**Cost of 3 Top-Ranking Line Items: 2011 General Elections**

Table VII shows that, for the 2011 general elections the cost for each of the three top-ranking items was expended as follows:- (a) Electoral Capital Projects (N60,233,464,752); (b) Continuous Voters' Registration Exercise (N25,869,807,344); and Honoraria for Election Officers (N13,739,994,801). The cost of the three top-ranking items is N99, 843,266,897, i.e. 71.7 per cent of the total cost (N139, 193,866,670) of the 2011 general elections

**Table VII: 3 Top-Ranking Items by Cost: 2011 General Elections**

Line Item	Cost (Naira)
Electoral Capital Projects (Item 10)	60,233,464,752
Continuous Voters' Registration Exercise (Item 5)	25,869,807,344
Honoraria for Election Officers (Item 6)	13,739,994,801
Total	99,843,266,897

But if the expenditure on related items for the employment of ad hoc staff is aggregated (items 6, 3, 2, and 7 at a cost of N13,739,994,801, N7,472,637,799, N7,008,455,902, and N2,426,688,624, respectively, making for a total of N30,647,767,126), as in Table VIIA, it will account for the second highest single expenditure for the 2011 general elections.

**Table VIIA: Cost of Related Items for Employment of Ad Hoc Staff 2011 General Elections**

Line Item	Cost (Naira)
Honoraria for Election Officers (Item 3)	13,739,994,801
Hazard/Feeding Allowance for Election Officers (Item 3)	7,472,637,799
Transportation/DTA for Election Officers (Item 2)	7,008,455,902
Training of Election Officers (Item 7)	2,426,688,624
TOTAL	30,647,767,126

## Country Study of Nigeria

### **Cost of 3 Top-Ranking Line Items: 2015 General Elections**

For the 2015 general elections, Table VIII, shows that the highest cost in for the top three items in rank order was expended on:- (a) Ballot Box/Ballot Papers (N29,086,456,706); (b) Hazard Allowances/Honoraria for Election Officials (N27,535,471,023); and (c) Continuous Voters Registration Exercise (N14,273,125,000) . The cost of the three top-ranking items is N70,895,052,729 i.e. approx. 61 per cent of the total election cost (N116,375,660,903) of the country's 2015 general elections.

**Table VIII: 3 Top Ranking Line Items by Cost: 2015 General Elections**

Line Item	Cost (Naira)
Ballot Boxes/Ballot Papers for Elections (item 9)	29,086,456,706
Hazard Allowances/Honoraria for Election Officers (Item 6)	27,535,471,023
Continuous Voters' Registration Exercise (Item 5)	14,273,125,000
TOTAL	70,895,052,729

But if the expenditure on related items for the employment of ad hoc staff is aggregated (items 2, 3, 6, and 7 at a cost of N10,464,089,600, N2,331,518,000, N27,535,471,023, and N6,430,000,000, respectively, totaling N46,761,078,623), as in Table VIIIA, it will account for the highest expenditure for the 2015 general elections.

**Table VIIIA: Cost of Related Items for Employment of Ad Hoc Staff: 2015 General Elections**

Line Item	Cost (Naira)
Transportation/DTA for Election Officers (Item 2)	10,464,089,600
Feeding Allowance for Election Officers (Item3)	2,331,518,000
Hazard Allowance/Honoraria for Election Officers (item 6)	27,535,471,023
Training of Election Officers (Item 7)	6,430,000,000
TOTAL	46,761,078,623

**Comparative Cost of Similar Line Items: 2011 & 2012 General Elections**

Table IX provides a comparison of trends (increase and decrease) in expenditure on each of the selected lines items between the 2011 and 2015 general elections in Nigeria.

**Table IX: Comparative Cost of Similar Line Items: 2011 & 2015 Election Budgets**

S/ N	DESCRIPTION	2011 APPROVED BUDGET ₦	2015 APPROVED BUDGET ₦	Difference Between 2011 and 2015 Budget
1	Publicity for the Election	1,417,792,000	4,708,977,587.5	3,291,185,587.5
2	Transportation/ DTA for election officers	7,008,455,902	10,464,089,600	3,455,633,698
3	Hazards /Feeding allowance for election officers	7,472,637,799	2,331,518,000 (itemized as feeding allowance )	-5,141,119.799
4	Election monitoring & Security for election	1,298,452,500	2,000,000,000	-701,547,500
5	Continuous Voters Registration exercise	25,869,807,344	14,273,125,000	-11,596,682,344
6	Honoraria for Election officers	13,739,994,801	27,535,471,023 (itemized as hazard allowance/Honoraria for Election Officials)	13,795,476,222
7	Training of Election Officers	2,426,688,624	6,430,000,000	4,003,311,376
8	Procurement of Election materials	3,455,275,464	7,765,363,200	4,310,087,736
9	Ballot Box/Ballot Papers for Election	9,680,314,350	29,086,456,706	19,406,142,356
10	Electoral Capital Projects	60,233,464,752	4,629,934,600	-55,603,530,152
11	Result Forms /Transmission of Election Results	1,894,319,633	755,725,186 (Itemized as Transmission of Election Results)	-1,138,594,447
12	Monitoring of Political Parties Activities	1,203,300,000	95,000,000	-1,108,300,000
13	Litigation/Legal Books	2,619,945,000	2,500,000,000 (Itemized as Legal Services and Litigation)	-119,945,000

## Country Study of Nigeria

### Trends/Changes in Cost of Selected Line Items: 2011 & 2015 General Elections

Table X shows, other things being equal, a significant increase in the cost of each of the following line items between the 2011 and the 2015 general elections, with the highest increase of 232 per cent in the cost of publicity for the elections, followed by the cost of ballot box/ballot papers with an increase of 200.5 per cent.

**Table X: Trends/Changes in the Cost of Selected Line Items in 2011 & 2015 Election Budgets: Increase**

Item	Cost Increase (Naira)	Per Cent Change/Increase in Cost
Ballot Box/Ballot Papers (Item 9)	19, 406,142,356	200.5
Honoraria for Election Officials (Item 6)	13,795,476,222	100.4
Procurement of Election Materials (Item 8)	4,310,087,736	124.7
Training of Election Officials (Item 7)	4,003,311,376	165
Transportation /DTA for Election Officials (Item 2)	3,455,633,698	49.3
Publicity for the Election (Item 1)	3,291,185,587.5	232

Table XI shows, other things being equal, a major decrease in the cost of each of the following line items between the 2011 and the 2015 general elections, with the highest decrease of (-)92.3 per cent in the cost of capital projects for the elections, followed by the cost of monitoring political parties with a decrease of (-) 92 per cent.

**Table XI: Trends/Changes in the Cost of Selected Line Items in 2011 & 2015 Election Budgets: Decrease**

Item	Cost of Decrease (Naira)	Per Cent Change/Decrease in Cost
Electoral Capital Projects (Item 10)	55,603,530,152	-92.3
Continuous Voters' Registration (Item 5)	11,596,682,344	-44.8
Hazards/Feeding Allowance for Election Officials (Item 3)	5,141,119,799	-68.8
Result Forms/Transmission of Election Results (Item 11)	1,138,594,447	-60
Monitoring of Political Parties (Item 12)	1,108,300,000	-92



## **F. Cost of Elections and the Future of Democracy & Elections in Nigeria**

The findings and analysis of the cost of elections in Nigeria for the country's 2011 and 2015 general elections contained in the previous sections of this chapter draw on the election budgetary allocations and expenditures for each of the two elections.

No account was taken of the wider economic, political, and social costs of the elections, such as their effect on the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Also not taken into account are costs incurred through election-related activities by other agencies of government, the political parties, the private sector, and civil society organizations, in the year before and during each election year.

Although there is a decrease in the election cost for the 2015 general elections (N116,375,660,902) from the cost of the 2011 general elections (N139,193,866,669), as shown in Table III, one current projection of the cost of the 2019 general elections put it at N189,207,544,893.13,<sup>19</sup> indicating a projected increase of N72,831,883,991 or 62.3 per cent.

With an estimated 73 million registered voters, the projected cost per voter for the 2019 general elections in the country at the current official exchange rate of N360: US\$ is US\$7.

The major increase is projected to come from election technological cost ( N27, 503,970,680), notably the introduction of E-technology to transmit results to collation centres, the printing of at least 10 million more Permanent Voters' Cards (PVC) to cater for an estimated 80 million registered voters, up from the 68.3 million registered voters in 2015, the purchase of additional Smart Card Readers; and election administrative cost ( N22,660,887,887.50), including the costs of recruiting an additional 800,000 ad hoc staff and the related costs of deploying them for election-related activities, and the cost of conducting elections in the Federal Capital Territory that did not hold as part of the 2015 general elections, and a projected increase in the size of the ballot papers for the 2019 general elections, because of a projected rise in number of political parties from 29 in 2015 to 80 for the 2019 general elections.

(See Table XI for elaboration)

---

<sup>19</sup>INEC Source, email to author, April 2018

## Country Study of Nigeria

**Table XII: Nigeria's 2015 and 2019 General Elections in Comparative Perspective**

<u>Item</u>	<u>2015</u>	<u>2019</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Number of registered voters	68.3 million	80 million (est.)	Presently 75 million with the Continuous Voter Registration (CVR) still in progress. This means that at least 10 million more Permanent Voter's Cards (PVC) will be printed in addition to other requirements to cater for the voters such as additional Smart Card Readers.
Number of political parties	29	80 (est.)	Presently there are 68 registered political parties, but thirty-nine associations have passed initial assessment and asked to pay the registration fee. 9 out of the thirty-nine have already paid the fees. With this number of parties, the size of the ballot papers will be much more than in 2015
Constituencies to be filled	1,490	1,558	The FCT Area Council elections did not hold in 2015. There are 68 constituencies in the FCT elections.
Ad hoc staff	756,000	800,000	This is for ad hoc staff alone. However, the total, inclusive staffing requirement for the 2019 general elections is 1,381,995.
E-collation	No	Yes	E-collation, which will make it possible to transmit results to collation centres will be introduced for the 2019 general elections.

Source: Abstracted from INEC Source, email to author, April 2018

In view of the projected high integrity costs of election technology and election administration for the 2019 general elections, should the projected increase be a source of concern, despite the projected marginal drop in the cost per voter to US\$7 from US\$8.5 in 2015?

While it may raise concern in the short-term, the introduction of high technology should be viewed from the medium- to long-term as a worthwhile investment. Despite its high cost, the application of sophisticated technology to the conduct of elections by INEC in 2011 and 2015 has been a significant factor, along with the leadership factor and a transparent procurement process, such as competitive bidding and the timely release of funds collectively went a long way in assuring the electorate that their votes count, as a result of the relative security provided by the biometric data registration and smart card readers in the 2011 and 2015 general elections.<sup>20</sup> Flowing from this confidence-building role of high technology in the electoral process is a general sentiment that its use be routinized, including the introduction of e-voting, and on-line tabulation and transmission of results as an option to be considered.

Yet, this is neither to underestimate serious flaws that may emerge or that have appeared from the introduction, particularly the wholesale introduction of high technology in the election process nor to overlook the need to moderate and stagger its use on an experiential basis. The question to pose is, “How much of high technology, and at what cost?” Alternative options to high technology and other cost saving options in other areas, such as in the recruitment and honoraria for ad hoc staff, should be explored. Moreover, the development of an environment of good democratic governance, anchored on massive investment in human security will serve in the medium- to long-term to lower the cost of elections considerably. If the introduction of high technology contributes to such a development by enhancing electoral integrity, it will be a good investment.

## **G. Recommendations**

### **Financial Independence of INEC**

1. The Government of Nigeria and the country's Legislature introduce and enact legislation to strengthen the financial and operational independence of NEC, as follows:
  - (a) Reserve a per cent of the annual national budget for elections, as a charge on the consolidated revenue fund, deposited into an escrow account managed by NEC, but with strict accountability and transparency oversights, by a board of trustees of eminent Nigerians outside of the public bureaucracy, put in place.

---

<sup>20</sup>Jega, Election Management in Nigeria, p.7.



## Country Study of Nigeria

- (b) Give expedited consideration to, and approval of election budget and ensure timely release of funds from the approved to INEC.
- (c) Consider provision for special grants in the annual Appropriations Act for deposit into the INEC Trust Fund and encourage the private sector to provide grants for the Fund.

### **Strategic Planning, Capacity-Building/Enhancement & Streamlining of INEC**

2. INEC to initiate a process to reinvent and re-energize itself by pursuing the following action and/or initiatives:
  - (a) Continue to pursue and implement recommendations and policies flowing from the Report of the Technical Committee on Election Project Plan, 2015, especially as they relate to ensuring timely procurement, improving the internal INEC budgetary processes, ensuring effective change management in the Commission to keep abreast of, and keep on track on-going and future reforms in the Commission, and strengthening the capacity of the departments of the Commission, and notably the Directorate of Planning and Monitoring, and improvement in relations between INEC Headquarters and its field offices at the state and local government council levels. Doing all this will be cost effective.
  - (b) Continue to empower the Electoral Institute as the think tank of the Commission and constantly review its mandate, in light of the needs of the Commission, and strengthen synergies between it and the relevant departments in the Commission.
  - (c) Develop strategy to moderate and reduce the cost of high technology in election budget in the medium- to long-term and consider staggering its further use to reduce election costs.
  - (d) Develop strategy to reduce or moderate the cost of using ad hoc staff for election duties.
  - (e) Continue to build and make more durable bridges of trust and understanding between the Commission, the federal bureaucracy, the National Assembly, political parties and the civil society, as a cost saving measure, especially in the area of civic and voter education.

- (f) Explore importation of sensitive election materials from African countries that have a comparative and tested advantage in producing them.
- (g) Prepare and submit timeously the election budget for consideration by the Ministry of Finance and the Legislature.

### **ECONEC & ECOWAS**

1. ECONEC and through it ECOWAS should consider the following to help reduce election costs, borne by governments in the region:
  - (a) Deploy their power of moral suasion to encourage the Government of Nigeria take a proactive interest in helping to strengthen the independence of INEC, along the lines of the recommendations in this study.
  - (b) Consider the feasibility of ECOWAS member countries imposing an election tax on the private sector in the region, to be administered and used to defray election costs, as part of their corporate social responsibility and investment in the region's democracy and development.

The private sector stands to benefit from, and should invest in elections as mechanism for consolidating peace and stability in the region. Collective pressure and agreement at the REC level will send a powerful message to the private sector.





## COUNTRY STUDY OF SENEGAL

### A. Background

Unlike Dahomey, renamed Benin in 1975, the political history of Senegal has been marked by a longstanding political and institutional stability. Senegal is recognized as one of the rare countries of the sub-region that have not experienced unconstitutional change of government or a coup d'état. The political history of Senegal highlights two changeovers of political power: the first occurred in 2000 and the second 2012. Senegal has a long electoral tradition – the first elections date back to 1848 – and a strong electoral administration. This electoral administration hinges on a solid public administration, which has been able to take advantage of the political stability to improve in terms of performance and quality, compared to public administrations in other countries.

*“Senegal has experienced a long history in the field of elections. Over the years, the country has been able to propose an institutional architecture with a relatively appreciable level of performance, which helped to build on several achievements in electoral matters: organization of relatively smooth polls, compliance with international norms and standards, increased trivialization of changeovers... etc.”<sup>1</sup>*

Contrary to Benin in this case also, Senegal has a joint electoral administration. In fact, the electoral architecture of Senegal is mostly based on the sharing of roles between the General Directorate of Election (DGE) which is responsible for the substantive electoral operations, both in terms of preparation and implementation and the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENA) – established by law of 11 June 2005- which essentially has a control and supervision role over the electoral process. Aside the two major actors of the process, there is a series of other stakeholders that are links in the institutional electoral chain, including the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Communication, Ministry of the interior, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Finance, and the National Broadcasting Regulatory Council. It is worth mentioning the CENA replaced the National Elections Observatory which aimed at having some control over electoral operations.

### B. Structure, powers, functions and mandates of the EMB

The legal framework for elections in Senegal is governed by two major acts: Act 2017-12 of 18 January abrogating and replacing Act 2014-18 of 15 April on the Electoral Code for the legislative

<sup>1</sup>Study on the key individual determinants of abstention in Senegal, 2000 – 2016 Final Report June 2017



## Country Study of Senegal

part and Decree No. 2017-170 of 21 January 2017 abrogating and replacing Decree No 2014-514 of 16 April 2014 on the Electoral Code on the regulatory part.

As indicated earlier on, the electoral architecture of Senegal is marked by two key actors: The Ministry responsible for elections and the CENA. Article 1 of the Electoral Code clearly state that “the Ministry responsible for Elections, under the terms and conditions of this Code, shall be the competent authority in charge of the preparation and organization of electoral and referendum operations. As regards voting by Senegalese resident abroad, it is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which is the competent authority, working in conjunction with the Ministry responsible for Elections. Article L.2 specifies that the Ministry responsible for Elections shall manage the electoral lists and the general voters' register. The central state departments in conjunction with the administrative authorities, exercise the prerogatives stated above (article L3).

The CENA has a role quite different from that of its Benin counterpart. In fact, Senegal's CENA was established by Article L.4 which makes it “a permanent body with a legal personality and financial autonomy”. It “shall control and supervise all elections and referendums. It shall ensure, especially their proper material organization and provide the necessary corrective measures to any failures observed”.

The CENA enforces the electoral law to guarantee the transparency and genuineness of polls while making sure voters and candidates freely exercise their rights (Article L.5). According to the Code, “the CENA shall be involved at all stages of the design, organization, decision making and implementation, from the registration on the electoral register up to the provisional declaration of results”. After serving a formal notice, the CENA may go as far as taking “immediately binding decisions of injunction, rectification, relinquishment, and substitution within the framework of elections and referendums, notwithstanding its power to refer to the competent jurisdictions”, in case of non-compliance with the legislative and regulatory provisions on elections or referendums by and administrative authority (article L.6).

In Senegal, the CENA is made up of twelve (12) members appointed by decree. These persons are selected “following consultations with institutions, associations and agencies such as those of lawyers, academicians, human rights advocates, communication professionals or any other institution” (article L.7)

Members of the CENA are appointed for a term of six (06) years and a third of its membership is renewable every three (03) years. They are sworn in by the Constitutional Council (article L.20). The CENA is led by a chairperson assisted by two vice chairpersons and a Secretary General appointed by Decree.

### **C. Types and sources of funding of the EMB**

EMBs in Senegal have a single source of funding elections i.e. the national budget. Indeed, Senegal considers elections as an issue of absolute sovereignty and does not allow any external funding for the organization of elections. The only external funding that is accepted is funding that, at the initiative of donors, can be used for sensitization activities, but they cannot serve as substitute to funds allocated in the election budget. In other words, the election budget already makes provision for sensitization activities. However, noting prevents external partners to fund other sensitization activities during the elections considered. The funding of elections is both direct (costs associated with the electoral personnel expenses and purchase of electoral materials etc.) and indirect (media coverage through the provision of space in the public media for campaigns, press team for parliamentary and presidential candidates, daily broadcasting of the “campaign news”, team of security forces placed at the disposal of candidates etc.). In the specific case of parliamentary elections, it is worth specifying that only the leading candidates are accompanied by teams from public media houses. However, while private media organizations are free to follow candidates of their choice, the information balance must be observed and monitored by the National Broadcasting Regulatory Council (CNRA).

The exclusive financing of elections from national sources means that external influence will not be possible, a priori, in the organization and implementation of the electoral process. The sovereign financing of elections leads ipso facto to sovereignty in the organization and conduct of elections from upstream to downstream. The refusal of any external assistance in the organization of elections also has as implications for national stakeholders themselves additional responsibility to avoid easy criticisms. This is expected to ensure a better organization of the process due to the faster availability of the necessary funds to implement the electoral process.

### **D. Variable cost of elections (I): Legislative provisions/Overview**

Senegal has adopted, since 2011, a new system of public management known as results-based management, with the passing of the Organic Law No. 2011-15 of 8 July 2011 to transpose the UEMOA directive No.06/CM/UEMOA on the budget law into the Senegal's domestic laws. This



## Country Study of Senegal

new method of management resulted, among others, in the establishment a resource budget. However, the constraints of this method compelled the national authorities in 2016 to complement this new arrangement by developing and adopting a program-budget through the Organic Law 2016-34 of 10 December 2016 amending Organic Law 2011-15. In line with the implementation of the new complemented management standards, the DGE now prepares a multi-annual budget over a period of three years, taking into account the rule which provides that elections expenditures of year “N” are included in the budget of year N-1. Concretely, the budget for the 2019 presidential elections is not only already prepared but also many election expenditures planned for this purpose have already been incurred in the first half of 2018.

The election budget is approved by the Ministry of Finance following a budget conference. Each actor, stakeholder in the electoral process make submissions to the ministry during the conference. The ministry makes the necessary arbitrations, where necessary, seeking support and information from the Directorate General of Elections (Ministry responsible for elections). Once established, the election budget is then incorporated into the budget of the Ministry responsible for elections and presented to Parliament for adoption.

Based on the information gathered from the DGE, the conventional budget for a presidential election or even parliamentary elections in Senegal is outlined as follows:

**Table No 1: Distribution of election budget among stakeholders (conventional budget for presidential or parliamentary election)**

No	Institution	Amount	Remarks
1	Ministry of the Interior	6,000,000.000	
2	CENA	1,000,000.000	
3	Foreign Affairs	1,500,000.000	
4	Security	1,000,000.000	
5	CNRA	500,000.000	
6	Justice	500,000.000	
	Total	10,500,000.000	

Source: DGE / Senegal

The process seems quite participatory since each stakeholder is involved and when the need arises the Ministry of Finance may call for the services the Ministry responsible for Elections as already mentioned.

*In the particular case of the CENA, according to Article L.22 of the Electoral Code, “the CENA shall prepare its budget in conjunction with the competent state technical services and shall implement it in accordance with public accounting rules.*

*The appropriations required to run the CENA as well as its branches and fulfil its mission shall be distinctively stated in the general budget. They shall be authorized within the framework of the budget law. The corresponding appropriations shall be placed at the disposal of the CENA by the beginning of the financial year.*

*The CENA shall have an authorizing officer in the person of its Chairperson and an accountant appointed by the Minister of Finance”.*

**The procurement process is what prevails in public administration in Senegal and is as follows:**

- Launch of the tender process after the validation of tender documents by the Central Directorate of Public Procurement (DCMP),
- Opening of bids in public
- Provisional award to the lowest bidder,
- Final award after a favorable opinion from the DCMP
- Approval by the Director General of Elections, the Minister of the Interior or the Minister of Finance depending on the level of the contract price, and
- Registration of the contract before its implementation and payment.

Though it appears ordinary and therefore not specific to elections, the procurement process does seem to affect compliance with electoral timelines. At least two elements help to explain and understand the reason behind it.

The first reason is that some preparatory activities for the election are systematically implemented during the pre-election year. This process is greatly facilitated and required since the adoption and implementation of the program based budget and the three-year budgetary planning of related electoral expenditures. This helps to avoid special procedures dictated by emergency circumstances and deal, for that matter, with the higher and sometimes prohibitive cost that tend to be justified by the emergency. Some members of the CENA of Benin, for example, explained that they had to pay double the value for some purchases and deal with “blackmail” from some service providers due to





## Country Study of Senegal

the urgency with which they must fulfil orders for elections. Turning to Senegal, the second moderating factor is the legal obligation to put funds at the disposal of EMB by the beginning of the fiscal year. This involves the commitment of all funds. All these help in ensuring predictability and enable the EMG to have a free hand to operate, provided that this legal requirement is met. In addition, regarding the budget managed by the DGE, the fact that it is a state institution within the framework of a joint electoral architecture probably facilitate the process, including budget negotiations and the provision of funds. Finally, another significant factor is the longstanding electoral tradition in Senegal. Time may have contributed to the fine-tuning of the mechanisms described above which appears well oiled, even if there are some weaknesses that must be addressed.

### **E. Variable costs of elections (ii): Sources, processes and factors**

A priori, since the election budget is fully funded by the national budget as indicated earlier, there is no possibility for external influence on the process. At the national level, it is the socio-political actors that can influence the drafting of the budget by demanding, for example, additional transparency measures. By way of illustration, the country audited its electoral register at the beginning of 2018. This measure does not form part of the cost of 2019 elections. The audit was externally funded by the European Centre for Electoral Support (ECES). In other contexts, it could have been part of the election budget and increased the cost. In Benin, for instance, during many electoral processes, the longstanding mistrust among the stakeholders has led them to demand additional transparency measures. Sometimes, it is also the number of contestants, in case of a long list, that can be the source of increase in the elections budget. This was the case in Senegal during 2014 parliamentary election for which there was a record number of 47 lists.

The difficulties facing EMBs in Senegal especially in the disbursement of fund stems from the cumbersome administrative procedures and the fact that legal timeline for the release of funds are not always observed. Funds are not provided to the EMB on time. In its 2016 annual activity report, the CENA welcomed the fact that resources were provided on time, without any major difficulty, and the fruitful collaboration from the Ministry of Finance. “These transfers enabled the institution to fulfil its obligations in due course, especially with the referendum held on March 20, 2016”<sup>2</sup>.

*However, in its report on parliamentary elections held on 30 July 2017, the CENA highlighted “the difficulties encountered in mobilizing the electoral budget. In fact, despite the many correspondences addressed to the authorities concerned, the CENA received no information in this regard. However,*

---

<sup>2</sup>In the 2016 Annual Activity Report of the CENA, page 25

thanks to the diligence of some authorities of the MEF, especially the Director General in charge of Budget, the funds were released to the institution seven (7) days to the holding of the elections”. Better still, the CENA stressed that “In the face of such a tight schedule, the General Treasurer of the DGCPT showed diligence by settling immediately the amount stated above. In the absence of such diligence, the CENA’s participation in the elections would have been compromised”.<sup>3</sup>

**F. Variable costs of elections (iii): Key items of the election budget/analysis of trends and gaps**

Out of a total amount of CFAF 1, 000, 000, 000, received by the CENA, expenditures to the tune of de 911 107 980 F CFA were incurred. The breakdown by item and related amount is as follows:

**Table No 2: Details on electoral expenditures**

No.	Type of expenditure	Amount
1	Purchase of stamps for controllers	62 433 800
2	Procurement of office equipment and supplies	26 685 700
3	Badges for controllers and supervisors	14 991 700
4	Dispatch of documents abroad	3 372 600
5	DECENA expenditures (mission allowances and expenses ...)	112 623 980
6	CEDA expenditures (allowances, hiring of vehicles, training, miscellaneous expenses	691 000 200
TOTAL		911 107 980

*NB: Expenditures on the preparatory phase such as registration on the electoral register are not covered in the table above.*

*Source: CENA – Report on the parliamentary elections held on 30 July 2017, page 63.*

Regarding the DGE, the budget includes items such as electoral materials, ballot papers, logistics, electoral personnel, fees for the management of the electoral personnel... The most expensive item is the ballot papers. Surprising as it may seem, Senegal has so far used multiple ballot papers. The DGE confirmed that the 2014 parliamentary elections were particularly costly due to the increase in list of contestants (47lists) and explained it through a simple calculation. It is just a matter of multiplying each list by 7 million ballot papers, this gives 400 million ballot papers to be printed. As

<sup>3</sup>In the Report of parliamentary elections held on 30 July 2017, page 62.



## Country Study of Senegal

such, the cost of printing these ballot papers rose to over CFAF 5 billion, representing almost the entire ordinarily allocated to the DGE for the parliamentary elections. Finally, the share of the DGE for the election was 9 billion and the overall budget for the said elections stood at about 16 billion.

### **The DGE elections budget covers items such as:**

- Ballot papers and other electoral documents,
- Indirect costs (communication and training), and
- Electoral equipment.

### **The electoral budget is structured around four (4) points:**

- Revision of the electoral register
- Training,
- Communication and sensitization, and
- Material organization of elections.

### **Regarding the weight of the various items, the budget reveals that the most expensive headings are:**

- Ballot papers,
- Allowances for the part-time personnel, and
- Allocations to administrative authorities...

Fixed costs, which are mainly personnel expenses, do not affect the DGE's budget.

### **G. Variable costs of elections (iv): Opportunities, problems and challenges**

- The costs of elections are high, but it would not be fair to attribute it solely to the EMBs. As can be observed, there are at least five institutional actors in addition to the EMBS in Senegal. At this point, it is appropriate to raise questions about the relevance each of the components of the electoral chain, the related costs and the possibility of finding alternative solutions.
- Budgeting for the cost of elections on a timely basis, providing resources within the prescribed timelines and organizing the necessary expenditures on time (in the pre-electoral year, for example) help to reduce and obviously contain the cost of elections. This would not be the case, if the same operations are carried at the last hour.

- In the case of Senegal, the issue concerning the type of ballot paper (single or multiple ballot paper) needs to be seriously examined. It should be a more practical and less costly solution even in case of increased numbers of candidates. In addition, Senegal has the advantage of providing in advance the funds of the election budget. These two factors (single ballot and election expenses in pre-electoral year) should enable the country to avoid the blackmail of service providers and secure better proposals than the CENA of Benin, for example, that operates almost systematically in an emergency mode.
- Both Senegal and Benin seem to lack a specific mechanism to coordinate the preparation of the electoral budget. Each component of the chain directly negotiates its budget with the Minister of Finance. With the introduction of program budget, all elections expenditures are now grouped under a program entitled “electoral processes”. Allocations to other institutional actors within the electoral process go through the DGA, aside the budget allocation to the CENA. It is the DGE that receives the allocations for redistribution to each of them and this ends it all. In Benin also, there is no specific arrangement that facilitates information feedback in a way as to have a clearer view of the effective utilization of the budget by each of the actors concerned, though there are some nuances. In fact, allocations to other actors are justified before the DGE only when they are released in cash. However, when this involves the delegation of appropriations, justifications are provided before the Regional Financial Controller (RFC). In sum, like the case of Benin, each actor taken individually can state how it compiled its budget. But no institutions can talk for the others.

Thus, the finding is the same as in the previous case. Beyond the provisional costs, the concrete and exact assessment of the cost of elections remains complex and difficult. Again, while it is appropriate to commend the availability and genuine cooperation of many actors at various level of the electoral chain which enabled us to gather information, it must be stressed that the search for information on the real cost of elections is met with some kind of law of silence, a silence loaded with undertones akin to a denial of transparency as far as the actual electoral expenditures and sharing of documents with figures are concerned. Outside these key elements, the actors concerned are vocal on the other aspects.

## Country Study of Senegal

**Table No. 3: Summary of budget estimates and expenses for the 2017 parliamentary elections**

N°	INSTITUTIONS	ALLOCATIONS FOR 2017 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS	2017 EXPENDITURES
1	Ministry of the Interior	CFA F 11,312,466,226	CFA F 11.312.476.113F CFA
2	CENA	1,000,000,000	911, 107, 980
3	Foreign Affairs	Unavailable	Unavailable
4	Security	Unavailable	Unavailable
5	CNRA	Unavailable	Unavailable
6	Judiciary	Unavailable	Unavailable
	TOTAL		

Sources: DGE and CENA

**Table No. 4: Trends in the cost of elections for DGE in Senegal (last three elections)**

N°	Election(s)	Year	Total allocation (all institutions included)	Expenditures	Remarks
1	Presidential	2000	Unavailable	Unavailable	
2		2007	13,900,000,000	See remarks	The budget of e 13.900.000.000 covered three polls in 2007: first and second round of presidential elections and parliamentary elections
3		2012	6,758,162,300	6,756,369,080	
4	Parliamentary	2007			
5		2012	3,700,000,000	3,700,000,000	
6		2017	11,312,466,226	11,312,476,113	



## H. Key findings

- A significant part of the electoral budget and expenditures are not incurred by the CENA or the DGE but other actors in the electoral process. In Senegal, aside the DGE and CENA, virtually half the budget is spent almost systematically by the other institutional actors (CRNA, Foreign Affairs, Security, Judiciary).
- In Senegal, the elections budget is relatively stable and varies between CFAF 10 and 11 billion. As pointed out earlier, the only case of overrun of this limit was observed during the 2014 parliamentary elections due to unprecedented number of candidates and the use of multiple ballot papers. That year, the elections cost nearly 16 billion! There are good reasons to believe that if Senegal finally choses a single ballot, the cost of election should reduce.
- The large share of electoral personnel expenses in the electoral budget: this is due to the multiplicity of actors and the bid to ensure transparency, among others.
- The lack of a binding mechanism to ensure accountability in the use electoral funds by the ministries and other bodies involved in the elections: As in the case of Benin, the *laissez-faire* observed among stakeholders in the electoral process (excluding the EMB), which is reflected in the fact that the said stakeholders are not held accountable for electoral expenditures, does not contribute neither to the required transparency in the said expenditures nor the control of elections cost. Indeed, it is difficult to have an accurate idea, and worst till, obtain budget documents relating to the actual execution of the budget received by these stakeholders after elections. The practice is therefore, unfortunately, a complete freedom in the management of funds without an obligation to account for them from one election to the other. To this accountability must be added a systematic post-electoral audit of the funds received and used by all stakeholders in the electoral process during an election.
- The non-inclusion of indirect funds into the electoral budget: some non-financial contributions from the State do not appear in the election budget lines (provision of vehicles and premises). However, these contributions have significant financial cost that must be incorporated into the elections budget to have a realistic overall cost of elections.



## Country Study of Senegal

### I. Recommendations

- An objective assessment of the cost of elections in Africa call for the inclusion of elements that are not considered in the budget lines but affect the overall cost of elections, including the depreciation of various equipment. To this end, all indirect contributions from State or non-state sources must be compiled, quantified or assessed to determine their exact cost. This will provide as closely as possible the real cost of elections.
- The rationalization of electoral budgets necessarily entails the anticipation, timely implementation and compliance with legal procedures in terms of procurement. In fact, to avoid overruns, it is preferable and more appropriate that some preparatory activities and, for that matter, some expenditures are executed in the pre-electoral year. This is already the case in Senegal where the budget is prepared well in advance as part of a three-year strategic planning. This should be pursued and improved in Senegal and encouraged and replicated in the other countries. Procurement made according to regular procedures and without pressure will be at the normal cost and will contribute to the reduction of the overall cost of elections.
- Provide, in accordance with the law, resources for electoral expenditures within the prescribed timelines, at the beginning of the budget year.
- Coordinate, in practice, compare budget items and lines of the various bodies and institutions involved in the organization of elections to avoid the replication of similar activities and parallel expenditures.
- Encourage resolutely the construction of storage and maintenance sites of electoral materials as envisaged by the DGE and deal with the necessary investments.
- Set as principle and require any body or institutions that has benefited from public electoral funds to produce and publish budget execution reports for the said funds back by supporting documents.
- Conduct on a systematic basis audits of institutions that have received public funds for electoral expenditure; publish the related audit reports.



**COST OF ELECTIONS IN THE ECOWAS REGION**  
COUNTRY STUDY OF BENIN REPUBLIC, CAPE VERDE, GUINEA BISSAU,  
LIBERIA, NIGERIA & SENEGAL

- Strongly encourage ECOWAS countries to fully fund their elections as part of respecting their sovereignty.
- Conduct, at the national level, reflections on the harmonization of measures aimed at financially taking care of all support staff employed by institutions responsible for the electoral process.



## **APPENDICES: ELECTION BUDGET MATRICES**

The Matrices in Appendix I and Appendix II are indicative of the main line items and the major disaggregated or sub-main line items of the election budgets in the six country studies.

How the main lines items are designated differ from country to country but they refer to and describe essentially the same set of major activities central to the conduct of general [presidential and parliamentary] elections in each country: Voter Registration, and Elections, as outlined in Appendix I.

Appendix II provides an overview of the major disaggregated or sub-line items for each main line item that recur in the election budgets in the six countries, although the actual designation of each disaggregated or sub- line item may differ across electoral cycles across and within each country.

The matrices should provide a comparative overview of the cost of elections over election cycles within and across each country. They should help highlight cost trends that indicate which main line items and disaggregated main line items consume the most cost, and, perhaps, where savings can be made or are difficult to make.

The trends highlighted as part of the findings of the country studies provide the basis for the recommendations summarized in Appendix III for reduction in the cost of elections

### **APPENDIX I: MATRIX FOR ELECTION COST ANALYSIS (MAIN LINE ITEMS)**

Main Line Items	Proposed Budget	Approved Budget	Actual Released	Actual Spent	Deficit/Surplus
Voter Registration					
Elections (including Referendum/Presidential Re-Runs, where applicable in the election cycle)					
External/Technical Assistance					

**APPENDIX II:  
 MATRIX FOR ELECTION COST ANALYSIS  
 (DISAGGREGATED MAIN LINE ITEMS)**

Disaggregated Line Items	Proposed Budget	Approved Budget	Actual Released	Actual Spent	% of Actual Spent over Actual Released	Deficit/Surplus
VOTER REGISTRATION						
a) Registration Personnel (Temp)						
-honorarium						
--Daily Transport and Feeding Allowance						
--Hazard Allowance/Insurance						
b) Voter Registration Materials and kits						
c) Registration Logistics & Related Activities: Transport, Office Rentals, etc.						
d) Voter Education: Voter Registration						
e) Voter Registration travel and overtime allowance for permanent staff						
f) Payments to Other Agencies (e.g. security services/police for Voter Registration Support Activities						
g) Continuous Voter Registration						



## Country Study of Senegal

<p>ELECTIONS</p> <p>a) Personnel (Temp) -honorarium --Daily Transport and Feeding Allowance --Hazard Allowance/Insurance</p> <p>b) Election Materials, including Equipment and Kits</p> <p>c) Elections Logistics &amp; Related Activities: Transport, Office Rentals, etc.</p> <p>d) Voter Education: Elections</p> <p>e) Elections Travel and Overtime Allowance for Permanent Staff</p> <p>f) Payments to Other Agencies (e.g. security services/police) for Election Support Activities</p> <p>g) Elections Grants to political Parties</p>						
---	--	--	--	--	--	--

## **APPENDIX III: ELECTION COST REDUCTION RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **The National Government**

1. Adopt a three-year election rolling plan for the election-budget, passed three-years before the general elections, with twice-yearly releases and disbursement in January and June of each of the two years before the elections.
2. Enact law that provides exemption from the provisions of the national procurement laws for the procurement by EMBs of sensitive security election materials, such as ballot papers and results forms, under specified conditions, such as approval by the country's President or national cabinet.
3. Encourage the coordination and integration of the budget line items of the different bodies and institutions involved in the administration and management of elections, in countries with more than one EMB, to avoid duplication of similar activities and parallel spending.
4. Hold all elections simultaneously, where feasible, on the same day or closely following each other.

### **EMBs**

1. Prepare and submit timeously the election budget for consideration, by statutorily designated public authorities, as provided in national constitutions and relevant national legislation.
2. Strengthen its internal mechanisms by plugging and constraining leakages and rent-seeking activities in its procurement activities.
3. Initiate or continue processes to reinvent and re-energize itself by pursuing the following action and/or initiatives:
  - (a). Partner with the relevant stakeholders to undertake a five- to seven- year Strategic Planning, to rationalize its activities; envision futures scenarios, build and enhance capacity, especially in critical financial management, logistics and ICT areas through research and training; trim waste, undertake a management audit to avoid duplication of activities and its departments;



## Country Study of Senegal

decentralize its operations, particularly those relating to contract award, procurement of election materials, and the recruitment of ad hoc staff at lower levels, such as the centrally deployment of staff and election materials from its headquarters field offices.

- (b) Establish an in-house think tank for applied comparative policy research on trends in West African regional and African continentally electoral and political behavior that can help the EMB adopt and implement cost saving strategies in planning for elections, especially related to the high technology and integrity costs of elections.
- (c) Carry out regular, and especially post-election audit of election materials and resources, laying emphasis on avoiding theft and wastage, especially by identifying and taking measures for the safe storage of re-usable election materials, in order to save on the replacement cost of procuring them every election year.
- (d) Pursue on-going efforts, or begin, to integrate its voter registration exercise into the country's national identity card program. If the National ID card is yet to take off firmly or there are problems with effecting the integration in the short-term, explore the cost/benefit implications of gradually introducing biometric data registration, using direct data capture or other credible options to replace the current wholesale voter registration exercise before every election, with continuous voter registration.
- (e) Embark on or strengthen on-going confidence-building outreach to political parties and civil society. Poor relations with the two critical stakeholder often can, and often add to the cost of elections.
- (f) Explore, using the instrumentality provided by ECONEC, election cost-saving strategies, such as the importation of electoral materials from ECOWAS member states, and elsewhere in Africa, from countries that have comparative advantage in the production of election materials.